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Abstract
This thesis contributes to three important topics on the conduct of fiscal policy. First,
although the positive effects of fiscal policy on the aggregate economy are often dis-
cussed, the literature frequently omits a normative analysis and, moreover, fails to con-
sider political frictions to policy: something frequently observed in fiscal policy debates.
This thesis attempts to address these omissions through constructing New Keynesian
‘dynamic stochastic general equilibrium’ (DSGE) models with heterogeneous agents.
Exogenous shocks are shown to impact households differently and in polarizing ways,
and the results imply that there is a normative justification for countercyclical fiscal
policy, but on redistributive rather than aggregate grounds; austerity is observed to
have the biggest impact on those agents who do not engage in capital markets, unless
targeted on raising production taxes. Second, DSGE models frequently fail to repli-
cate the empirical regularity that private consumption crowds in fiscal stimuli. This
thesis overcomes this anomaly through combining the assumptions of external habit
persistence and credit-constrained households, both of which are frequently used in the
literature, but often in isolation of one another. External habit persistence creates an
interaction between the heterogeneous agents whereby the consumption of one impacts
the future preferences of others, and in so doing, introduces herding behaviour into
an otherwise standard DSGE model. Finally, there is widespread evidence that pro-
cyclical fiscal policies have been prevalent in developing countries and often in some
industrial nations. It is therefore surprising that, in contrast to the wealth of studies
on the sources of such policy, potential consequences have been largely ignored in the
existing literature. This thesis empirically estimates that fiscally procyclical countries
have lower rates of economic growth and higher rates of output volatility and inflation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The 2008 financial crisis and subsequent global economic downturn has renewed politi-
cal and academic debates on the conduct of fiscal policy. These debates have manifested
themselves both domestically and internationally as world leaders looked to coordinate
policy actions. The April 2009 G20 Summit resulted in an announcement of a combined
global stimulus package in excess of $5 trillion as collective wisdom saw such measures as
necessary to combat depressed demand. However, this response led to subsequent fears
over sovereign debt as ‘fiscal responsibility’ and ‘consolidation’ became the widespread
political rhetoric.
Despite the initial resurgence and return to fiscal policy, there is still much doubt and
debate as to whether such policy has the desired effects. These debates are not a
new phenomenon, are often highly contested, and in recent years have fallen under
the category of ‘austerity versus stimulus’ debates, commonly seen throughout Europe.
This thesis seeks to contribute to the academic literature on the conduct of fiscal policy,
discussing topics on it’s empirical and theoretical effectiveness and on its associated
redistributive consequences.
Much of the recent literature has focused on the impact of policy on the aggregate
economy, typically focusing on the government spending multiplier, empirical estimates
for which are often observed to be greater than one (see for example Blanchard and
Perotti; 2002).1 However traditional New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium (DSGE) models fail to predict this and much of the theoretical literature has
aimed to rectify this anomaly: see for example Linnemann and Schabert (2003), Co-
enen and Straub (2005), Linnemann (2006), Gal´ı et al. (2007) and Monacelli and Perotti
(2008). The experience of the recent downturn combined with low central bank rates
1However it should be noted that empirical results do vary with estimates below one; see for example
Ramey (2011) and Ilzetzki et al. (2013).
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has prompted a discussion on the impact of fiscal policy when the nominal interest
rate is at the zero lower bound, see for example Christiano et al. (2011), Eggertsson
(2011), Hall (2011), and Woodford (2011), where again the focus is the positive im-
pact of policy on the aggregate economy. The fiscal-DSGE literature currently has two
key omissions: first, through focusing on the positive properties of policy the analysis
is lacking a comprehensive consideration of the normative consequences; and second,
through focusing on aggregate dynamics and using the often assumed representative
agent, the analysis abstracts away from any heterogeneity of the impacts of fiscal policy.
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of this thesis seek to address these omissions through constructing
a small scale New Keynesian DSGE model with a proportion of credit-constrained
agents. Although this segregation between agents is crude, splitting between those
who have access to credit (Ricardian agents) and those who do not (non-Ricardian, or
‘rule-of-thumb’, agents), it is reflective of typical fiscal debates where two clear camps
are frequently observed. Moreover, the increasing presence of DSGE models which also
make this distinction, including in policy institutions, allows the procedures developed
here to be directly incorporated into the existing literature.
This question is first addressed in Chapter 3 in a model which abstracts from fiscal
policy. This is performed to provide a robust analysis of the transmission mechanisms
involved and results are obtained through deriving algebraic properties in general equi-
librium, dynamic simulations of the model and through observing welfare movements
through the evaluation of a second order Taylor series expansion of the heterogeneous
households homogeneous utility function. In the presence of recessionary shocks, non-
Ricardian households increase their supply of labour, above that which would prevail
were they to be able to borrow, in order to increase their disposable income and in-
sulate themselves from the impact of the shock. In general equilibrium this increases
employment and output, however non-Ricardian households are unable to purchase
all the additional production as their increased labour supply results in a fall in real
wages. The surplus is consumed by Ricardian households who are observed to both
consume more and work less than their non-Ricardian neighbours in the presence of
recessionary shocks and moreover, consume more and work less than if they were in
a fully Ricardian economy; the credit-constrained agents are seen to insulate both the
unconstrained and the economy more broadly. In the presence of a shock causing a
fall in output, non-Ricardian households are seen to lose welfare whereas Ricardian
households can gain welfare, given a sufficient weight of credit-constrained agents.
When stabilising fiscal policy is incorporated in the economy in Chapter 4, it is found
that countercyclical policy is to the benefit of the rule-of-thumb agents as it smooths the
business cycle and removes some of the costs of not having access to credit. However,
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countercyclical policy is to the detriment of Ricardian households, both in the presence
of recessions and more broadly over the business cycle, as the insulating impact of the
responsive labour supply of non-Ricardian households is more effective than govern-
ment intervention. This results in a conflict of preferences over the conduct of fiscal
policy between the heterogeneous agents. Further, non-Ricardian households prefer
policy which is debt financed and reversed over a long time horizon, whereas Ricardian
households prefer prompt repayment of any initial stimulus. There is a normative justi-
fication for countercyclical fiscal measures, however the quantitative aggregate gains of
stabilisation policy are minimal. The main normative justification comes from the re-
distributional consequences of countercyclical policy, reducing the inequality of shocks.
The gains from policy of the rule-of-thumb agents are (nearly) matched by the losses
of the Ricardian agents; in many respects, the conduct of fiscal policy is performed in
a de-facto zero sum game which is the source of the polarized preferences in the model.
The results in Chapter 4 further suggest that preferences become more polarized be-
tween the two agents when fiscal policy is conducted at the monetary zero lower bound:
when nominal interest rates are at, or close to, zero.
Chapter 5 further extends this analysis by considering the positive, normative and in-
come distribution effects of austerity in a medium scale New Keynesian DSGE model
including nominal rigidities in price and wage setting, real frictions of adjustment costs
and monopolistic competition, and distortionary taxation on labour, capital and con-
sumption. The resulting model provides nine separate fiscal instruments in which to
comprehensively explore the redistributive impact of specific policy packages. Austerity
is found to have a range of positive and normative effects, depending on the speed and
composition of consolidation. A trade off emerges between the efficiency and equity of
austerity, with policies focusing on government spending reductions having the smallest
impact on output, average incomes and welfare, but having the greatest impact on the
distribution of incomes and welfare. Tax based austerity, on the other hand, tends to
be more detrimental to both output, income and welfare, but in a more equitable way.
These impacts (when considering the lifetime of the fiscal consolidation) are sensitive
to the composition of austerity but are largely unaffected by its speed. Chapter 5 also
examines the implications of some recent consolidation packages enacted by developed
countries, through applying data obtained from IMF Fiscal Monitors (IMF, 2013 &
2014).
As mentioned above, traditional New Keynesian DSGE models frequently fail to repli-
cate the typical empirical result that private consumption crowds in fiscal stimuli ei-
ther through government spending increases or tax cuts. Papers such as Gal´ı et al.
(2007) and Monacelli and Perotti (2008) have induced positive comovements between
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public and private consumption by introducing credit-constrained households and com-
plementary preferences between consumption and work respectively, however the latter
maintains Ricardian equivalence and the former is criticised for the level of imperfection
required to obtain this comovement. Chapter 6 illustrates that empirically appropriate
theoretical fiscal multipliers can be obtained at reasonable parameter values by combin-
ing the modelling assumptions of external habit persistence and rule-of-thumb agents.
These assumptions are frequently used in the literature, but often in isolation of one
another, where their inclusion is introduced to allow theoretical models to better match
empirical data. Habit persistence imposes a weight in the utility function such that
agents obtain disutility from movements away from the previous period’s average level
of consumption: for this reason it has also been labelled ‘catching up with the Joneses’.
However, the concept of catching up with others is trivial when combined with the rep-
resentative agent assumption. Through introducing heterogeneity across the actions of
households through including rule-of-thumb consumers, the combination of these two
modelling assumptions provides compelling results, particularly with respect to fiscal
policy.
The inclusion of both heterogeneous agents and habit persistence can have significant
long run consequences on the effectiveness of fiscal policy. Not only do these factors im-
pact the results individually, there is also an intuitive relationship whereby they work in
union such that the feedback process of one is amplified by the other. In effect, through
introducing an empirically appropriate interaction between heterogeneous agents, only
a small proportion of individuals who behave differently from the perceived optimal
approach are required in order to produce a larger aggregate impact than when this
interaction is not present: there is a contagion of private spending as one type of house-
hold attempts to ‘keep up with’ the other. In this respect, the combination of these
two modelling assumptions is imposing a form of herding behaviour or ‘animal spirits’
on the model.
Finally, Chapter 7 conducts an empirical study on the consequences of procyclical fiscal
policy. There is widespread evidence that fiscal policy has been procyclical (expansion-
ary in good times and contractionary in bad) in many developing and emerging market
countries, and frequently in developed nations (see for example Gavin and Perotti; 1997;
Kaminsky et al.; 2004; Talvi and Ve´gh; 2005; Woo; 2009). However, despite the wealth
of literature discussing potential causes of such behaviour there is limited discussion on
the consequences to the macroeconomy: it is implicit in the analysis that procyclical
policy is undesirable. Through constructing a dataset consisting of 114 countries be-
tween 1950 and 2010, Chapter 7 presents evidence to suggest that fiscally procyclical
countries have lower rates of economic growth, higher rates of output volatility, and
higher rates of inflation.
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For the purposes of brevity, Chapter 2 derives a New Keynesian DSGE model with a
proportion of credit-constrained agents. This model is used in both Chapters 3 and 4
and is the base for the model applied in Chapter 6. Chapter 2 also includes a discus-
sion on the empirical literature identifying rule-of-thumb consumption behaviour, and
discusses properties of the model which will be important for the analysis performed.
Chapter 8 concludes.
Chapter 2
A DSGE model with
credit-constrained agents
2.1 Introduction
This chapter derives and discusses the properties of a New Keynesian dynamic stochas-
tic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with a proportion of credit-constrained agents:
this model forms the skeleton for the remaining theoretical chapters of this thesis. This
builds upon the recent research using non-Ricardian (or rule-of-thumb) agents who are
assumed not to have access to credit and therefore consume ‘hand-to-mouth’ by spend-
ing their disposable income each period. This assumption means that these agents
cannot smooth their consumption (unlike traditional Ricardian agents who follow the
permanent income hypothesis) and their inclusion in models is as a result of the empir-
ical observation that for many individuals their spending closely tracks their income:
see Section 2.2 for a further discussion on this empirical literature. The justification for
the inclusion of rule-of-thumb households in DSGE models is supported by the observa-
tion that these models better match empirical data: see for example Gal´ı et al. (2007),
Andre´s et al. (2008), Graham (2008), Furlanetto and Seneca (2009, 2012) and Bosca´
et al. (2011). This improvement in performance has led to rule-of-thumb consumers
appearing in many central banks and policy institutions DSGE models.1
The model derived is similar to those of Gal´ı et al. (2007) and Bilbiie (2008). Compared
to the former this model abstracts from physical capital accumulation, and compared
1Institutions that use such households include the European Central Bank (NAWM), the European
Commission (QUEST III), the Federal Reserve Board (SIGMA) and the International Monetary Fund
(GIMF).
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to the latter it abstracts from fixed costs to production. Moreover, this model is dif-
ferentiated from Bilbiie (2008) by allowing rule-of-thumb households to control their
labour supply in order to optimise in any given time period. These abstractions allow
the algebraic properties of the resulting small scale DSGE model to be explored. Incor-
porating rule-of-thumb agents into an otherwise standard model imports many unique
features which are discussed in this chapter. Moreover, including heterogeneity in the
actions of households allows for these different households to respond differently to ex-
ogenous shocks and subsequently have different preferences over policy interventions.
This is a theme which will be explored throughout this thesis.
The chapter proceeds in the following way: Section 2.2 discusses the empirical literature
on the observation of rule-of-thumb consumption behaviour. Section 2.3 derives a model
with a proportion of credit-constrained agents and Section 2.4 discusses the properties
of such a model. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Empirical results on non-Ricardian households
This section reviews the empirical literature on the argument that a proportion of
individuals behave in a non-Ricardian, or rule-of-thumb, manner. These agents are
identified as departing from the predictions of the permanent income hypothesis, having
a high degree of dependence on current disposable income for their current levels of
consumption. This literature is vast and uses a variety of techniques and data to not
only attempt to quantify the prevalence of such behaviour but also seek to identify the
reasons for such activity.
2.2.1 Empirical identification of non-Ricardian behaviour
If the economy consists of entirely forward looking rational agents then, under rea-
sonable assumptions, Hall (1978) shows that this would lead aggregate consumption
(Ct) to follow a random walk; the difference in consumption today from yesterday is
generated only from shocks received today about future income:2
∆Ct = t
where t is new information received in period t. This Euler equation approach is a
direct way to test the predictions of the permanent income hypothesis and is a method
2Specifically, the result requires the conditions that utility is quadratic and movements in marginal
utility are small.
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that has been commonly applied to the data. When it is applied, however, it is often
found that the predictions of the theory are rejected and that current information can
predict future levels of consumption; see for example Hall (1978), Flavin (1981), Hall
and Mishkin (1982) and Evans (1993).
To reconcile this anomaly Campbell and Mankiw (1989) modified this approach by
nesting within the model the hypothesis that although a fraction (1−λ) of total income
(Yt) accrues to these forward looking rational agents, the remaining fraction (λ) accrues
to agents who consume wholly and directly out of this income: consume ‘hand-to-
mouth’.3 This nested model is represented algebraically:
∆Ct = λ∆Yt + (1− λ)t (2.1)
where equation (2.1) can be estimated using instrumental variables, where current in-
come is instrumented because it is likely to be correlated with t.
4 This specification
allows for a direct test of rule-of-thumb behaviour, measured by the value and sig-
nificance of λ. Campbell and Mankiw (1989), using such an approach on US data,
conclude that approximately half of agents in the economy act in a rational forward
looking manner and half in a rule-of-thumb manner.5
Tests similar to that proposed in equation (2.1) have been performed on a wide range of
data with a wide range of alternative specifications testing different hypotheses. Some
studies perform cross country tests to see how the degree of rule-of-thumb behaviour
changes internationally; Table 1 presents a summary of some of these studies for those
countries who appear in at least three separate papers. A clear message from this
table, which is a common theme throughout the literature, is that the estimates of λ
are broad; these estimates seem highly sensitive to the country used in the sample,
the sample period, the length of each period and the specification applied. There also
appears to be a lack of consistency of the relative rankings across the countries involved
in these studies with some economies being reported as having the lowest values of λ
in some studies and the highest in others. However, another common theme in Table
3This innovation is introduced in Campbell and Mankiw (1989) as a method of testing the permanent
income hypothesis and no rationale is given to why consumers may behave in such a way. Potential
explanations for this would be a lack of access to capital markets, impatience, or myopia.
4The approach used by Campbell and Mankiw (1989) was to instrument using lagged values of
income.
5It should be noted that there are other interpretations than the simple ‘rule-of-thumb’ perspective
given by Campbell and Mankiw (1989). For example, Carroll (1997) builds a model with income
uncertainty and risk averse individuals who when they are sufficiently impatient will have a preference
towards maintaining a buffer stock of savings. Carroll uses this model to intuitively link back to the
Campbell and Mankiw ‘rule-of-thumb’ explanation for consumption tracking income.
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1, and the literature in general, is that despite this broad range, positive, non-trivial
and significant values of λ are consistently found.
The paper of Evans and Karras (1996) performs estimates on 54 separate countries;
Table 2 presents a summary of these estimates where countries have been grouped by
income categories defined by the World Bank. The results show that, on average, de-
veloping economies have a larger proportion of non-Ricardian agents than developed
economies and that the estimation of this proportion is less precise with higher av-
erage standard errors associated to these estimates. However, the table also implies
that whereas developing countries have consistently higher levels of asset market non-
participation, there is more variability in the developed economies results; the average
standard deviation of the λ estimates is higher in developed economies.
Much of the literature focuses on testing different specifications to US data with very
similar results; a non-trivial value of rule-of-thumb behaviour is observed despite broad
ranges for λ being found. When these studies test relationships over time, it is often
found that the level of non-Ricardian behaviour is diminishing with time, but not at a
fast rate: see for example Aschauer (1993), Graham (1993) and Cushing (1999).6
The predictions of the permanent income hypothesis has also been tested against spe-
cific individuals and households using microeconometric methods. Similar results are
found both in terms of departures away from consumption smoothing and rule-of-thumb
type behaviour: see for example Shea (1995), Parker (1999), Souleles (1999), Shapiro
and Slemrod (2003) and Souleles et al. (2006).7 Experimental economics has also been
applied to the topic with excessive sensitivity of current consumption to current income
found in these scenarios: see for example Hey and Dardanoni (1988), Carbone and Hey
(2004) and Carbone (2005).8
2.2.2 Hypotheses behind non-Ricardian behaviour
The literature has also attempted to investigate and identify reasons behind such
widespread departures from the permanent income hypothesis. Jappelli and Pagano
(1989) in their cross country investigation adopt a two stage approach; first, they
6Campbell and Mankiw (1989) also address this with a sample of six countries and find no discernible
relationship between λ and the time period used when considering all these countries.
7For microeconometric analysis that shows more support of consumption smoothing refer to Paxson
(1993), Browning and Collado (2001) and Hsieh (2003); however, these studies test the movement of
consumption to large and predictable movements in income that occur at regular intervals. The papers
showing less support, cited in the body, are for less predictable infrequent movements in income.
8Carbone (2005) uses her larger sample of 498 participants to identify if certain demographics be-
haved significantly different from others with respect to their consumption smoothing, with no signifi-
cant differences highlighted (test were made across age, gender, household characteristics, educational
experience and employment, amongst others).
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Table 2: Estimates of λ and the level of development
Ave(λ) Ave(SE) StdDev Count
Developed countries 0.389 0.221 0.442 25
Developing countries 0.717 0.218 0.333 29
SOURCE: Author’s analysis of results presented in Evans and Karras (1996). Developed countries are
those that are described by the World Bank as ‘High Income’; Developing countries are those who
are not described as ‘High Income’. The statistic Ave(SE) relates to the mean standard error on the
estimate of λ for that income group. The statistic StdDev relates to the standard deviation in the
estimated λ values within the income group in question.
identify rule-of-thumb behaviour in seven OECD countries and subsequently investi-
gate the differences across countries in the levels of this behaviour. It is found that
there are more non-Ricardian agents in economies where the ratio of consumer debt
to aggregate consumption is low, and moreover, that this is caused not by a lack of
demand for consumer debt, but from a lack of supply: individuals are concluded not
to have access to capital markets. Zeldes (1989) uses a panel of US households to test
the same hypothesis, where this panel is split into two separate types of household:
those with assets and those without. The latter households are found to consume out
of their current income whereas for the former households a standard Euler equation
cannot be rejected. The concept proposed by Zeldes is that it is the lack of assets
by these rule-of-thumb households that prohibits their access to capital markets, and
therefore subsequent consumption behaviour.9 Sarantis and Stewart (2003) use both
cross country regression and panel data to conclude that it is the presence of liquidity
constraints, and to a lesser extent, a precautionary savings motive, that causes cross
country deviations in rule-of-thumb behaviour.
Sullivan (2008) performs a separate microeconometric study to see how disadvantaged
households supplement their consumption through the use of credit cards in response
to a temporary shortfall in earnings. It was found that those households defined as
being ‘very low asset holders’ did not borrow in such times, whereas those households
defined as ‘low asset holders’ borrowed 11 cents for each dollar lost.10 Moreover, it
was identified that households rich in wealth did not borrow in response to temporary
shocks. The implication being that some households, with very low wealth, wish to be
able to borrow in hard times but are credit-constrained, others can borrow but on high
interest credit cards, and the wealthiest can either use their savings or more attractive
forms of debt when experiencing temporary income shortfalls.
9Shea (1995) performs a similar test through segregating the sample by wealth and finds no support
for liquidity constraints explaining departures from the permanent income hypothesis. However, this
test was performed on a smaller, more restrictive sample.
10Very low asset holders were defined as those households in the bottom decile of total wealth; the
study was performed on US data.
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The link between limited wealth resources and access to capital markets has been
highlighted by other authors, including in Mankiw (2000) who also highlighted the
divergence between wealth inequality and income inequality. In the United Kingdom
the lowest two quartiles of the wealth distribution hold approximately 10% of the total
wealth (Daffin; 2009); this compares the lowest two quartiles of the income distribution
earning 29% of total income (ONS, 2011). In terms of Gini coefficients, the statistics for
wealth and income distributions are 0.61 (Daffin; 2009) and 0.34 (Barnard et al.; 2011)
respectively. When just financial wealth is considered, wealth which is most liquid,
the Gini coefficient determining this distribution is 0.81 (Daffin; 2009): “25 percent of
households had net financial wealth that was negligible” (Daffin; 2009, p. xxii). The
evidence suggests that there is a significant proportion of agents who are unable to
save from their current earnings, which prohibits them access to credit markets in the
presence of adverse income shocks.
2.2.3 Discussion
The literature on the consumption behaviour of economies and individuals suggests
that there are significant proportions of agents within developed and developing coun-
tries who do not follow the predictions of the permanent income hypothesis, and whose
consumption follows closely the path of their disposable income. This general conclu-
sion is robust across countries, data and specifications. The literature also suggests
that this observation is at least partially driven by a lack of access to capital markets
by some proportion of agents, who therefore cannot smooth their consumption. It is
implied that this lack of access is related to low and negative levels of assets, for these
individuals who cannot therefore provide collateral to financial institutions.
It is a key premise of this thesis that the households classified as ‘non-Ricardians’ are
distinct economic agents.11 It is also proposed, given the lack of wealth prohibiting
capital market transactions and from general intuition, that non-Ricardian households
will come from the lower end of the income distribution, and given how skewed this
distribution is, a consequence of this discussion is that the share of households that are
credit-constrained in an economy will be greater than λ from equation (2.1); with the
11This is an important distinction because it could be thought that every economic agent uses a
proportion (λ) of their income for direct consumption and a proportion (1−λ) in a rational, permanent
income hypothesis, way. If this were true then each agent in the economy would be identical and there
would be no deviation across them.
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high estimates of λ in Tables 1 and 2 this could leave a very significant proportion of
the population as being non-Ricardian.12
The lack of asset market participation is, however, an empirical regularity and for some
consumers formal restrictions to participation seems to be a fair reflection, whereas
for other this restriction appears to be ex post appropriate. However, the modelling
technique that disaggregates households into those who participate in financial markets
and those who do not should not be used without consideration of these issues and
appropriate qualifications.
2.3 The model
The model presented below is a cashless DSGE model with sticky prices including
six types of economic agent: a continuum of households split into two heterogeneous
groups; a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms producing intermediate
goods and a perfectly competitive market producing the final good; and a monetary
and fiscal authority. The model is similar to Gal´ı et al. (2007), the seminal paper in
the rule-of-thumb DSGE literature and the benchmark from which most subsequent
models follow. The model differentiates itself from Gal´ı et al. (2007) by abstracting
from physical capital accumulation: this is to simplify the model such that transmis-
sion mechanisms can be identified, and further, algebraic properties can be observed.
Moreover, the shocks come from non-policy sources and as such the government sector
is modelled fully through reaction functions, responding to the business cycle and levels
of debt.
2.3.1 Households
There is a continuum [0, 1] of infinitely lived households, all of which consume the
final good and supply labour to firms. A proportion of these households (1− λ) are
‘Ricardian’ who have access to capital markets and can trade in a full set of state
contingent securities. The remaining proportion (λ) are ‘non-Ricardian’ and have no
access to capital markets. The period utility function, U it , is assumed to be the same
for both types of household and is given by:
12 Equation (2.1) works on the assumption that λ represents the proportion of income that goes to
hand-to-mouth agents; if these agents receive less than the average levels of income per capita there
will be more weight of them in terms of people (proportion of the population) than λ (proportion of
income).
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U it = ε
b
t
((
Cit
)1−σ
1− σ −
(
N it
)1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
)
(2.2)
where Ct and Nt are the amount of consumption and employment consumed and sup-
plied respectively in period t, and εbt represents an exogenous shock to the discount rate
which affects intertemporal substitution preferences of households. The parameter σ
is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and ϕ is the inverse elasticity of work with
respect to the real wage. Superscript i differentiates these variables between Ricardian
(i = R) and non-Ricardian (i = NR) households.
Ricardian households
Ricardian households gain income from their labour supply (at a wage rate Wt), from
the dividends paid on share ownership, DRt , and from maturing one period bonds
purchased in the previous time period, BRt . They can use this income in order to
purchase the consumption good (at a price Pt), reinvest in the bond market (at a given
return Rt), and to pay any lump sum tax levied by the fiscal authority, T
R
t . This leaves
a budget constraint to Ricardian households given by:
PtC
R
t +
BRt+1
Rt
+ PtT
R
t ≤WtNRt +DRt +BRt (2.3)
Ricardian households maximise expected lifetime utility (given by the sum of (2.2) from
t = 0 to t = ∞) discounting future periods of utility by a factor βR ∈ (0, 1), subject
to the budget constraint (2.3) with respect to consumption, employment and bond
purchases, where all prices are taken as given. Performing this optimisation provides
the following first order conditions:
(
NRt
)ϕ (
CRt
)σ
=
Wt
Pt
(2.4)
R−1t = β
REt
{(
CRt+1
CRt
)−σ (
Pt
Pt+1
)(
εbt+1
εbt
)}
(2.5)
Equation (2.4) is a function describing the labour supply function for Ricardian house-
holds and equation (2.5) is a typical Euler equation describing the relationship between
intertemporal consumption and interest rates.
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Non-Ricardian households
Non-Ricardian households do not have access to bond markets and as such cannot
intertemporally substitute consumption. Moreover they do not own company shares.
They simply consume, period-by-period, their disposal income generated through their
supply of labour; this provides the non-Ricardian consumption function:
PtC
NR
t = WtN
NR
t − PtTNRt (2.6)
where equality is given by assumed strictly positive marginal utility from consumption.
This consumption behaviour is either exogenously imposed or can be endogenously ra-
tionalised in a framework similar to Iacoviello (2005) whereby non-Ricardian households
are more impatient than Ricardian households, βR > βNR, and can default on their
debt up to the value of their collateral. With no durable goods in the non-Ricardian
utility function, impatience prohibits the accumulation of collateral, and as such they
are prohibited from engaging in bond and capital markets.13 Non-Ricardian households
still optimise their period-by-period utility by making decisions on how much labour
to supply at a given wage rate: maximising (2.2) subject to the budget constraint (2.6)
with respect to consumption and employment where prices and wages are taken as
given, resulting in the following:
(
NNRt
)ϕ (
CNRt
)σ
=
Wt
Pt
(2.7)
Which describes the supply of labour for non-Ricardian households. Note that this
condition is similar to that of (2.4), the supply of labour of Ricardian households,
which is due to the assumed identical period utility function of the two heterogeneous
households.
Labour market assumptions
Similar to Gal´ı et al. (2007), two labour market assumptions will be utilised. The first
will be that of perfectly competitive markets where each agent can supply labour at a
given wage rate to the market. The negotiation of this wage happens frictionlessly and
instantly.
In the second labour market assumption a continuum, indexed k ∈ [0, 1], of monopolis-
tically competitive unions add a markup to wages: this can be performed because each
13Section 2.2 above discusses empirical results on both low wealth holdings for some individuals and
the observation that some agents consume ‘hand-to-mouth’.
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union supplies a differentiated labour input. There is no friction to wage negotiations,
and all households are treated indiscriminately receiving the same wages and working
the same hours. This is performed by the unions aggregating preferences across house-
holds to find a weighted average labour supply function. Each union is assumed to
have a ratio of non-Ricardian to Ricardian members of λ : (1− λ). Effective labour in
firm j is now given by a CES aggregation function:
Nt(j) =
(∫ 1
0
Nt(j, k)
w−1
w di
) w
w−1
where Nt(j, k) represents the input of firm j of labour from union j and w represents
the elasticity of substitution across different labour types. Such a technology leads to
a demand schedule similar to (2.8) which acts as the constraint to each union, who
maximise a weighted average of household utility.
Steady state consumption, employment and utility
It will be assumed that the government set steady state lump sum taxes on the two
types of households such that the increased income from dividends for the Ricardian
agents is eliminated. Note, that this could also be achieved through assuming that
no profits are made in steady state, through imposing a fixed cost in production (as
assumed in Chapter 5), or through fully taxing these profits lump sum. Note also that
as the transfer is lump sum, it does not impact on the steady state properties of the
model, just the steady state allocation; Section 3.6.2 also demonstrates algebraically
how the dynamics of the model are unaffected by this assumption, if λ is treated as
the share of income accruing to non-Ricardian agents, as opposed to the share of these
households in the population (as is the case in the empirical literature: see Section 2.2).
The assumption, combined with the identical utility function assumed for the two
types of households, leads to the same consumption and employment profile of the
heterogeneous households in steady state: CNR = CR = C and NNR = NR = N.
This assumption simplifies the calculations but is not critical to the main results of
the model.14 However it provides the benchmark whereby if the economy remains in
steady state, both types of households will consume and work in identical proportions
and consequently derive identical period utilities.
14This assumption does go against the hypothesis discussed above that non-Ricardian households are
financially poorer than Ricardian households. However, the results are not sensitive to this assumption,
and significant results can be obtained without imposing this hypothesis on the model. A full discussion
of the implications of relaxing this assumption is presented in Chapter 3.
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2.3.2 Firms
The production sector is made up of a continuum of monopolistically competitive pro-
ducers, indexed j ∈ [0, 1], who employ household labour in order to produce differen-
tiated intermediate goods. These goods are then purchased by a perfectly competitive
firm who makes the final good Y , consumed by both households and the fiscal authority.
Final good firm
The sector which produces the final good is modelled as a single representative perfectly
competitive market which combines the intermediate goods using a standard Dixit-
Stiglitz aggregator:
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Yt (j)
1
1+µt dj
)1+µt
where Yt represents the final good, Yt (j) represents the intermediate good quantity from
firm j, and µt represents a stochastic time varying markup charged by intermediate
good firms, given by µt = µ + ε
µ
t . This markup is possible because each intermediate
firm produces a differentiated product with the elasticity of substitution across goods
given by , such that the steady state markup is given by µ = 1/(−1): εµt represents an
AR(1) shock process in log-linear form. Profit maximisation of the final good market,
taking all prices as given, yields the following standard demand schedules:
Yt (j) =
(
Pt (j)
Pt
)− 1+µt
µt
Yt ∀ j ∈ [0, 1] (2.8)
where Pt (j) is the price of the intermediate good Yt(j) and Pt is the price of the final
good, in period t. The market is perfectly competitive and as such makes zero profits,
which provides the following aggregate price index condition:
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
Pt (j)
− 1
µt dj
)−µt
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Intermediate goods firms
A continuum of firms are assumed to produce the differentiated intermediate goods
subject to Cobb-Douglas technology where capital is fixed and normalised:
Yt (j) = ε
a
tNt (j)
1−α (2.9)
where Nt (j) is the level of labour employment by firm j, and ε
a
t represents a productiv-
ity shock. A Calvo (1983) pricing structure is assumed for intermediate goods, where
firms in any period get the opportunity to reset prices with probability (1 − θ). This
probability is fixed, exogenous, and independent of when the firm was last randomly
selected to reset their prices. With assumed identical intermediate firms, all (1 − θ)
firms ‘reseting’ their price in period t will do so at the same price, P ∗t . With this pricing
structure, the dynamics of aggregate prices, Pt, is given by:
Pt =
[
θP
−µ−1t
t−1 + (1− θ) (P ∗t )−µ
−1
t
]−µt
(2.10)
A firm that is able to reset their price in any given period will do so such as to maximise
expected future profits given the new reset price, P ∗t . Algebraically:
max
P ∗t
∞∑
k=0
Et
{
Qt,t+k
(
P ∗t Yt+k|t (j)−Ψt+k
(
Yt+k|t (j)
))}
subject to the demand from the final good firms (2.8) where Ψt+k(.) is a nominal cost
function, Yt+k|t (j) is the expected output in period t + k for a firm who last reset
its price in period t, and Qt,t+k =
(
βR
)k {
(Ct+k/Ct)
−σ (Pt/Pt+k)
}
is the stochastic
discount factor for nominal payoffs.15 Solving this problem provides the following first
order condition:
∞∑
t=0
θkEt
{
Qt,t+kYt+k|t (j)
(
P ∗t − (1 + µt)ψt+k|t
)}
= 0 (2.11)
where ψt+k|t = Ψ
′
t+k denotes the nominal marginal cost in period t+ k for a firm who
reset its price in period t. The remaining suppliers, θ, must maintain the same price
as they had in period t− 1.
15Note that in this economy the nominal cost function is one of only wages and the level of employ-
ment.
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2.3.3 Monetary authority
For the conduct of monetary policy a simple log-linear Taylor rule is assumed where
the nominal interest rate responds positively and contemporaneously to deviations in
both inflation and output:
rt = ϕpipit + ϕyyt + ε
r
t (2.12)
where lower case letters represent log deviations of variables from their non-stochastic,
zero inflation, zero government debt, steady state values; rt is the log deviation in the
nominal interest rate in period t, pit the log inflation rate between period t and t − 1,
and yt is the log deviation of output from steady state.
16 The policy parameters ϕpi
and ϕy define the responsiveness of the nominal interest rate to movements away from
target rates of inflation and output respectively. An exogenous AR(1) shock process,
εrt , is included in the monetary policy setting process, which represents movements in
the nominal interest rate which are not determined by movements in the aggregate
economy.
2.3.4 Fiscal authority
The fiscal authority purchases a proportion of the final goods for public consumption,
Gt, raises lump sum taxes from the two households, T
R
t and T
NR
t , and issues nominal
risk-free one-period bonds, Bt+1. As such, the flow constraint of the government is
given by:
PtGt +Bt ≤ Pt(TRt + TNRt ) +
Bt+1
Rt
(2.13)
The model includes a proportion of non-Ricardian households and therefore the dy-
namics and evolution of government expenditures, taxes and debt are relevant. Simple
log-linear feedback rules are considered which allow the government to respond to the
business cycle and ensure that debt is stabilised. Formally:
ĝt = ϕgyt + ϕb,g b̂t (2.14)
t̂t = ϕT yt + ϕb,T b̂t (2.15)
16Note that this could have been written in its ‘pre-log-linear’ form with Rt/R =
(Πt/Π)
ϕpi (Yt/Y )
ϕy εrt .
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where hatted lower case variables represent deviations from steady state as a proportion
of steady state output: for example x̂t = (Xt−X)/Y .17 To simplify, it will be assumed
throughout the analysis t̂NRt = t̂
R
t = t̂t; changes in lump sum taxes are equal across all
households and there is no redistribution between households through taxation. This
means the results abstract away from progressive or regressive taxes. The coefficients
ϕg, ϕT , ϕb,g and ϕb,T are policy parameters set by the fiscal authority. Setting either
ϕg < 0 or ϕT > 0 means that government spending rises, or taxes fall in response to a
shock resulting in lower than natural output levels; countercyclical fiscal policy. Setting
these parameters to nil is equivalent to an acyclical policy, or with reversed signs, a
procyclical policy. The above rules allow the fiscal variables to respond to the level
of government debt which acts to preserve the solvency constraint.18 Log-linearising
(2.13) and substituting (2.14) and (2.15) into the resulting expression provides the
condition:
b̂t+1 = (1 + ρR)
[
b̂t (1 + ϕb,g − ϕb,T ) + yt (ϕg − ϕT )
]
(2.16)
The dynamics of government debt are stationary providing that (1 + ρR) (1 + ϕb,g −
ϕb,T ) < 1, or equivalently ϕb,T − ϕb,g > ρR/(1 + ρR), where ρR = (1 − βR)/βR is the
steady state interest rate; this condition states that in the long run the fiscal authority
must pay back debt faster than interest accrues on it.19
2.3.5 Market clearing, aggregation and equilibrium conditions
In equilibrium, aggregate consumption and employment are equal to the weighted av-
erage of the two variables across households:
Ct = (1− λ)CRt + λCNRt (2.17)
Nt = (1− λ)NRt + λNNRt (2.18)
Moreover, all output must be consumed by either the government or private individuals:
17Similar to the Taylor rule, we could have written these fiscal rules in their pre-log-linear format.
18The government is assumed to satisfy the solvency constraint that in the long run all debts are
fully repaid: algebraically, limt→∞Bt+1/Rt = 0.
19Note that the condition ϕg = ϕT provides a balanced budget at all times and nil government debt;
the counter(pro)cyclical reaction of one fiscal policy variable must be matched by an equal and opposite
pro(counter)cyclical reaction in the other variable.
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Yt = Ct +Gt (2.19)
The model is solved by deriving log-linear approximations of the key optimality con-
ditions and policy rules around the non-stochastic steady state with zero inflation and
zero government bonds: these conditions can be found in Appendix A.1. Once all cal-
culations have been performed the general equilibrium model can be expressed through
the policy and non-policy blocks, the latter of which can be represented through an
aggregate demand condition and a New Keynesian Phillips curve.
Aggregate demand
The aggregate demand relationship can be obtained by combining log-linear versions
of the goods market clearing condition (2.19), the production function (2.9), and the
Euler equation obtained through combining the optimisation of the Ricardian and non-
Ricardian household utility. In a general format the aggregate demand condition can
be written as:
yt = Et {yt+1} − ΦEt {4ĝt+1} − ΦΘA
(
rt − Et {pit+1} − Et
{
∆εbt+1
})
(2.20)
+ΦΘBEt
{
∆εat+1
}
+ ΦΘCEt
{4t̂NRt+1}
where the coefficients Φ, ΘA, ΘB and Γ depend upon the labour market assumption.
When perfectly competitive labour markets are assumed these coefficients are defined
by (derived in Appendix A.3):
ΦPC =
(
ΓPC
)−1
(ΓPC)−1 − γcϕλ (1 + ϕ)
(2.21)
ΘPCA = γc (1− λ)
1
σ
(ϕ(1 + µ)γc + σ (1− α)) ΓPC
ΘPCB = γcϕλ(1 + ϕ)Γ
PC
ΘPCC = γcϕλ(1 + µ)Γ
PC
ΓPC = [ϕ(1 + µ)γc + σ (1− α) [1− λ (1 + ϕ)]]−1
A DSGE model with credit-constrained agents 33
where superscript PC represents coefficients that result from an economy with a per-
fectly competitive labour market. When labour markets are assumed to be imperfectly
competitive, the coefficients are defined by (derived in Appendix A.4):
ΦIC =
(
ΓIC
)−1
(ΓIC)−1 − γcλ (1 + ϕ)
(2.22)
ΘICA = γ
2
c (1− λ)
1
σ
(1 + µ)ΓIC
ΘICB = γcλ (1 + ϕ) Γ
IC
ΘICC = γcλ(1 + µ)Γ
IC
ΓIC = [(1 + µ)γc − λσ (1− α)]−1
where superscript IC represents coefficients that result from an economy with imper-
fectly competitive labour markets. Demand is a function of fiscal and monetary policy,
where the extent of each element is dependent upon the share of non-Ricardian house-
holds in the economy. When λ = 0, the expression becomes a simple log-linear Euler
expression in output, with intertemporal substitution between periods defined through
the real interest rate (and where the perfectly competitive and perfectively competitive
labour market aggregate demand coefficients are the same). As λ increases so too does
the coefficient Φ, which is a coefficient reflecting that both employment and the real
wage rate (which combine to give non-Ricardian households’ disposable income) can
be expressed as functions of output. Non-Ricardian consumption is a function of out-
put which itself is a function of non-Ricardian consumption, which creates a multiplier
effect between demand and any initial stimulus.
New Keynesian Phillips curve
The production sector of the economy is independent of the proportion of rule-of-thumb
consumers and can be summarised by a typical New Keynesian Phillips curve (derived
in Appendix A.5):
pit = β
REt {pit+1}+ ω (mcrt + εµt ) (2.23)
ω =
1− α
1− α+ α
(
1− βRθ) (1− θ)
θ
mcrt = yt
[
σ
1− γg +
ϕ+ α
1− α
]
− ĝt
[
σ
1− γg
]
− εat
[
1 + ϕ
1− α
]
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where Et {pit+1} is the expectation in the current time period of inflation in the next
and mcrt represents the (log deviations of) real marginal costs of the monopolistically
competitive firms in the current time period. Increases in output increase consumption
in the economy and thus reduce labour supply as households substitute consumption
for leisure, and increase the demand for labour in order to produce the extra output.
Both of these factors push up the real wage and therefore increase the real marginal
cost of production, mcrt , to firms. The decrease in the labour supply can be muted by
increases in government spending as this removes resources from private consumption
and therefore reduces the substitution effect: increases in government consumption, for
a given level of output, reduce real wages.
Exogenous shocks and the closed system
The two equations above illustrate that the four exogenous shocks can be grouped into
three separate categories: those which only enter aggregate demand (preference and
interest rate shocks); those which only enter the Phillips curve (exogenous movements
in the desired markup); and those which enter both (productivity shocks). Preference
and interest rate shocks enter the aggregate demand condition because movements in
both impact the consumption decisions of Ricardian households. Exogenous increases
in the desired markup charged by intermediate firms acts as a cost push shock on the
economy, providing additional inflation given a certain level of output. Productivity
increases, on the other hand, increase the productive capacity of the economy at no
additional cost to inflation and moreover impact the labour demanded by firms. The
former impacts the Phillips curve whilst the latter impacts aggregate demand through
the consumption of non-Ricardian households.20 Although the model is too simple to
include the vast array of exogenous processes of larger DSGE models, these four shocks
provide us with three possibilities that cover many further extensions. All logarithms
of shocks are assumed to follow a first order autoregressive process with persistence ρi
and an i.i.d error term ηit for i = {a, b, l, r}.
2.4 Properties of the model
This section explores the properties of DSGE models including rule-of-thumb house-
holds by reflecting upon the properties of the general form model presented above and
comparing these against those found in the literature: the most comprehensive existing
analysis comes from Bilbiie (2008).
20Bilbiie (2008) also demonstrated that technology shocks enter additively in both the aggregate
demand condition and New Keynesian Phillips curve.
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2.4.1 Non-Keynesian region
It is commonly observed that increases in government spending, tax cuts and reductions
in interest rates lead to an increase in aggregate demand, all other things being equal.
However, this is only true if Φ, ΘA, ΘB and Γ are positive in the aggregate demand
condition (2.20); as can be seen from the definitions of these coefficients, however, this
assumption does not always hold.
Proposition 1. (The ‘non-Keynesian region’) There exist a range of λ, and other rel-
evant parameters, such that the expected demand relationships of increases (decreases)
in government spending and cuts (rises) in interest rates and taxes lead to a rise (fall)
in demand, are reversed.
Proof. The above proposition will be true when the coefficient Φ is negative which in
turn is true when the denominator of this coefficient is negative (noting that the numer-
ator is always greater than the denominator); Bilbiie (2005) refers such calibrations as
those where the economy is in the ‘non-Keynesian region’. Solving this condition with
respect to λ for the economy with perfectly and imperfectly competitive labour markets
respectively, provides the following two calibrations at which point this non-Keynesian
region is reached:
λ∗PC =
ϕγc(1 + µ) + σ(1− α)
(1 + ϕ) [ϕγc + σ(1− α)] (2.24)
λ∗IC =
γc(1 + µ)
(1 + ϕ)γc + σ(1− α)
where λ∗ follows the notations of Bilbiie (2008): the calibration of λ where the econ-
omy goes from the Keynesian to the non-Keynesian region. At all values of λ > λ∗,
the expected directions of movement in the aggregate demand condition (2.20) are re-
versed (with the potential exception of government spending, see Proposition 4): Bilbiie
describes this as ‘inverted aggregate demand logic’ (Bilbiie; 2008, 164).
Figure 1 plots different values of Φ for different λ whilst holding all other relevant
parameters constant; within this it is possible to see that there is a critical calibration
of λ, where the value of Φ reverses, and this is given by λ∗. This is an important
property of the model as it will have a significant impact on the determinacy conditions;
however, it will be trivial if λ∗ > 1.
Corollary 1. Providing the markup charged by the intermediate good firms is not
unreasonably large, λ∗ < 1.
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Proof. From the definitions of λ∗ for both labour market assumptions it is possible to
derive that providing:
µ < ϕ+ σ(1− α)(γc)−1
λ∗ < 1, and therefore not trivial.
2.4.2 The non-linear feedback mechanism
The presence of the non-Keynesian region in models which include a proportion of
credit-constrained agents is an interesting property which provides further scope to
this class of models. This region comes about as a result of a feedback mechanism
whereby output is a function of non-Ricardian consumption which itself is a function
of output due to the way increased activity in the economy leads to increases in wages
and subsequently disposable incomes. In this respect a traditional Keynesian multiplier
is present in the model.
Proposition 2. (Feedback Effect) The higher the proportion of non-Ricardian con-
sumers, up until the point λ∗, the greater the impact to aggregate demand of changes
in fiscal and monetary policy.
Proof. Algebraically this can be illustrated by partially differentiating the coefficients
in the aggregate demand condition (2.20) with respect to λ. For both labour market
assumptions Appendix A.6 demonstrates that:
∂Φ
∂λ
> 0;
∂ΦΘA
∂λ
> 0;
∂ΦΘB
∂λ
> 0;
∂ΦΘC
∂λ
> 0 (2.25)
in the region 0 < λ < λ∗.
Any changes in the aggregate demand of the economy consequently impact on wage
levels and subsequently the disposable income of all agents. When this occurs, the
consumption of non-Ricardian households deviates and correspondingly this changes
aggregate demand; there is a feedback mechanism that amplifies any movements in
aggregate demand. The greater the proportion of non-Ricardian agents in the economy,
those agents who consume out of disposable income, the greater this amplification is.
Again Φ is the key parameter and from equations (2.21) and (2.22) it can be seen that
this is a rectangular hyperbola with respect to λ (as is demonstrated in Figure 1),
implying that this feedback effect will accelerate.
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Proposition 3. (Non-Linear Feedback Effect) The result found in Proposition 2 will be
non-linear in λ such that the higher the level of λ, up until λ∗, the greater the increase
in aggregate demand coefficients associated with a unit change in λ.
Proof. Proposition 3 directly follows on from Proposition 2 and can be demonstrated
by partially differentiating the conditions in (2.25) with respect to λ. Appendix A.7
demonstrates, in the region of 0 < λ < λ∗:
∂2Φ
∂λ2
> 0;
∂2ΦΘA
∂λ2
> 0;
∂2ΦΘB
∂λ2
> 0;
∂2ΦΘC
∂λ2
> 0
Hence Proposition 3 is demonstrated.
Proposition 3 states that the feedback effect found in Proposition 2 is non-linear; as
more agents act hand-to-mouth the impact from an initial demand impulse will be
amplified to greater degrees. Again this is an important property of this class of
models and highlights the importance of the value of λ. This non-linear feedback effect
of credit-constrained individuals has been seen in previous work; most comprehensively
in the papers of Bilbiie and Straub (2004) and Bilbiie (2008). Although not explicitly
reflected upon, the non-linear effect can also be seen in a number of other papers in
the literature, when the sensitivity of results in these papers are tested against varying
degrees of λ.21 This property can also be observed in Figure 1.
The result found in Proposition 1 states that the non-linear feedback property of these
models is unsustainable; there is a limit at which the relationship collapses, at calibra-
tions of λ ≥ λ∗. Bilbiie (2008) stated that the key parameter in the λ∗ relationship is ϕ,
the inverse elasticity of the labour supply with respect to real wages. As the elasticity
of labour supply decreases (ϕ increases), additional output can only be produced by a
large increase in real wages needed to increase the supply of labour. When this occurs,
there is a large comovement between real wages and employment and therefore also
in the non-Ricardian households’ disposable income. When λ reaches λ∗, the ampli-
fication process becomes unstable and beyond this point the relationship is reversed.
Bilbiie (2008) relates this situation to where marginal costs are increasing by so much
they squeeze the profits of production firms, therefore reducing the dividends paid out
in general equilibrium and restricting consumption of Ricardian agents; this intuition is
supported by the observation that ∂λ∗/∂µ > 0. Further, the λ∗ condition is a function
of both σ and (1−α) where higher values of each decrease λ∗ because they elicit larger
21See for example Coenen and Straub (2005), Gal´ı et al. (2007), Furlanetto and Seneca (2009) and
Colciago (2011).
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increases in wages necessary to increase output, the former because it reduces the util-
ity from consumption (and therefore decrease the utility from additional income) and
the latter because it increases the marginal product of labour.
2.4.3 Quasi-Keynesian region
The two regions described above (the Keynesian and non-Keynesian regions) do not
fully describe the model. There is a third region, referred to here as the quasi-Keynesian
region, because although the relationship between aggregate demand and taxes and in-
terest rates remain inverted, the ‘normal’ relationship between demand and government
spending is restored. This region was not reflected upon in Bilbiie (2008) as in that
paper there was no fiscal sector.
Proposition 4. (The ‘quasi-Keynesian region’) At sufficiently high values of λ, Φ will
go from being negative to positive. At this point the economy is said to be in the quasi-
Keynesian region as the expected relationship of greater government spending leading
to increases in output will be restored.
Proof. Although the proof to Proposition 1 covered the ranges where the denominator
and numerator of Φ are both positive (the Keynesian region) and where the former
is negative and the latter positive (the non-Keynesian region), there exists plausible
calibrations where both the denominator and the numerator are negative and therefore
where Φ is positive (the quasi-Keynesian region). For such a region to exist there
needs to be a range of λ where the following is true, for the perfectly and imperfectly
competitive labour market assumptions, respectively:
λ′PC >
ϕγc(1 + µ) + σ(1− α)
σ(1− α)(1 + ϕ) (2.26)
λ′IC >
γc(1 + µ)
σ(1− α)
Therefore, under such a scenario there is a region such that 1 > λ > λ′ where the
economy is in the quasi-Keynesian region.
2.4.4 A graphical representation
To demonstrate these properties Figure 1 plots the values for Φ for both labour market
assumptions, using the calibration applied in Chapter 4; namely, α = 1/3, ϕ = 2,
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Figure 1: Model properties: Φ at different values of λ
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The left plot measures the value of Φ for different values of λ for the perfectly competitive labour
market, and the right hand plot does the same for the imperfectly competitive market. All other
parameters are fixed: specifically, α = 1/3, ϕ = 2, γc = 0.8, µ = 0.2 and σ = 1. The dashed-vertical
line represents the value of λ∗ in both plots.
γc = 0.8, µ = 0.2 and σ = 1. Note that Φ is the key parameter in these properties as it
appears in all the coefficients within the aggregate demand condition. In this figure it
is possible to observe: the ‘non-Keynesian region’ above λ∗ (Proposition 1); the non-
linear feedback mechanism up until the value of λ∗ (Propositions 2 and 3); and that
λ∗PC > λ
∗
IC . Note at this calibration, the ‘quasi-Keynesian’ region is not applicable as
λ′ > 1.
2.5 Conclusions
The introduction of credit-constrained households into DSGE models is increasingly
popular. This is due to the empirical relevance of such consumption behaviour and
moreover due to the better performance for these models to match empirical data.
Despite the widespread use of these models, however, limited analysis is performed
considering the heterogeneous experiences of the different agents and this is a significant
focus of this thesis. This chapter derives a tractable New Keynesian DSGE model with
the inclusion of credit-constrained agents and explores the algebraic properties of the
model. The inclusion of rule-of-thumb agents adds specific properties to such class of
models, which have been demonstrated and discussed, and which we will return to in
the following Chapters.
Chapter 3
“We’re all in this together”? A
DSGE interpretation
3.1 Introduction
The recent global economic downturn has resulted in hardship for many individuals in
many countries; the unequal distribution of this hardship across agents is a topic of
political significance, which is frequently debated. In the autumn of 2008, before the
extent of the recession was known, The Economist (October 23, 2008) suggested that
there was a desire for an ‘equality of sacrifice’ in the looming downturn with the fear that
this equality would not be reached. A commentary in the Financial Times (March 25,
2011) reflecting upon the movements in share prices for different retail firms, inferred
that the middle and lower classes in the US and UK were suffering more than the
wealthiest in the current recession, supporting the concerns of the earlier Economist
article.1 Beyond this class and income divide there is clear anecdotal evidence that
the recent recession is impacting some more than others. Perhaps the most globally
widespread, at least in Europe, are the high levels of youth unemployment. These
debates and fears entered the political rhetoric of the recession with calls of a ‘squeezed
and anxious middle’ in the UK and US respectively.2 Despite this there are continuing
calls from ruling politicians that ‘we’re all in this together’.3
1The article compares the appreciation in shares in companies such as Tiffany and Saks against the
depreciation in companies such as Walmart. Another article in the Financial Times came to similar
conclusions using anecdotal evidence interviewing families in the US (Financial Times, July 30, 2010).
2The ‘anxious middle’ is an expression used in the US by Larry Summers, former US Treasury
Secretary; in the UK, the leader of the opposition Ed Miliband has frequently used the phase the
‘squeezed middle’ (Financial Times, December 20, 2011).
3This is most noticeably used by David Cameron in the UK and has also been used by others such
as Barack Obama. The former in a speech given on the August 15 2011 (for example) and the latter
in an interview with CBS News April 19, 2009.
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Lucas (2003) abstracted from these heterogeneity issues to propose that the impact of
business cycles on aggregate welfare was negligible. Through analysing movements in
aggregate US consumption around trend, the welfare gain of removing economic fluc-
tuations was calculated to be the utility equivalent of less than one-tenth a percentage
point increase in average consumption. However, a number of papers have challenged
this result by removing the representative agent assumption of Lucas’ analysis. Krusell
and Smith (1999) claim that the welfare costs of business cycles are of interest because
of the heterogeneous distribution of these costs: abstracting away from this abstracts
away from the crux of the issue. Through introducing idiosyncratic agent productivity
shocks combined with incomplete insurance markets, Krusell and Smith (1999) show
that eliminating business cycles would be to the benefit of the poor and unemployed:
fluctuations hurt these the most, something reflected in the anecdotal evidence of the
recent downturn. Krusell et al. (2009) obtain comparable results showing that business
cycle fluctuations disproportionately impact the poor and rich more than the middle
classes. Mukoyama and S¸ahin (2006) perform a similar analysis to conclude that it
is unskilled workers who suffer most from business cycles. Carroll (2000) further sug-
gests that the distribution of wealth is an important determinant in agents’ experiences
from macroeconomic phenomena, a concept also emphasised by Mankiw (2000) when
discussing the aggregate effects of fiscal policy. This heterogeneity may also reconcile
the result that when using subjective measures of welfare the implied costs of business
cycles are larger than those originally suggested by Lucas: see for example Wolfers
(2003).
The innovation of this chapter is to address this question using a New Keynesian DSGE
model with a proportion of credit-constrained agents as derived in Chapter 2. We pro-
pose that these two agents (Ricardian and non-Ricardian households) represent two
clear distinct groups in society of empirically non-trivial proportions, and hypothesise
that the latter will come from those individuals at the lower end of the income dis-
tribution; although the results are not sensitive to this hypothesis, the interpretations
of these results are. This is supported by the growing literature that includes credit-
constrained agents into their model: see Chapter 2. However, despite the growing use
of these models, limited analysis currently exists on disaggregated variables. Although
some papers do report on heterogeneous dynamics, this tends to only give more detail
behind the aggregate variables.
The contribution of this chapter is to apply these now standard models to perform a
detailed analysis of heterogeneous dynamics, with specific reference to adverse shocks:
defined here as those which generate a negative output gap. The results provided by
the model present a clear and intuitive message. When an adverse shock strikes the
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economy non-Ricardian households can only use their employment decisions to opti-
mise, which they do through increasing their labour supply above that which would
prevail if they had access to credit. This increases their disposable income and ag-
gregate production, however the former is not sufficient to purchase all of the latter,
and the surplus is consumed by the Ricardian agents who purchase this through ad-
ditional dividends paid by firms through an improvement in profits from the supply
of cheap non-Ricardian labour. The non-constrained agents both work less and con-
sume more than their constrained counterparts; there is a redistribution of welfare from
non-Ricardian to Ricardian households. These results are obtained through deriving
algebraic properties in general equilibrium, dynamic simulations and through observing
welfare movements through the evaluation of a second order Taylor series expansion of
the heterogeneous households homogeneous utility function. Not only is it shown that
Ricardian households achieve higher levels of welfare from the adverse shocks than non-
Ricardian households, they are also shown to experience positive welfare movements in
the presence of these shocks: the Ricardian households gain compared to steady state
values. The results support the conclusion of Lucas (2003) that in aggregate welfare
losses are small, but this hides a disparity across agents with one set losing significantly
whilst the other gain. These results are robust and are also supported by an empirical
investigation performed in the chapter showing a negative correlation between growth
and income inequality.
The chapter proceeds in the following way: Section 3.2 discusses the benchmark model
which includes a fraction of non-Ricardian households. Section 3.3 analyses the hetero-
geneous impact of adverse shocks on agents by deriving analytical expressions, through
observing dynamic simulations and deriving a disaggregated welfare criterion. Section
3.4 tests the robustness of the results to the labour market assumption and Section 3.5
empirically tests the implication of the model. Section 3.6 performs further sensitivity
analysis and Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 The model
The model is the same as was derived in Chapter 2 however the economy abstracts away
from a fiscal sector. This further abstraction from the Gal´ı et al. (2007) simplifies the
calculations sufficiently to allow a significant amount of the analysis to be performed on
algebraic properties, independent of parameter calibration. Without a fiscal authority
we have γc = 1 and the market clearing condition (2.19) becomes Yt = Ct; the model
can be described by the aggregate demand condition (2.20), the New Keynesian Phillips
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curve (2.24) and the Taylor rule (2.12) where ϕg = ϕT = ϕb,g = ϕb,T = γg = 0. The
resulting set of equations can then be presented in the following system:
Et {ut+1} = Aut + Bεt (3.1)
where ut = [yt, pit]
′, εt = [εrt , Et
{
∆εbt+1
}
, εat , ε
a
t+1, ε
µ
t ]
′ and the matrices A and B are
given by:
A =
[
1 + ΘAΦϕy +
(
βR
)−1
ωyΘAΦ ΘAΦ(ϕpi −
(
βR
)−1
)
− (βR)−1 ωy (βR)−1
]
B =
[
ΦΘA −ΦΘA ΦΘB −
(
βR
)−1
ΦΘAωε −ΦΘB
(
βR
)−1
ωΦΘA
0 0
(
βR
)−1
ωε 0 −
(
βR
)−1
ω
]
where ωy = ω [σ + (ϕ+ α)/(1− α)] and ωε = ω(1 + ϕ)/(1 − α). The properties of
the model as discussed in Section 2.4 hold, the only difference being that now γc = 1
in these derivations. The most significant property of this model with respect to the
determinacy of the system is the λ∗ property (Proposition 1) as identified in Bilbiie
(2008), due to its effect on the sign of parameters in the aggregate demand condition.
The model has two forward looking (‘jump’) variables (yt, pit) and therefore determinacy
requires that both eigenvalues in matrix A lie outside the unit circle (are ‘unstable’).
Woodford (2003, 670) shows that either of two cases need to be satisfied for determinacy
of the model:
Case I:
A1 detA > 1; and
A2 detA− trA > −1; and,
A3 detA + trA > −1.
Case II:
B1 detA− trA < −1; and,
B2 detA + trA < −1.
where all conditions in each ‘Case’ need to be met, and where A is the matrix defined
in system (3.1). For simplicity, the following discussion on the determinacy conditions
will set ϕy = 0; this does not change the main result but simplifies the algebra in order
to make the analysis clearer. A discussion on setting ϕy > 0 will be presented at the
end of the section.
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3.2.1 Determinacy when λ < λ∗
Applying the criteria outlined in Woodford (2003), the following conditions for Case I
when λ < λ∗ can be obtained:
A1 ϕpi > 0;
A2 ΦΘA (ϕpi − 1) > 0;
A3 ΦΘA (ϕpi + 1) > −2(β
R+1)
ωy
.
Note that when λ < λ∗, Φ and ΘA are positive and therefore all three conditions are
satisfied providing ϕpi > 1. This is the ‘Taylor Principle’, which stipulates that for
determinacy and price stability the monetary authority needs to respond more than
one-for-one with the nominal interest rate to inflation.
3.2.2 Determinacy when λ > λ∗
Applying the criteria outlined in Woodford (2003), the following conditions for Case I
when λ > λ∗ can be obtained:
A1 ϕpi < (ΦΘA)
−1
(
βR−1
ωy
)
;
A2 ϕpi < 1;
A3 ϕpi < −
[
1 + (ΦΘA)
−1
(
2(βR+1)
ωy
)]
.
The calibrations that satisfy these conditions are not as clearly defined as those for
when λ < λ∗. Whereas the previous conditions set a lower limit on the value of ϕpi
with no upper limit, the above conditions set an upper limit with no lower limit. One of
these potential upper limits (A2) is 1 which means that the Taylor Principle is violated;
when λ > λ∗ the Taylor Principle does not guarantee uniqueness and moreover, under
Case I, it will lead to indeterminacy. Case II of Woodford (2003) provides the following:
B1 ϕpi > 1; and,
B2 ϕpi > −
[
1 + (ΦΘA)
−1
(
2(βR+1)
ωy
)]
.
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These results both put a lower limit on the value of ϕpi as in the situation with the
Taylor Principle.4 Therefore, combining the two results from Case I and Case II the
following condition for ϕpi is required for determinacy when λ > λ
∗:
ϕpi ∈ min
{
1, (ΦΘA)
−1
(
βR − 1
ωy
)
,−
[
1 + (ΦΘA)
−1
(
2(βR + 1)
ωy
)]}
(3.2)
∪max
{
1,−
[
1 + (ΦΘA)
−1
(
2(βR + 1)
ωy
)]}
Where the first expression in (3.2) is when ‘Case A’ above is met, and the second
interval is when ‘Case B’ is met. These results are in line with those derived in Bilbiie
(2008) and state that either monetary policy needs to be passive (Case I) or very
aggressive (Case II) when λ > λ∗.
3.2.3 Allowing for ϕy > 0
Allowing ϕy to be positive does not significantly change the determinacy conditions of
the model. In the case where λ < λ∗ the Taylor Principle (ϕpi > 1) ensures determinacy,
but the Taylor Principle represents the limit condition for when ϕy → 0: any positive
values of ϕy relaxes this condition. When λ > λ
∗, Case I above represents the ‘least
passive’ monetary policy needs to be when allowing ϕy > 0; greater values of ϕy
result in more passive values of ϕpi allowed to provide determinacy. Similarly, Case II
above represents the most aggressive the monetary authority needs to be when allowing
ϕy > 0. In all three cases, ϕy is acting as an extra condition that can provide stable
prices. When aggressive monetary policy is required, a higher value of ϕy relaxes the
conditions on ϕpi and when monetary policy is required to be passive, higher values of
ϕy lead to the opposite effect. The derivation of these results are presented in Appendix
B.1.
3.3 Heterogeneous impacts of adverse shocks
This section uses the model derived in Section 2.3 to address the main question of
this paper: what are the heterogeneous impacts of adverse shocks across households?
4Note that when λ > λ∗, Φ and ΘA are both negative. Under reasonable calibrations, the condition
(B2) would result in ϕpi needing to be a large (positive) figure; monetary policy would be required to
be very aggressive. The analysis of Bilbiie (2008) largely ignored this possibility due to the implied
large value of ϕpi.
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This is performed in the first instance in a model with perfectly competitive labour
markets which provides clear and intuitive results. First, this question is addressed
by reviewing algebraic properties; the model is sufficiently simple to allow for these
properties to be identified which permits the question to be answered independent of
calibration. Next, the question is reviewed by performing simulations on the benchmark
model to observe disaggregated impulse response functions in the presence of adverse
shocks. Finally, a welfare criterion is derived from which these simulations can be
converted into quantifiable comparisons of utilities of the two households.
3.3.1 Algebraic properties
Aggregate relationships
Section 3.2 demonstrates how the model can be reduced to two equations. Using
the method of determined coefficients we can assert that yt = Ψyε
i
t and pit = Ψpiε
i
t,
where Ψy and Ψpi are the undetermined coefficients and using these equations, their
corresponding lead counterparts and the formula for the shock process, whilst setting
εit = 0 ∀ t > 1, we can obtain the results:
Ψry = −
(1− βRρr)ΦΘA
(1− βRρr)(1− ρr + ΦΘAϕy) + ΦΘAωy(ϕpi − ρr) (3.3)
Ψrpi =
ωyΨ
r
y
1− βRρr
Ψby = −
(1− βRρb)ΦΘA(1− ρb)
(1− βRρb)(1− ρb + ΦΘAϕy) + ΦΘAωy(ϕpi − ρb)
Ψbpi =
ωyΨ
b
y
1− βRρb
Ψµy = −
ΦΘA (ϕpi − ρµ)ω
(1− βRρµ)(1− ρµ + ΦΘAϕy) + ΦΘAωy(ϕpi − ρr)
Ψµpi =
ωyΨ
µ
y + ω
1− βRρµ
Ψay =
ΦΘAωε(ϕpi − ρa)− ΦΘB(1− ρa)(1− βRρa)
(1− βRρa)(1− ρa + ΦΘAϕy) + ΦΘAωy(ϕpi − ρa)
Ψapi =
ωyΨ
a
y − ωε
1− βRρa
where these coefficient represent ‘impact multipliers’ from the reduced form model such
that (for example) Ψiy = ∂y
i/∂εi. The signs for each of these, in the region of λ > λ∗,
are all easily derived, noting that both βR and ρi lie between zero and one, that ϕpi > 1,
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and that each of the aggregate demand relationships are positive when λ < λ∗. These
relationships are summarised in Table 3.
Table 3: Aggregate algebraic relationships in general equilibrium: impact multipliers
derived using the method of undetermined coefficients
Output Inflation
Demand shocks Ψy < 0 (Y1) Ψpi < 0 (Π1)
Supply (markup) shocks Ψy < 0 (Y2) Ψpi > 0 (Π2)
Technology Shocks Ψy Q 0 (Y3) Ψpi < 0 (Π3)
All conditions trivially require that λ < λ∗, φy ≥ 0 and φpi ≥ 1.
A positive exogenous movement in the interest rate or the Ricardian discount factor
leads to a reduction in both output (Y1) and inflation (Π1), whereas positive movements
in the desired markup lead to a reduction in output (Y2) with a rise in inflation (Π2);
these are intuitive results that have been identified before and which are true of a
fully Ricardian economy. The ambiguous result between technology shocks and output
(Y3) derives from an increase in productivity leading to a reduction in labour with
ambiguous impacts on non-Ricardian disposable income. In a fully Ricardian economy,
the increase in productive capacity is the only relevant factor and output unambiguously
improves. In an economy with or without non-Ricardian households the presence of a
positive productivity shock leads to a fall in inflation as the same level of output can
be produced at a lower labour cost.
Disaggregate relationships
The modelling assumption for rule-of-thumb agents makes it possible to track their
employment and consumption behaviour relative to output. These, in unison with the
market clearing conditions, can be used in turn to infer Ricardian agents’ disaggregated
dynamics. This task is straight forward in the absence of productivity shocks as in such
a scenario movements in output are directly related to movements in employment.
When these technology changes are ignored, the following expressions can be obtained
for the model under the assumption of perfectly competitive labour markets, where
relevant derivations are presented in Appendix B.2 (this appendix also discusses the
results in the presence of productivity shocks):5
5Specifically, the first of these equations is derived by obtaining a log-linear expression of non-
Ricardian consumption, which itself is a function of non-Ricardian employment and the real wage,
which can substituted for using log-linear conditions of labour supply functions, the production function
and the market clearing condition. The second of these equations can then be obtained by using the
aggregate consumption function and rearranging for Ricardian consumption. Finally, the third and
fourth conditions are obtained applying labour supply functions, the production function, and the
goods market clearing condition. More details can be found in Appendix B.2.
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cNRt =
(1 + ϕ)(ϕ+ σ(1− α))
ϕ(1 + µ) + σ(1− α) yt
cRt =
[
λ
1− λ
(1 + µ)ϕ+ σ(1− α)− λ(1 + ϕ)(ϕ+ σ(1− α))
1 + µ+ σ(1− α) ϕ
]
yt
nNRt =
1
ϕ
[
ϕ+ σ(1− α)
1− α −
σ(1 + ϕ)(ϕ+ σ(1− α))
(1 + µ)ϕ+ σ(1− α)
]
yt
nRt =
yt
1− λ
[
1
1− α −
λ
ϕ
[
ϕ+ σ(1− α)
1− α −
σ(1 + ϕ)(ϕ+ σ(1− α))
(1 + µ)ϕ+ σ(1− α)
]]
where these ‘partially reduced form’ expressions can be combined with (3.3) to obtain
reduced form expressions specific to individual shock processes. Table 4 summarises
the properties of these disaggregate relationships.
Table 4: Disaggregate algebraic relationships in general equilibrium in the absence
of productivity shocks
Disaggregated Consumption Disaggregated Employment
∂cNRt
∂yt
> 0 (C1)
∂nNRt
∂yt
Q 0 (N1)
∂cRt
∂yt
> 0 (C2)
∂nRt
∂yt
> 0 (N2)
∂cNRt
∂yt
> ∂ct∂yt >
∂cRt
∂yt
(C3)
∂nNRt
∂yt
< ∂nt∂yt <
∂nRt
∂yt
(N3)
Results (C3), (N2) and (N3) require that µ < ϕ + σ(1 − α): this is a reasonable restriction. Result
(C2) is true providing λ < λ∗. Results (C3) and (N3) assume λ > 0 otherwise aggregate variables
would become Ricardian variables. Adverse shocks are defined as those resulting in yt < 0. Note
that in aggregate ∂ct/∂yt = 1 and ∂nt/∂yt = 1/(1 − α) in the absence of exogenous movements in
productivity.
An adverse shock leads to a decrease in both non-Ricardian and Ricardian consumption
(C1 and C2), however, the fall of the former is bigger than that of the latter (C3). The
Ricardian agents have access to capital markets and profits and therefore can substitute
future consumption for consumption today, which they do to maximise utility. Rule-
of-thumb agents, on the other hand, do not have this access and as a result their
consumption is more volatile: the only way they can smooth consumption is through
their labour supply decisions. In the presence of an adverse shock, this is performed
through increasing their labour supply above that which would prevail were they to
have access to credit in order to increase their disposable income: they substitute leisure
for consumption. This reaction is confirmed through observing that the reduction in
non-Ricardian employment as a result of an adverse shock is smaller than that of
their Ricardian neighbours (N3); credit-constrained households work more than the
unconstrained in order to insulate themselves from the impact of the shock, and at
certain calibrations their employment will rise in the presence of reducing output (N1).
Ricardian households unambiguously decrease their labour supply and this occurs for
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two reasons: first, less output is produced in the economy overall, therefore lowering
demand for labour; and second, the rule-of-thumb agent’s increase in labour supply
drives down the real wage which makes Ricardian agents substitute consumption for
leisure. The reaction of rule-of-thumb households to increase their labour supply in
the presence of adverse shocks appears to insulate Ricardian consumption, because its
movement with respect to output is less than unity (C3): that which would prevail in
a fully-Ricardian economy. However, this result does not take into account that the
inclusion of the credit-constrained households may amplify the aggregate response to
exogenous shocks (see below).
The presence of productivity shocks, however, provides ambiguous results compared to
those discussed above because increases in productivity allow increases in output with
no additional increases in employment. Using the method of undetermined coefficients
it is possible to produce algebraic results similar to those used to find the properties in
Table 4, however the inference is no longer clear. Disposable income for non-Ricardian
households can fall in the presence of a shock increasing productivity, at certain cali-
brations, as a rise in wages (reflecting an increase in the marginal product of labour)
is tempered by a fall in labour demand. Note that a shock increasing productivity is
an ‘adverse’ shock as defined above because the presence of sticky prices means that
output capacity expands at a greater rate than actual production, leading to a negative
output gap. Although a productivity increase will lead to a fall in inflation it may also
lead to a reduction of output when the demand effect of a reduction in non-Ricardian
consumption outweighs the impact of the increase in productive capacity: this will
occur at high values of λ and low levels of ρa.
However, results and intuition from Table 4 still follow through. An adverse technology
shock leads to a rise in Ricardian consumption which dominates that of non-Ricardian
consumption, which may indeed fall. In order to insulate themselves from this diver-
gence, rule-of-thumb agents will supply more labour in order to increase their disposable
income: non-Ricardian labour will be greater than Ricardian labour.
When imperfectly competitive labour markets are assumed (C1), (C2) and (C3) can
be derived under the same conditions as those labelled in Table 4 using the following
conditions (derived in Appendix B.2):
cNRt =
1 + ϕ+ σ(1− α)
1 + µ
yt
cRt =
1
1− λ
[
1− λ (1 + ϕ+ σ(1− α))
1 + µ
]
yt
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Under the assumption of imperfectly competitive labour markets however, nNRt = n
R
t =
nt and therefore (N1) and (N3) no longer hold. However, the discussion with respect
to perfectly competitive labour markets gives us the intuitive result that non-Ricardian
households would prefer higher levels of employment and Ricardian households lower
levels of employment, compared to those negotiated when a weighted average of their
preferences are used, in response to an adverse shock.
Aggregate relationships and asset market non-participation
Increasing the share of non-Ricardian households in the economy has two effects on
the coefficients in Table 3: first, the impact of the shock is increased due to the non-
linear relationship between any stimulant and λ, demonstrated in the λ∗ relationship
(2.24) and in Proposition 3 (in Chapter 2); and second, any adverse impact is met
with an increase in labour supply from these rule-of-thumb agents who attempt to
insulate themselves from the impact of the recession. This latter effect also insulates
the economy and can be seen through the increasing impact of monetary policy at
higher levels of λ.6 The first effect will always dominate leading to a larger impact
from any exogenous shock.
3.3.2 Dynamic simulations
Calibration
The algebraic properties above can now be observed through dynamic simulations using
the calibration outlined below. Each unit of time is a quarter and the Ricardian and
non-Ricardian discount factors, βR and βNR, are set at 0.99 (corresponding to a steady
state rate of return to bonds of 4%) and 0.973 respectively.7 The preference parameters
are set such that σ = 1, which represents log utility with respect to consumption, and
ϕ = 0.2, the inverse elasticity of work with respect to the real wage.8 The degree of
decreasing returns to labour, α, is set to equal 1/3 and the steady state markup, µ,
is calibrated to 0.2; this value corresponds to a elasticity of substitution across the
intermediate goods, , of 6. The parameter governing the stickiness of prices, θ, is set
at 0.75 leading to the average price duration for a given firm of four quarters. The
6It can be shown that providing λ < λ∗, ∂ΦΘA/∂λ > 0.
7Lawrance (1991) presents evidence to suggest that rates of annual time preference vary by 7%
between rich and poor households.
8Under this specification with log utility of consumption, Bilbiie (2008) finds that non-Ricardian
employment is constant as the income and substitution effects cancel one another out. However, the
introduction of steady state transfers (see Section 2.3.1), even at a constant steady state level, drives
a wedge between the income and substitution effects due to movements in the real wage such that this
is not true in our model.
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Taylor rule parameters are set such that ϕpi = 1.5 and ϕy = 0.125. The persistence
parameter of all shocks, ρi, are set equal to 0.8 to make comparisons across the results
for different shocks.
This calibration follows closely that of Gal´ı et al. (2007), which has been criticised
for its low value of the wage elasticity of employment.9 As demonstrated in equation
(2.24), if it is required that λ < λ∗, there is a constraint on the calibration of other
parameters: through setting ϕ = 0.2 a calibration of λ = 0.5 < λ∗ is achievable (λ = 0.5
is reflective of empirical observations, see Section 2.2, and is the calibration used in Gal´ı
et al. 2007). The value of λ∗ with other parameters at reasonable calibrations is too
low, which is primarily due to the simplicity of the model. It has been implicitly
shown that through including further rigidities such as fixed capital accumulation,
habit persistence, Kimball demand curves and firm specific capital, the values of λ∗
increase.10 Moreover, Chapter 6 (equation (6.13)) algebraically demonstrates that λ∗
will increase if habit persistence is included in the model. To demonstrate the proposal
that it is a lack of complexity of the model that limits the value of λ∗, if non-Ricardian
households are included into the medium scale DSGE model of Smets and Wouters
(2003) with reasonable parameter calibrations, a value of λ∗ > 1 is provided.
It is a preference to not overcomplicate the model in order to identify algebraic prop-
erties and transmission mechanisms. Moreover, it is desired that the share of the two
types of households are approximately equal to their empirical size because the paper
reviews welfare movements, and with appropriate proportions of each household comes
appropriate weighted average welfare calculations. Sensitivity of the results to the
calibrations of ϕ and λ parameters, amongst others, will be commented on throughout.
Simulations
The aggregate impacts of the three individual shocks are those predicted in Table 3:
output falls in response to both a positive interest rate shock and a positive markup
shock whereas inflation falls and rises with these two shocks respectively. Output is
found to increase following a positive productivity shock in this calibration and, as
predicted above, inflation falls. The disaggregate responses to these shocks, which
are the main focus of this chapter, are presented in Figure 2 for adverse demand (first
column), cost push (second column) and productivity (third column) shocks, where the
9In particular, this calibration has been questioned in Furlanetto and Seneca (2009) and Colciago
(2011); on the other hand, Gal´ı et al. (2007) cite Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) as evidence to
support this calibration.
10Although this cause and effect is not explicitly shown, it is highlighted through sensitivity analysis
which varies the level of λ. The examples above are shown in Gal´ı et al. (2007) and Furlanetto and
Seneca (2009).
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first and second rows presents disaggregated consumption and employment responses
respectively, and the third row presents dynamics for the disposable income of Ricardian
households.
Figure 2: Disaggregate dynamics from adverse shocks
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Dynamics achieved through the calibration discussed in Section 3.3.2 and through setting ηrt = 1.0
when t = 1 for demand shocks, setting ηµt = 1.4 when t = 1 for cost push shocks, and setting
ηat = 0.4 when t = 1 for productivity shocks. The latter two calibrations were performed to make
the welfare loss (gain) equal to that of the interest rate shock in a fully Ricardian economy for the
cost push (productivity) shocks. Note only interest rate shocks have been included to represent an
aggregate demand shock because, as discussed above, preference shocks enter the aggregate demand
condition (2.20) in the same way and therefore the analysis would be identical. The first row presents
results for disaggregated consumption, the second row results for disaggregated employment and the
third row dynamics on Ricardian disposable income given by the sum of their employment income
and dividends received. The graph also presents results for Ricardian household dynamics in a fully-
Ricardian economy (λ = 0).
As is illustrated in the figure, the predictions of Section 3.3.1 are observed; non-
Ricardian households work more and consume less than their Ricardian neighbours,
who themselves work less and consume more in the presence of the rule-of-thumb
agents, compared to a similar shock in a fully-Ricardian economy (λ = 0). Rule-of-
thumb agents use the labour market as their smoothing resource and in the presence
of adverse shocks they do this through increasing their labour supply. This results in
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additional disposable income for these agents and additional production in the econ-
omy, however the former is not sufficient to purchase all of the latter and the surplus
goes to the Ricardian agents. This is funded by these agents through additional profits
which is as a result of cheap labour in the market and also due to the Ricardian agents
sharing dividends across only a fraction of the population when λ 6= 0.11 The reduction
of both Ricardian employment and wages means that these agents’ labour incomes fall
as a result of the adverse shock, however the rise in profits (dividends) compensates
them for this. The third row in Figure 2 shows that as a result of all adverse shocks
Ricardian disposable income increases in the presence of rule-of-thumb agents, relative
to the fully-Ricardian benchmark. Ricardian income rises whilst non-Ricardian income
falls despite the former working less than the latter: the path of rule-of-thumb income
is given by their consumption (by definition).
Note that these results would be affected were non-Ricardian agents to have access to
the profits of the firms. We could have assumed that shares of company profits were
distributed equally across all agents in the economy, and as such profits would enter
both the non-Ricardian consumption function and subsequently the aggregate demand
relationship. However, given rule-of-thumb agents’ impatience, a restriction must be
made such that these shares could not be sold. Otherwise, these agents would optimise
by divesting their firm ownership to the more patient.
A clear redistribution of welfare is observed from non-Ricardian to Ricardian households
as a consequence of the former’s employment decisions and the latter’s access to capital.
This is with respect to the arguments in the utility function but moreover in income
streams: a clear inequality of experience is observed in the model as a result of adverse
shocks.
3.3.3 A welfare criterion
The dynamic responses for the heterogeneous households in these examples are clear to
see, interpret and evaluate; the responses for Ricardian households’ variables strictly
dominate those for the non-Ricardian households in both the employment and consump-
tion dimensions. Moreover, the presence of the non-Ricardian households benefits the
Ricardian households whose dynamics where λ 6= 0 strictly dominate their dynamics
in an economy where λ = 0. However, a more formal analysis can be performed by
determining a welfare criterion based on a second order Taylor series expansion of the
utility function around steady state values. This procedure provides a criterion ex-
pressed as the equivalent one period consumption loss, as a proportion of steady state
11Dividends paid out through profits are subject to the relationshipDt = (1−λ)DRt , as only Ricardian
agents receive dividends.
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consumption, that leaves the agent indifferent between living through the shock or the
one period consumption loss (the derivation of which is in Appendix B.3):
W i = E0
∞∑
t=0
βi,t
(
cit +
1− σ
2
(
cit
)2)− (1− α)
γc(1 + µ)
E0
∞∑
t=0
βi,t
(
nit +
1 + ϕ
2
(
nit
)2)
(3.4)
Welfare results are derived using a second order approximation of the model because,
as Walsh (2010) highlights, a first order approximation can be inappropriate. Apply-
ing the disaggregated dynamics of the three adverse shocks simulated above to this
criterion gives the results presented in Table 5. The table confirms the above analysis;
Ricardian households experience greater welfare, as a result of the adverse shocks, than
non-Ricardian households, and when the latter are present the Ricardian households
experience greater levels of welfare than when they are not. However, one result that
is not directly predicted through observing the disaggregated dynamics is that these
Ricardian households experience a welfare gain as a result of the adverse shocks. In
the two shocks that lead to a fall in output, the large fall in employment more than
compensates Ricardian households for their small fall in consumption. Moreover, in
the presence of the adverse technology shock output rises and gains accrue to Ricar-
dian agents. The unambiguous fall in lifetime utility is observed for the non-Ricardian
households for adverse demand and cost push shocks, and in the presence of adverse
productivity shocks, at this calibration, they experience a mild gain of welfare.
Table 5: Disaggregated welfare - perfectly competitive labour markets
Non-Ricardian Ricardian Weighted Average
Demand (interest rate) shock
λ = 0 N/A -0.010 -0.010
λ = 0.5 -0.060 0.046 -0.007
Cost push (markup) shock
λ = 0 N/A -0.010 -0.010
λ = 0.5 -0.061 0.041 -0.010
Productivity shock
λ = 0 N/A 0.010 0.010
λ = 0.5 0.003 0.016 0.009
The welfare loss is expressed as the equivalent one period consumption loss, as a proportion of steady
state consumption, that would leave the household indifferent between living through the shock or the
one period sacrifice. Dynamics achieved through the calibration discussed in Section 3.3.2 and through
setting ηrt = 1.0 when t = 1 for demand shocks, setting η
µ
t = 1.4 when t = 1 for cost push shocks, and
setting ηat = 0.4 when t = 1 for productivity shocks. The latter two calibrations were performed to
make the welfare loss (gain) equal to that of the interest rate shock in a fully Ricardian economy for
the cost push (productivity) shocks. A second order approximation of the model is applied to derive
welfare results.
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3.3.4 Discussion
This section has shown that there is a redistribution of welfare as a result of ad-
verse shocks from non-Ricardian to Ricardian households. This has been illustrated
through identifying algebraic properties of the model, through dynamic simulations,
and through deriving a disaggregated welfare criterion for the two households based on
a second order Taylor series expansion of their utility functions. This redistribution of
welfare comes as a result of the rule-of-thumb agents increasing their labour supply in
order to smooth their consumption. This action consequently insulates the economy
which indirectly insulates the Ricardian households whose welfare improves as a result
of the presence of the credit-constrained agents. It has been shown that Ricardian
household’s welfare is unambiguously better than their non-Ricardian neighbours and,
moreover, these agents actually gain as a result of adverse shocks under reasonable
calibrations. In aggregate, the weighted average welfare movement as a result of the
shocks is small: this is in line with the analysis of Lucas (2003). However, the dis-
aggregate movements within this overall mean average are not trivial with a negative
covariance between the experiences of the different households. This negative correla-
tion of agents’ welfare implies that we are not ‘all in this together’ and provides support
for the anecdotal evidence presented in Section 3.1.
The results also lend support to the concept of the squeezed or anxious middle, de-
pending on the beliefs on the identification of the rule-of-thumb agents.12 We argued
that these non-Ricardian households will be predominantly those agents at the lower
end of the income distribution. This hypothesis, in conjunction with estimates on their
relative share, implies that the middle class could be within this credit-constrained
group. Moreover, as the economic downturn continued, access to credit became more
restrictive, therefore eliminating further agents from this smoothing resource. The
combination of the theoretical results and the proposal that rule-of-thumb agents come
from the lower end of the income scale is coherent with the literature of Krusell and
Smith (1999), Mukoyama and S¸ahin (2006) and Krusell et al. (2009), and also with the
anecdotal evidence. However, these results have been derived with a stylised labour
market which plays an important role in the transmission mechanisms in the economy,
which is relaxed in the next section.
12This conclusion also requires considerations of the shock process generating the recent recession. As
is seen above, an ‘adverse’ technology shock increases output (but at less than its potential), therefore,
if it is believed a negative technology shock produced the recession then the analysis would be inverted.
Ireland (2011) use variance decomposition techniques to estimate that the recent recession was mainly
as a result of demand shocks and there were positive productivity shocks to compensate for this: this
conclusion is reached in other papers.
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3.4 An alternative labour market assumption
This section tests the sensitivity of the above results to the assumptions made of the
labour market. It is through the labour market that the non-Ricardian households
perform their optimisation and insulate themselves against the impact of the shocks:
an important transmission mechanism in the above results. To test the sensitivity of the
results to the labour market assumption, the imperfectly competitive labour market of
Gal´ı et al. (2007) is used. With such an assumption there is no heterogeneous supply of
labour across households: this will have a significant impact on both the aggregate and
disaggregate economy. In the presence of an adverse shock, non-Ricardian households
have a preference to increase their labour supply, whereas Ricardian households have a
preference to decrease theirs; the aggregation process across households results in the
former working less and the latter more than if they were allowed to supply labour
independently.
One important aspect to consider when performing simulations under this different
labour market will be that of the calibrated value of λ, because the change in the
labour market will have a corresponding change in λ∗ as demonstrated in (2.24). The
strategy here is to maintain a constant value for the ratio λ/λ∗, where this constant
is determined by the perfectly competitive labour market analysis above; this strategy
isolates the impact that the change in the labour market assumption is creating by
eliminating the impact of a change in λ∗.
Table 6: Disaggregated welfare - imperfectly competitive labour markets
Non-Ricardian Ricardian Weighted Average
Demand (interest rate) shock
λ = 0 N/A -0.010 -0.010
λ = 0.5 -0.062 0.023 -0.008
Cost push (markup) shock
λ = 0 N/A -0.010 -0.010
λ = 0.5 -0.065 0.025 -0.008
Productivity shock
λ = 0 N/A 0.010 0.010
λ = 0.5 0.002 0.014 0.009
The welfare loss is expressed as the equivalent one period consumption loss, as a proportion of steady
state consumption, that would leave the household indifferent between living through the shock or the
one period sacrifice. Dynamics achieved through the calibration discussed in Section 3.3.2 and through
setting ηrt = 1.0 when t = 1 for demand shocks, setting η
µ
t = 1.4 when t = 1 for cost push shocks, and
setting ηat = 0.4 when t = 1 for productivity shocks. A second order approximation of the model is
applied to derive welfare results.
Comparable results to those in Table 5 are presented in Table 6 for an economy with
the new labour market assumption subjected to the three types of shock. These show
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that the welfare gains of the Ricardian households are reduced in an economy which
includes non-Ricardian households compared to the perfectly competitive labour mar-
ket benchmark. This is an intuitive result; the aggregation process performed by the
trade unions in order to derive an aggregate labour supply function results in these
households working more than they otherwise would, were they to supply labour inde-
pendently. Moreover, because non-Ricardian households are working less compared to
the benchmark of the perfectly competitive labour markets, profits distributed to the
Ricardian agents are not rising to a similar degree. Likewise, the welfare penalty for
non-Ricardian households is also observed whose utility losses are increased as a result
of the new labour market assumption. The redistribution of welfare is still observed
and the results are robust to the change in the labour market.
This extension does merit further consideration. Subjecting both types of household to
the same labour market conditions may be inappropriate if it is believed that there is a
distinct difference between both types of agent in the model; under this circumstance
separate labour markets for the two types of household may be deemed more appro-
priate. For example, the hypothesis we proposed was that the rule-of-thumb agents
would predominantly come from the lower end of the income spectrum. These agents
would have lower skill levels and it is these who are observed to be most empirically
vulnerable to business cycles. The experience of unemployment during recessions is
what causes the most pain to individuals; the fact that the above results were obtained
in a model that does not include unemployment and where labour can move freely is
compelling.
3.5 An empirical investigation
The model presents clear results with respect to both welfare and income movements of
the two types of agents as a result of adverse shocks. Combined with our proposal that
the non-Ricardian households come predominantly from the lower end of the income
distribution, a working hypothesis is provided that income inequality will increase
during periods of recession; this is in line with the anecdotal evidence and can be
tested empirically. The method proposed here is to review the correlation between the
changes in the Gini coefficient against movements in the cyclical component of growth.
The Gini coefficient is a measure of income inequality and if the proposed hypothesis
is correct it would be expected that this should increase in times of negative cyclical
growth. The following panel regression is applied:
∆Ginii,t = αi + βCY CGrowthi,t + θZi,t + εi,t (3.5)
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where ∆Ginii,t is the change in the Gini coefficient from year t− 1 to year t in country
i, αi are country specific constants identified using a fixed effects panel, CY CGrowthi,t
is the cyclical component of growth for country i in year t identified using the Hodrick-
Prescott filter, Zi,t a group of control variables and εi,t is an error term. The problems
with such an approach is the availability of data on the Gini coefficient and the se-
lection of appropriate control variables. For such a specification to be worthwhile,
data on inequality needs to be observed for a number of consecutive years, to ensure
an appropriate number of observations, and from the same study to ensure consistent
methodology for comparable statistics. The selection of control variables is complicated
by the short term nature of the annual changes: inequality movements are generally
studied over longer horizons.
Empirical results from estimating (3.5) are presented in Table 7. In all, seven coun-
tries are used which represents the number of developed nations with more than 10
consecutive observations for Gini coefficients, each year from the same study, in the
United Nations World Income Inequality dataset. The results show that not only are
the coefficients attached to the CY CGrowth variable always with the expected sign,
but moreover, they are always significant to at least 5% confidence levels. This is true
across five separate specifications with different combinations of independent variables,
controlling for the political stance of ruling parties and a time trend to pick up the
universal steady growth of inequality post 1979.13 Further, the results are not sensitive
to the regression method used, countries in the sample and the method of detrending
GDP data: similar results can be achieved from OLS and random effects panel regres-
sion; from dropping any one country in the sample and from dropping both France and
Germany which represent the two countries with the smallest number of observations;
and from detrending growth rate data using a polynomial time trend. The results
suggest a redistribution of welfare from the poor (non-Ricardian households) to the
rich (Ricardian households) occurs during times of below trend growth. Although it is
beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a fully fledged empirical analysis, results
presented in Table 7 are supportive of the anecdotal evidence presented in Section 3.1,
for the theoretical modelling of divergent experiences during recessions and moreover
the hypothesis that non-Ricardian households come from the lower end of the income
distribution.
13The former was calculated using information on government formation over the period and bene-
fited from sample countries having predominantly a two party system. The latter was included due to
the pervasive increases in inequality observed for all countries in the dataset.
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Table 7: Inequality during recessions: an empirical investigation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CYCGrowth -7.285** -5.180*** -5.217*** -3.907** -3.944**
(0.023) (0.002) (0.002) (0.016) (0.015)
LWing 0.037 0.051
(0.628) (0.480)
Time 0.249*** 0.251***
(0.001) (0.000)
Observations 184 148 148 148 148
R2 0.029 0.054 0.058 0.131 0.136
The dependent variable is ∆Ginii,t, where Ginii,t is obtained from the United Nations World Income
Inequality dataset. The dataset includes the countries of Australia (41), Canada (19), France (11),
Germany (11), Japan (18), United Kingdom (41) and the USA (44), where the numbers in parenthesis
represent the number of observations for each country in the total sample. The results are obtained
using a fixed effects panel regression where the country fixed effects and constant are not presented.
The specification in column (1) represents all data in the sample where all other columns excludes
those years where the change in the Gini coefficient is equal to or greater than one in modulus. LWing
is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country has a political party in power that is from
the centre-left of the political scale for that country, and zero otherwise. T ime is a dummy variable
which takes the value 1 for any observation between the years 1979 and 2000 inclusive, 0 otherwise.
Data used to calculate CY CGrowthi,t was obtained from the IMF International Financial Statistics.
P-values of t-statistics for each individual coefficient are presented in parenthesis. The notation * is
used to represent t-statistics significant to at least 10%, ** significant to at least 5% and *** significant
to at least 1%.
3.6 Further sensitivity tests
The redistribution of welfare from non-Ricardian to Ricardian households associated
with adverse shocks has been shown to be algebraically robust and illustrated through
dynamic simulation: the results have also been seen not to be sensitive to the labour
market assumption. This section further tests the robustness of the results.
3.6.1 Non-adverse shocks
The above analysis has been performed considering only adverse shocks, defined as
those leading to a negative output gap. This restriction was made to consider the
impact of the current recession. The model is linear and therefore the impact from non-
adverse shocks would be the reverse of those presented above: non-Ricardian households
would benefit at the expense of Ricardian households in boom periods. However, it
could be argued that such behaviour over the course of the business cycle leads to lower
levels of welfare as the linear impacts net-off but the variance in consumption will be
higher for credit-constrained agents, thus leading to lower levels of utility.
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Table 8: Consumption variance throughout the business cycle
Labour Market
Perfectly Competitive Imperfectly Competitive
ϕ = 0.2 ϕ = 1.0 ϕ = 0.2 ϕ = 1.0
Var
(
cNRt
)
/Var (ct) 1.26 2.92 2.63 4.96
Var
(
cRt
)
/Var (ct) 0.92 0.85 0.82 0.82
Var
(
cRt
)
/Var (ct |λ=0) 0.95 0.90 0.89 0.89
Results achieved through simulating the model with both perfectly competitive (columns 2 & 3) and
imperfectly competitive (columns 4 & 5) labour markets with equal standard deviation weights for
demand, cost push and productivity shocks (where demand shocks are shared across both interest rate
and preference shocks); the results are not sensitive to this equal weighting. A simulation period of
10,000 quarters is used where the first 200 observations were dropped from the analysis. A calibration
of λPC = 0.3 is used as this is in line with many estimation results from DSGE analysis and λIC = 0.22
to maintain a constant λ/λ∗ ratio; results are amplified at higher values of λ. Moreover, a calibration
of ϕ = 1 is used as a sensitivity check as this is more in line with the literature and moreover, as
demonstrated, has a significant impact on the results. Var (Ct |λ=0) is the variance of (Ricardian)
consumption in a fully Ricardian economy.
To extend the analysis to consider the whole business cycle, simulations of the model are
performed and key statistics observed and documented in Table 8. This is performed
under both labour market assumptions and also where ϕ is increased to 1 because the
imperfectly competitive labour market and a higher wage elasticity to employment are
more coherent with empirical observations. Ricardian households experience a lower
variance in consumption than their non-Ricardian neighbours and moreover, than in
a fully Ricardian economy; credit-constrained households insulate the unconstrained
despite the fact that their presence increases the impact of shocks and therefore exposes
the aggregate economy more to these exogenous movements. In a model with perfectly
competitive labour markets the variance in non-Ricardian consumption is nearly a
third greater than that in Ricardian consumption; however in the more empirically
appropriate assumption of imperfect labour markets this increases to 263% greater as
rule-of-agents are less able to smooth consumption through their labour supply. When
ϕ is allowed to increase to more frequently used calibrations (with a corresponding
reduction in λ to maintain a constant λ/λ∗ ratio) these results are amplified; with
imperfectly competitive labour markets non-Ricardian consumption variance is nearly
six times greater than their Ricardian neighbours. This occurs because agents are more
adverse to movements in employment and therefore use this resource less to smooth
consumption.
“We’re all in this together”? 61
3.6.2 The degree of asset market non-participation
As was discussed in Section 3.3.1 the greater the share of non-Ricardian households the
greater the impact of a shock on the aggregate economy due to the non-linear feedback
mechanism between any exogenous movement and aggregate demand. From a disaggre-
gate perspective two factors are influencing the welfare of individual agents: first, the
increased aggregate impact of the shock is leading to a larger labour supply reaction
by rule-of-thumb agents; and second, as the proportion of rule-of-thumb households
increase, the proportion of Ricardian households is decreasing, and therefore so too
are the agents who can take advantage of the additional employment and dividends in
the economy. These two factors work in unison such that the losses of non-Ricardian
households and the gains of Ricardian households are amplified and so too is the re-
distribution of welfare. However, movements in λ are having the greatest impact on
Ricardian agents: for example, an increase of λ = 0.3 to λ = 0.5 leads to a rise in
Ricardian gains of 85% with a rise in non-Ricardian losses of only 4% for demand and
cost push shocks (see the top left pane in Figure 3). This dominance occurs due to the
impact of having fewer agents from which to share dividends across. However, these
quantitative movements are met with the same intuition and qualitative responses: at
all calibrations in the region of λ < λ∗ and in the presence of adverse shocks Ricardian
welfare always dominates non-Ricardian welfare.
We can also remove the assumption that both types of agent consume and work the
same amounts in steady state. The only impact this would have on the model would
be to change the aggregate consumption condition to:14
ct = χc
NR
t + (1− χ)cRt
where χ = λCNR/C. Empirical studies on rule-of-thumb consumption behaviour, for
which the calibration of λ is based, are finding χ as they are estimating the share
of income accruing to rule-of-thumb households. Therefore, if the proposition that
these agents will come from the lower end of the income distribution is believed, this
will result in more non-Ricardian households than their share of total income; the only
impact that this will have on the above results is to change the weighted average welfare
figures. More details of the algebra for this are given in Appendix B.4.
14Note that the remaining areas where disaggregate steady state levels arise in the derivation of the
model (the welfare criterion and the log-linear non-Ricardian consumption function) require the ratio
of these variables (N i/Ci), which given the assumed identical period utility function will be equal in
steady state.
“We’re all in this together”? 62
3.6.3 Other parameters
The calibration used, which follows closely that of Gal´ı et al. (2007), has been criticised
for its low value of the wage elasticity of labour (see for example Furlanetto and Seneca;
2009). The main reason for having ϕ set at 0.2 is to allow λ to be set at 0.5, recalling
from equation (2.24) that these two variables cannot be independently calibrated if
all other parameters are, whilst maintaining λ < λ∗. An increase in this parameter
has three main effects: first, as the disutility of labour increases, the labour response
of rule-of-thumb agents to adverse shocks will decrease; second, the value of λ∗ will
decrease leading a bigger impact from shocks for a given value of λ; and third, the
weight attached to squared movements in employment in the welfare criterion (3.4)
increase. These impacts combine to increase the redistribution of welfare in the presence
of adverse shocks as the second of these will dominate. An increase from ϕ = 0.2 to
ϕ = 1, for example, will lead to Ricardian gains and non-Ricardian losses approximately
trebling and doubling respectively (see the top right pane in Figure 3).
The calibration is also criticised for the high level of price stickiness (see again Furlan-
etto and Seneca; 2009) with θ = 0.75 leading to an average price duration of one year.
With respect to demand and productivity shocks, an increase in θ increases the aggre-
gate impact of the shock thus increasing the redistribution of welfare. With respect to
cost push shocks, however, the reverse is true because at high levels of θ the shock is
not transmitted into the economy, as is clear through inspection of the New Keynesian
Phillips curve (2.24). These impacts are shared across both types of households; for
example, an increase from θ = 0.5 to θ = 0.75 leads to an increase in Ricardian gains
and non-Ricardian losses equal to approximately 150% for demand shocks and a fall of
approximately 55% for cost push shocks (see the the second row in Figure 3).
Finally, the policy parameters are of significance because the two types of agent may
have differing preferences over these. In general, more conservative monetary policy
leads to a lower impact from shocks and therefore will reduce both gains and losses to
Ricardian and non-Ricardian households respectively: these impacts, although quan-
titatively small, are shared across both types of agent. The only exception to this is
with cost push shocks where a higher calibration of ϕpi leads to a greater aversion to
the inflation these shocks generate and subsequently the impact they have on output:
in this scenario, higher values lead to a rise in the gains and losses of Ricardian and
non-Ricardian households respectively (see the final right hand side pane in Figure
3). However, these are only quantitatively small changes and qualitatively the above
results are robust.
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Figure 3: Chapter 3 sensitivity
1 1.5 2 2.5
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
ϕpi
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
−0.1
0
0.1
ϕ
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
θ
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
θ
1 1.5 2 2.5
-0.05
0
0.05
·10−2
ϕpi
0 0.5 1 1.5
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
ϕy
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0
0.2
0.4
λ
Ricardian
Non-Ricardian
Weighted Average
Results achieved through shocking the economy with an adverse interest rate shock (ηrt = 1) in period
t = 1 using the calibration outlined in Section 3.3.2 where in each pane one parameter is varied from
this calibration (determined by the notation on the x-axis). For sensitivity results with respect to θ
and ϕpi the source of the shock is significant and therefore for these a separate pane of results is shown
where ηµt = 1.4 in period t = 1. The left hand pane for these results represent demand shocks and the
right hand pane cost push socks. In all other parameters the analysis from demand shocks give the
relationships involved and therefore for brevity only these results are presented.
3.7 Conclusions
The objective of this chapter was to identify whether a simple DSGE model with het-
erogeneity among households could provide theoretical support for the recent anecdotal
evidence of an inequality of sacrifice in the recent recession: the results have gone some
way towards dispelling the notion that ‘we’re all in this together’. This was performed
by distinguishing agents with respect to their engagement with capital markets, which
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was argued to be empirically appropriate and apt in the current credit crisis. It was
found that those agents who are credit-constrained disproportionately lose in the pres-
ence of adverse shocks in the economy. Further, it was observed that this suffering
from one set of individuals was to the benefit of the other, whereby the actions of
the rule-of-thumb households insulated the economy; under reasonable calibrations the
Ricardian households gain as a result of the adverse shocks. These results were shown
through algebraic proof, dynamic simulation and through a derivation of a disaggre-
gated welfare criteria based on a second order Taylor series expansion of the utility
function. The results from the model are also shown to be supported through an em-
pirical investigation that suggested a negative correlation between cyclical growth and
income inequality.
These results are important because it provides a further critique to the Lucas (2003)
argument that the welfare consequences of economic fluctuations are trivial. In this
respect it contributes and compliments the existing literature that finds similar results
suggesting business cycles disproportionately impact the poor, low skilled and unem-
ployed: this is coherent with the proposition behind the identification of these agents.
A further contribution of the chapter is to provide simple and tractable techniques that
can be applied in the growing DSGE literature that includes a fraction of rule-of-thumb
agents. Up to date, welfare analysis from DSGE models has been performed on a repre-
sentative agent, the same assumption used by Lucas (2003) to suggest that such studies
are not an important priority. This chapter illustrates that there are disaggregated and
redistributional impacts to exogenous shocks and subsequent policy actions. These im-
pacts by themselves are of importance but moreover provide potential frictions that
can commentate on why some policies are followed over others; the model can be used
to discuss political motives to policy. The potential extensions that follow this line of
argument are vast, certainly with the debate around current and recent policy actions,
and the next chapter extends this analysis to consider potential polarized preferences
in the conduct of fiscal policy.
Chapter 4
Austerity versus stimulus: the
polarizing effect of fiscal policy
4.1 Introduction
The 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent global economic downturn has brought fis-
cal policy back into the political and academic agenda. Across the developed economies,
governments looked to large fiscal stimuli in order to counteract the effects of recession
and boost demand. Despite this resurgence and return to fiscal policy there is still
much doubt and debate as to whether such policy has the desired effects. Recently in
Europe these discussions have centred around the ‘austerity versus stimulus’ debate.
These arguments were voiced both in the UK and internationally as the topic of ‘fis-
cal responsibility’ has become a key theme in the rhetoric of the recent downturn. In
fiscal debates around the world, there consistently appears to be two clear factions in
the discussions and ‘austerity versus stimulus’ is no exception. The conduct of fiscal
policy and the polarized preferences associated with it are rife in today’s political and
economic agenda and are the subject of this chapter.
This chapter seeks to contribute to two literatures: that reflecting on the heteroge-
neous welfare impacts of business cycles, discussed in Chapter 3, and the fiscal-DSGE
literature. The dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) literature focusing on
fiscal conduct has largely abstracted away from the normative gains of policy and has
been occupied with the question of the size of the fiscal multiplier. Estimates for these
multipliers from the empirical literature are often observed to be greater than one (see
for example Blanchard and Perotti; 2002), however traditional New Keynesian DSGE
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models fail to predict this.1 Much of the fiscal-DSGE literature has aimed to rectify
this anomaly: see for example Linnemann and Schabert (2003), Coenen and Straub
(2005), Linnemann (2006), Gal´ı et al. (2007), Bilbiie et al. (2008) and Monacelli and
Perotti (2008). The experience of the recent downturn, combined with low central
bank rates, has prompted a discussion on the impact of fiscal policy when the nominal
interest rate is at the zero lower bound, and moreover, the appropriate policy mix with
respect to the balance between spending and tax movements.2 Currently, we argue, the
fiscal-DSGE literature has two key omissions: first, through focusing on the positive
properties of policy the analysis is lacking a comprehensive consideration of the norma-
tive consequences; and second, through focusing on aggregate dynamics and using the
often assumed representative agent, the analysis abstracts away from any heterogeneity
and politics, something clearly evident in the conduct of fiscal policy. This chapter,
and the next, looks to address these omissions.
The innovation of this chapter is to address this question using a New Keynesian
DSGE model with a proportion of credit-constrained agents, as derived in Chapter
2. We propose that these two agents (the Ricardian and non-Ricardian households)
represent two clear distinct groups in society of empirically non-trivial proportions,
and hypothesise that the latter will come from those individuals at the lower end of
the income distribution; although the results are not sensitive to this hypothesis, the
interpretations of these results are. This is supported by the growing literature that
includes credit-constrained agents into DSGE models: see Chapter 3. However, despite
the growing use of these models, limited analysis currently exists on disaggregated
variables. Although some papers report heterogeneous dynamics, these tend to only
give more detail behind the aggregate variables and no in depth analysis of divergences
are discussed.
Through developing an agent specific welfare criteria using a second order Taylor series
expansion of the utility function, normative analyses of exogenous shocks and subse-
quent policy can be made. This adds insight into the different experiences of agents and
moreover identifies whether there are any differing preferences associated with policy.
In the absence of fiscal policy, credit-constrained agents experience a lower level of wel-
fare than their non-constrained counterparts who are seen to gain as a result of adverse
shocks. This divergence, as found in Chapter 3, is quantitatively non-trivial and is due
to the employment decision of the rule-of-thumb households: from this benchmark the
impact of policy can be analysed with four key results observed. First, countercyclical
1However, it should be highlighted that empirical results do vary with estimates below one, see for
example Ramey (2011) and Ilzetzki et al. (2013).
2See for example Christiano et al. (2011), Eggertsson (2011), Hall (2011), and Woodford (2011).
Within this literature, the effectiveness of policy is measured through the aggregate effects on the
economy: the fiscal multiplier.
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fiscal policy is to the benefit of rule-of-thumb agents and the detriment of their Ri-
cardian neighbours: there are polarized preferences to policy. This occurs because the
Ricardian agents gain as a result of the adverse shocks due to the responses of their
credit-constrained neighbours, and through stabilising the economy the fiscal authority
are reducing this impact. Second, these rule-of-thumb agents benefit more through
countercyclical policy that is paid back slowly over the medium term, whereas Ricar-
dian households prefer prompt repayment: they are more debt averse than the non-
Ricardian households. Third, countercyclical measures which favour spending increases
over tax cuts are more productive for the economy as a whole, but credit-constrained
individuals are largely indifferent between spending increases or tax cuts. Finally, there
is a normative justification for countercyclical fiscal measures, however, the quantita-
tive aggregate gains of stabilisation policy are minimal: this is in line with the results
from Lucas (2003). The real normative justification comes from the redistributional
consequences of countercyclical policy, reducing the inequality of adverse shocks, with
the gains from policy of the rule-of-thumb agents being (nearly) matched by the losses
of the Ricardian agents: in many respects, the conduct of fiscal policy is performed in
a de-facto zero sum game. This is the source of the polarizing preferences in the model
and provides a clear commentary of the current austerity versus stimulus debate. It is
the non-Ricardian agents who have a preference towards stimulus and their Ricardian
neighbours who have a preference towards austerity. This is with respect to both the
cyclical response and debt aversion priorities of the two households, with the same con-
clusions reached from the two perspectives. These debates are observed to be amplified
when monetary policy is at the zero lower bound.
The chapter proceeds in the following way. Section 4.2 discusses a model that includes
a share of non-Ricardian households and Section 4.3 reviews the algebraic properties
of fiscal variables in the model. Section 4.4 discusses both the positive and normative
consequences of fiscal policy across households, and Section 4.5 considers further ex-
tensions to this benchmark case. Section 4.6 performs sensitivity analysis confirming
the robustness of the key results, and Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 The model
The model is the same as that described in Section 2.3 and can therefore be described
through the following six equations: the aggregate demand condition (2.20); the New
Keynesian Phillips curve (2.24); the Taylor rule (2.12); the flow constraint for govern-
ment debt (2.16); and the government spending and taxation rules (2.14) and (2.15).
These six equations in six unknowns can subsequently be manipulated to produce a
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system of three variables (yt, pit and b̂t), details of which are given in Appendix C.1.
The model therefore has three forward looking predetermined variables and therefore
determinacy requires that three eigenvalues lie outside the unit circle; the determinacy
properties of such a system are similar to those derived in Section 3.2. These are too
complicated to present, but intuitive relationships can be established and subsequently
quantitatively tested. When λ < λ∗, a simple Taylor Principle delivers determinacy
(ϕpi > 1) and when λ > λ
∗ either passive or extremely aggressive policy is required. Ir-
respective of the value of λ, the fiscal determinacy condition of ϕb,T−ϕb,g > ρR/(1+ρR)
is also required. Moreover, to ensure price stability policy cannot be too procyclical,
the degree to which this is true is determined by the other stabilising parameters in
the policy rules.3
The chapter reflects upon normative consequences of fiscal policy which are sensitive
to the assumed presence, or not, of government spending in the utility function. We
propose to bypass this issue by only focusing on those policy actions which do not
lead to a net discounted movement in government spending over the lifetime of the
policy.4 This has the advantage that any conclusions reached are not sensitive to this
empirically questionable issue. This process leaves two policy experiments with which
to focus the analysis on. The first (from now on referred to as ‘policy experiment 1’)
is where short term government spending increases (decreases) are repaid in the longer
term through future spending cuts (rises: ϕg < 0, ϕb,g < 0). As demonstrated in the
log-linear government flow constraint (2.16) interest accrues on debt at a rate of
(
βR
)−t
whereas the impact on utility will be discounted at
(
βi
)t
. This experiment therefore
results in negligible discounted government spending movement (this is explained more
fully in Appendix C.2). The second (from now on referred to as ‘policy experiment
2’) is where short term tax cuts (rises) are repaid in the longer term through tax rises
(cuts: ϕT > 0, ϕb,T > 0).
4.3 Algebraic properties
4.3.1 Steady state properties of fiscal policy
In order to consider the steady state properties of fiscal policy, Appendix C.3 demon-
strates how the following condition can be derived considering the relationship between
3In a similar way as ϕy can relax the determinacy conditions found in Section 3.2, ϕg and ϕT can
also be used in such a fashion, if countercyclical. The reverse is also true: procyclical fiscal policy
requires stronger countercyclical monetary policy to ensure price stability.
4Note that if government spending entered the utility function separably, net discounted government
spending would enter a welfare criterion based on a second order Taylor series expansion of this utility
function separably. Therefore, if this is zero, the utility derived from government spending is irrelevant
to households over the lifetime of the policy.
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steady state private and public consumption:
G =
[
Cσ
(− 1)(1− α)
]− 1−α
ϕ+α
− C
and from this it can be shown that:
∂G
∂C
=
−(1− α)σ
(
Cσ
(1−α)(−1)
)− 1−α
ϕ+α
C(α+ ϕ)
= −γc(α+ ϕ)
σ(1− α)
where all variables are defined in Chapter 2. This states that a permanent increase in
government spending will crowd out private consumption. Moreover, from the above
we can infer that the bigger the share of private consumption in output (γc), the
higher the crowding out of private consumption. This is a common result and is due
to the increased employment required to produce additional government consumption;
agents derive disutility from this additional labour and optimise by trading off private
consumption for leisure. Moreover, from the above it is possible to show that this
crowding out can be bigger than the initial increase in government spending (∂G/∂C <
−1) when:
γc >
σ(1− α)
α+ ϕ
In such a scenario, an increase in government spending reduces output.
If lump sum taxation were increased to pay for any increase in steady state government
consumption, the crowding out of private consumption would be distributed equally
across the two types of agent in the model. However, were debt to permanently increase
to pay for this, non-Ricardian consumption would fall more than Ricardian consump-
tion in steady state, as the latter own government debt and therefore receive the interest
on this higher level of debt.5 Note that steady state debt is determined by the excess
of steady state spending over taxation, and the rate at which interest accrues on this
in steady state is determined by the reciprocal of the Ricardian discount factor
(
βR
)
.
5Alternatively, the lump sum transfers between agents would need to increase which equalises the
consumption levels between the two agents, now taking into account both the allocation of dividends
and debt interest.
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4.3.2 Dynamic properties of fiscal policy
This section analytically reviews the dynamic (out of steady state) algebraic relation-
ships between aggregate demand and fiscal policy variables, which follow from Propo-
sitions 2 and 3 in Chapter 2. From the aggregate demand condition (2.20) it is possible
to show, in the region of 0 < λ < λ∗, the following three results:
∂yt
∂ĝt
> 0,
∂yt
∂t̂t
< 0,
∣∣∣∣∂yt∂ĝt
∣∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∣∂yt∂t̂t
∣∣∣∣ (4.1)
all other things being equal.6 The first and second of these conditions follows from
the observation that ∂yt/∂ĝt = Φ and ∂yt/∂t̂t = −ΦΘC , and noting that the condition
λ < λ∗ results in each of these aggregate demand coefficients to be positive; the third
of these conditions is provided observing that Φ > ΦΘC when λ < λ
∗.
First, increases in government spending increase aggregate demand: this is true in
a fully-Ricardian economy and the magnitude of this (the fiscal multiplier) has been
studied extensively in the DSGE literature. Second, tax cuts increase aggregate de-
mand: in a fully-Ricardian economy this would not be true as Ricardian equivalence
would hold. The introduction of non-Ricardian households means that taxes are rel-
evant because they impact on these agents’ disposable income and subsequently their
consumption. Third, the aggregate demand impact of a unit change in government
spending is greater than the aggregate demand impact of a unit change in taxes. This
is an intuitive result and occurs for two main reasons: first, tax movements only impact
the consumption decisions of rule-of-thumb agents (at least in the first instance) be-
cause Ricardian agents maximise over their life time and therefore adhere to Ricardian
equivalence. Given that the share of rule-of-thumb households is less than one, there
are some consumers for which this fiscal action will not initially impact. Second, gov-
ernment spending movements directly affect demand. The impact of tax movements
on aggregate demand depend on the decisions of households, who can use, say, a tax
cut to both purchase more consumption and/or more leisure: the latter of which will
reduce production in the economy. The magnitude to which government spending in-
creases (decreases) dominate tax cuts (rises) can be algebraically shown to be inversely
proportional to the level of asset market non-participation, λ, and positively related
to the level of private consumption in steady state, γc, and the markup charged by
intermediate firms, µ.
6This ceteris paribus assumption eliminates how debt resulting from policy is repaid. However, it
is possible to show that providing there is no existing debt and that debt aversion parameters are
not excessively high, the results hold. The purpose of this partial analysis is to provide an algebraic
grounding of intuitive relationships which are discussed through the chapter.
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Ricardian equivalence in this model holds for any policy which only impacts lump sum
taxation of Ricardian households, who maximise over their lifetime; note that in the
aggregate demand condition (2.20), were λ = 0 (a fully Ricardian economy) the co-
efficient ΘC = 0 and therefore temporary movements in taxes do not impact output.
However, note that when λ > 0, the presence of credit-constrained agents impacts the
general equilibrium which has a subsequent impact of on the behaviour of Ricardian
households. Therefore, although Ricardian agents will not respond specifically to the
movements of lump sum taxes in policy experiment 2, they will respond to the move-
ments in wages and interest rates as a result of the actions of rule-of-thumb households
under such a policy.
Within these relationships, an intuitive key determinant is the proportion of rule-of-
thumb agents in the economy, λ. Propositions 2 and 3 show that increases in the
fraction of non-Ricardian households increases the impact that changes in government
spending and taxes have on aggregate demand, and does so in a non-linear way. The
more rule-of-thumb agents in the economy the more of an impact tax cuts will have in
stimulating aggregate demand because there will be fewer agents adhering to Ricardian
equivalence. Likewise, an increase in public consumption will increase labour demand
and wages such that it increases disposable incomes. Whereas Ricardian agents see a
negative wealth effect to an increase in government spending (therefore cutting their
private consumption), non-Ricardian agents simply consume this temporary increase in
incomes. This relationship is non-linear, demonstrating a typical Keynesian multiplier
effect.
4.4 Dynamic simulations
4.4.1 Calibration
For dynamic simulations the calibration as discussed in Section 3.3.2 is used. The
exceptions to this are the share of government spending in output, γg, is set equal to
0.2 (correspondingly, γc = 0.8) and the fiscal policy parameters (ϕg, ϕT , ϕb,g and ϕb,T )
which will be varied throughout the analysis. Moreover, as ϕ is an important parameter
for welfare, and for the impact of fiscal policy from an aggregate and disaggregate
perspective, we revert to the common calibration of ϕ = 2; correspondingly, we calibrate
the proportion of non-Ricardian households (λ) at 0.3 to maintain that λ < λ∗. As
was the case in Chapter 3, the model with perfectly competitive labour markets will be
used to obtain benchmark results and subsequently sensitivity to these results tested
against imperfectly competitive labour markets.
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4.4.2 The positive consequences of fiscal policy
An acyclical fiscal response
As a benchmark, the dynamics of an economy with no active fiscal policy will be con-
sidered. It will be against these results that the impact of fiscal interaction will be
analysed. These results are in line with those presented in Chapter 3 which are sum-
marised here for ease of reading. The impact of fiscal policy is not sensitive to the initial
shock and therefore, for brevity, the results for an exogenous adverse monetary policy
shock will be considered: sensitivity of the results to other shocks will be discussed.
Figure 4 illustrates the dynamics of an economy hit by a one percent shock to interest
rates under the circumstances of acyclical fiscal policy and the two fiscal experiments.
In the presence of acyclical fiscal policy, an exogenous positive monetary policy shock
leads to a fall in output in the economy; Ricardian consumers postpone consumption
due to higher rates of returns on savings, and non-Ricardian consumers respond to the
decline in the economy and subsequent drop in their disposable income. As a result,
both aggregate consumption and employment fall in general equilibrium. These results
are also true of a fully-Ricardian economy, although the initial impact of the shock
increases with the level of asset market non-participation, λ, due to the non-linear
feedback mechanism discussed in Chapter 2 and above; in this calibration, output
initially falls by approximately 2% from it’s steady state level but this diminishes over
time as the impact of the shock reduces.
Both Ricardian and non-Ricardian consumption fall following the shock; the former
due to higher nominal interest rates and the latter due to both the fall in real wages
in the economy, driven by lower labour demand, and lower levels of employment both
contributing to reduce disposal income. However, the fall in consumption for the rule-
of-thumb agents is greater than that of their Ricardian counterparts. This is an intuitive
result that occurs for all time periods. Rule-of-thumb households alleviate the impact
of the shock through their labour market decisions: their supply of labour. In the
presence of an adverse shock, the credit-constrained agents supply more labour to the
market, compared to Ricardian households, in order to increase their disposable income
and therefore consumption. However, the result of this increase in labour supply, and
the overall reduction in output, leads to a fall in wages and therefore the consumption
of non-Ricardian households still falls. These agents are supplying more labour to the
market, therefore increasing aggregate output, but they are unable to consume all of
this additional production; the surplus is consumed by the Ricardian households who
are being insulated as a result of the actions of the credit-constrained agents. They
are able to purchase this surplus through greater dividends in general equilibrium
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Figure 4: Dynamics under different fiscal experiments
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Dynamics achieved through using the calibration described in Section 4.4.1 and with a 1 percent
monetary policy shock (ηrt ) in period t = 1. The x-axis represents the number of quarters and the
y-axis the percentage deviation of the variable from steady state levels. Acyclical policy is when all
fiscal parameters are set to zero; ‘PE1’ represents policy experiment 1 with calibration ϕg = −3 and
ϕb,g = −0.1; ‘PE2’ represents policy experiment 2 with calibration ϕT = 3 and ϕb,T = 0.1. These
fiscal parameters are arbitrarily set for the purposes of demonstration in the figure. Note, debt aversion
parameters equal to 0.1 in modulus relates to an expected half life of debt of two years, using equation
(2.16).
brought about by the supply of cheap labour. As in Chapter 3, the assumption of the
distribution of profits is important in these results, and the impact of the impatience
of non-Ricardian households.
Overall, income of Ricardian households dominates that of non-Ricardian households
despite the fall in the former’s labour supply and the rise of the latter’s. Ricardian
households both consume more and work less than their non-Ricardian neighbours.
This is illustrated in Figure 4 for an adverse monetary policy shock, and this intuitive
transmission mechanism is not sensitive to the original shock and similar results for
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other shocks can be observed (although the aggregate dynamics underlying these will
differ).
The impact of fiscal policy
Figure 4 also presents the impact of the two policy experiments (calibrated to be coun-
tercyclical) to the aggregate and disaggregate economy. As predicted by the algebraic
analysis in Section 4.3 in both experiments aggregate demand, and subsequently out-
put, initially increases compared to the acyclical benchmark. In policy experiment 1,
where spending increases in the short term are funded by future spending cuts, this
increase in demand comes directly from the government. Aggregate private consump-
tion initially falls in the economy (it is ‘crowded out’ by the fiscal action) however,
this aggregate movement hides disparity across agents; non-Ricardian consumption in-
creases and Ricardian consumption falls, compared to the acyclical benchmark. This
rise in rule-of-thumb consumption is driven by an increase in real wages as labour de-
mand in the economy rises due to the increase in output. Ricardian households, on
the other hand, substitute leisure for consumption as the increase in labour demand
increases their employment levels: they optimise by reducing their consumption. In
policy experiment 2, where tax cuts today are funded by future tax rises, this rise in ag-
gregate demand and subsequently output comes entirely through private consumption.
Non-Ricardian consumption increases and Ricardian consumption falls, however the
increase in the former is greater than that of the latter. Rule-of-thumb consumption
increases as a result of both the tax cut, which directly increases disposable income,
and also through an increase in wages as labour demand in the economy increases. In
a fully-Ricardian economy (λ = 0), the impact of policy experiment 2 would be nil;
Ricardian equivalence would hold and private consumption would remain unchanged.
However, with λ > 0, a small short term fall in Ricardian consumption is observed,
compared to the acyclical benchmark, as a result of increasing Ricardian employment
leaving them with a preference to substitute consumption for leisure.
The effectiveness of policy experiment 1 over policy experiment 2 with respect to ag-
gregate output, as predicted in (4.1), is illustrated in Figure 4. In both cases, output
initially dominates the acyclical benchmark but the direct government injection of pub-
lic spending is more effective than private tax cuts as the latter are used (partially)
to purchase more leisure. Over longer horizons, the fiscal policy actions need to be
repaid and as such the stimulating impact is reduced until output falls below that of
the acyclical benchmark: in this calibration this occurs after 14 and 17 quarters for
policy experiments 1 and 2 respectively.
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From a disaggregate perspective clear results are presented as a consequence of the
fiscal experiments. Compared to the acyclical benchmark, consumption rises and em-
ployment falls (with the exception of a slight rise in employment in policy experiment
1) initially for rule-of-thumb households with the reverse results for Ricardian house-
holds. However, these results are only immediate consequences of the policy and as the
fiscal authority starts to repay resulting debt these dynamics are reversed.
4.4.3 The normative consequences of fiscal policy
This section reviews whether there is a normative justification to fiscal policy by evalu-
ating the different agent’s welfare under the policy experiments discussed above. This
is performed by deriving a welfare criterion based on a second order Taylor series ex-
pansion of the utility function around the non-stochastic, zero debt, zero inflation,
steady state values. This procedure provides a criterion expressed as the equivalent
one period consumption loss, as a proportion of steady state consumption, that leaves
the agent indifferent between living through the shock or the one period consumption
loss. This process provides the same criterion as derived in Section 3.3.3 with the re-
sulting function (3.4). As mentioned above, if government spending were to enter the
utility function separably this welfare criterion would also have a weight attached to
the net discounted movements in government spending; this will be zero for the two
policy experiments outlined in Section 4.2. Welfare results are derived using a second
order approximation of the model because, as Walsh (2010) highlights, a first order
approximation can be inappropriate.
An acyclical fiscal policy response
The top row of Figure 5 presents welfare valuations of the two policy experiments
when the economy is struck by the same one percent adverse monetary policy shock
discussed above, for differing values of the cyclical response parameters; the vertical
lines represent acyclical policy (ϕg = ϕT = 0). The results show the intuitive result
from the disaggregated dynamics presented above; in the absence of fiscal policy, Ri-
cardian welfare dominates non-Ricardian welfare as the former both consume more and
work less. The resulting dynamics mean that these unconstrained agents gain welfare
as a result of the shock; their fall in employment provides enough of a utility reward to
compensate for the penalty of a fall in consumption. These results are in stark contrast
to the non-Ricardian agents who see a significant fall in welfare as a result of the shock.
In aggregate, there is a mild improvement in welfare as there is a majority of Ricardian
Austerity versus stimulus and redistribution 76
agents who discount the future less whose gains are being netted against a smaller frac-
tion of rule-of-thumb agents; these results are coherent with those presented in Chapter
3 (in Table 5) but quantitatively larger predominantly due to the higher calibration
of ϕ. There is a redistribution of welfare from non-Ricardian to Ricardian agents as
a result of the adverse shock. This is not sensitive to the type of shock causing the
deviations and the intuitive transmission mechanism is maintained.
The impact of fiscal policy
Figure 5 presents the normative consequences of fiscal policy: as discussed above, the
first row illustrates the movement in welfare when the cyclical response parameters
(ϕg and ϕT ) are varied whilst the debt aversion parameters are fixed (ϕb,g and ϕb,T );
the second row reverses this, varying the debt aversion parameters whilst fixing the
cyclical response parameters. From these figures four clear results emerge. First, non-
Ricardian households gain and Ricardian households lose as a result of countercyclical
fiscal policy: this is an intuitive result. Countercyclical policy stabilises the economy
by reducing the impact of the exogenous shock. This stabilising role reduces the need
to use capital markets to smooth consumption and therefore reduces the welfare losses
associated to not being able to do this. However, because the stabilisation policy is
insulating the economy, the increase in the rule-of-thumb labour supply is reduced and
as such, the gains from the shock that the Ricardian agents experience are reduced
through countercyclical policy. There is a clear divergence of preferences between the
two households.
Second, rule-of-thumb households are largely indifferent between countercyclical mea-
sures which increase government spending and those which reduce taxes in response to
a recessionary shock. It was observed in equation (4.1) that the former have a greater
impact on the aggregate economy than the latter and this is demonstrated in Figure 4.
The normative results imply that rule-of-thumb agents benefit both from general in-
creases in aggregate demand and through direct injections into their disposable income.
Ricardian households prefer countercyclical measures which cut taxes over those that
increase spending because they have less of a stabilising role, and therefore maintain
their improved position as a result of the shock.
Third, high degrees of debt aversion lead to lower movements in relative welfare as a
result of policy (the second row in Figure 5). This occurs because the initial impact
of the intervention is shortened as the repayment for the policy is accelerated in the
economy.7 Therefore, the results from above are maintained, rule-of-thumb agents
7Similar effects of the impact of lower debt aversion on the impact of both aggregate and disaggregate
variables are found in Bilbiie and Straub (2004).
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Figure 5: Welfare consequences of fiscal experiments
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Dynamics achieved through using the calibration described in Section 4.4.1 with a 1 percent monetary
policy shock (ηrt ) in period t = 1. In the top left pane ϕg is varied whilst ϕb,g = −0.1; in the top
right pane ϕT is varied whilst ϕb,T = 0.1; in the bottom left pane ϕb,g is varied whilst ϕg = −3; and
in the bottom right pane ϕb,T is varied whilst ϕT = 3. Note, debt aversion parameters equal to 0.1
in modulus relate to an expected half life of debt of two years, using equation (2.16). Vertical lines
in the top row represent acyclical fiscal policy. Welfare movement is expressed as the equivalent one
period consumption loss, as a proportion of steady state consumption, that would leave the household
indifferent between living through the shock, or this one period sacrifice. A second order approximation
of the model is applied to derive welfare results.
benefit from countercyclical fiscal policy, and Ricardian households lose, and moreover,
rule-of-thumb agents would prefer that such policy be repaid slowly, when the impact of
the shock on the economy has passed. This further contributes to the austerity versus
stimulus debate. To some extent the expression ‘debt aversion’ could be replaced with
‘austerity preference’. Many western economies performed an initial fiscal stimulus as
a result of the financial crash in 2008, with limited controversy. When the downturn
persisted the austerity versus stimulus debate ignited with the ‘austerity-camp’ looking
to repay the initial stimulus quickly with the counter-argument that such repayment
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was inappropriate whilst the economy was still struggling. These results provide a
further polarizing preference to the conduct of fiscal policy.
Finally, there is a normative aggregate justification for countercyclical fiscal measures
but these are quantitatively small: this result is in line with Lucas (2003). The real
normative justification comes from the redistributional consequences of policy because
it reduces the inequality of sacrifice between the two households as a result of the shock.
Through having a stabilising influence on the economy, the countercyclical policy limits
the impact of the adverse shocks and in so doing reduces the redistribution of welfare
associated with the shock. The fact that aggregate welfare gains as a response of fiscal
intervention are small is the cause of the polarizing preferences in the model: as one
agent gains welfare, the other agent loses.
Other shock processes
The same analysis as presented in Figures 4 and 5 can be performed for when the initial
shock originates from any of the other microfounded shock processes. The redistribu-
tion of welfare, in the presence of the adverse shock and acyclical fiscal policy, from
non-Ricardian to Ricardian households is observed whereby the former agents’ labour
market decisions improves welfare for the latter agents over their steady state levels.
From this benchmark, fiscal policy interacts with the economy in a similar way as to
those presented for adverse nominal interest rate shocks, and the disaggregated welfare
experiences of the two households also follow similar paths. This consistency of results
is due to the way fiscal policy interacts within the economy through the aggregate
demand condition.
4.4.4 The conduct of fiscal policy over the business cycle
The above analysis has been performed considering only adverse shocks, defined as
those leading to a negative output gap. This restriction was made to consider the
conduct of fiscal policy relevant for the current recession. The model is linear and
therefore the results above would be reversed in the presence of non-adverse shocks:
Ricardian households benefit from countercyclical fiscal policy in a boom when the
redistribution of welfare operates in the other direction.
To consider the conduct of fiscal policy over the whole business cycle, simulations of the
model are made with a mixed fiscal strategy where −ϕb,g = ϕb,T = 0.05 and where the
cyclical response parameters are varied but set equal to each other in absolute terms
(−ϕg = ϕT ). The results are not sensitive to this mixed strategy and the remainder of
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calibrated parameters are as set out in Section 4.4.1. Simulations are run with equal
weights for demand, cost push and productivity shocks and key statistics observed and
documented in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Fiscal policy and consumption variance through the business cycle
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
2
4
6
8
10
ϕT − ϕg
V
a
r
( ci) /
V
a
r(
c)
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
ϕT − ϕg
V
ar
( ci) /
V
a
r
( ci | ϕ
g
=
ϕ
T
=
0
)
Ricardian
Non-Ricardian
Dynamics achieved through using the calibration described in Section 4.4.1 with equal standard devi-
ation weights for demand, cost push and productivity shocks (where demand shocks are shared across
both interest rate and preference shocks); the results are not sensitive to this equal weighting. A sim-
ulation period of 1,000 quarters is used where the first 200 observations are dropped from the analysis.
Debt aversion parameters are set such that −ϕb,g = ϕb,T = 0.05 and where cyclical response parameters
are varied and set such that −ϕg = ϕT . The left hand pane measures the variance in consumption of
the two types of agent, compared against a benchmark of the respective agent’s consumption variance
with acyclical policy; the right hand pane measures the variance in consumption of the two types of
agent as a ratio of the variance of aggregate consumption at that parameter calibration.
A countercyclical fiscal response to the business cycle leads to a fall in the variance
of non-Ricardian consumption and a rise in the variance of Ricardian consumption
compared to an acyclical benchmark (the first pane of Figure 6). The fall in the variance
of non-Ricardian consumption arises because the fiscal action acts to stabilise disposable
income, either directly through taxation or indirectly through government demand.
For Ricardian households, the insulating actions of their non-Ricardian neighbours are
more effective than those of the fiscal authority and the countercyclical conduct of
the latter therefore leads to a rise in the variance of their consumption. To these
agents, movements in government spending raises their consumption variance as they
substitute consumption for leisure, and movements in taxes are ignored, at least in
partial equilibrium. Therefore, over the course of the business cycle, countercyclical
fiscal policy works to the advantage of non-Ricardian households at the expense of
Ricardian households. There is a strong negative covariance between non-Ricardian
and Ricardian consumption which drives the polarizing preferences for fiscal policy:
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countercyclical policy reduces this covariance.8 Policies focusing on changing lump
sum taxes have a bigger impact on non-Ricardian households as they directly influence
their disposable income: correspondingly, policies focusing on government spending
reduces the detrimental impact on Ricardian households.
These results are not sensitive to the calibration used, in particular with respect to
λ, ϕ, and fiscal parameters, or changing the weights on different standard deviation of
shocks. Moreover, they are not sensitive to the labour market assumed. However, when
more frequently applied modelling assumptions and calibrations are used the point at
which non-Ricardian consumption variance is lower than that of Ricardian consumption
variance is significantly extended: this is particularly true of a more restrictive labour
market.9
These results are of particular significance because they contribute to the literate that
observes fiscal policy to be frequently procyclical, especially in developing nations: see
for example Kaminsky et al. (2004) and Chapter 7. This can be reconciled to our model
by observing that the results above are amplified the higher the proportion of credit-
constrained agents, see Section 4.6, and therefore the returns to procyclical policy
for Ricardian households are greater in such economies. Empirical data illustrates
that the proportion of credit-constrained agents is greater in developing countries, see
for example the work performed by Evans and Karras (1996) and discussed in Table
2 above, and that voter turnout in both parliamentary and presidential elections are
lower in these countries.10 Providing sufficient voting power is retained in the remaining
Ricardian households of a nation, the model would predict the empirical regularity that
these developing countries are more fiscally procyclical as they provide more insulation
for the capital owners within the economy.
8This is illustrated by the fact that a weighted average of the variance of Ricardian and non-
Ricardian consumption normalised by the variance of total consumption is substantially higher than
one (the second pane in Figure 6).
9Optimal policy in such a framework where a benevolent social planner minimises variation in both
output and inflation is numerically estimated to be where ϕg = −3.7 and ϕT = 2.3: both of which
represent countercyclical policy but with an emphasis on government spending as a more effective tool.
Moreover, the Ramsey policy for government spending where the social planner is not constrained by
specific policy functions will lead to a reduction in the variance of non-Ricardian consumption and a
rise in the variance of Ricardian consumption as government spending responds countercyclically to
the business cycle.
10Evans and Karras (1996) estimate the proportion of credit-constrained agents in 54 different coun-
tries and applying World Bank classifications the mean estimate for developing countries is nearly
double that of developed countries: this is summarised in Table 2. Moreover, applying the same World
Bank classifications to voter turnout data from the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance,
rates of 78% are found for developed economies followed by a monotonic decline with the level of devel-
opment, with rates of 65% for low income countries. Studies into the socio-economic factors influencing
voter turnout frequently show that it is those with less education and less income who are less likely to
vote (see for example Nevitte et al.; 2009): those individuals most likely not to participate in capital
markets.
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4.4.5 Discussion
The results observed from the theoretical model are simple, intuitive and reflective of
empirical debates. Polarized preferences to fiscal policy are predicted where policies
affect heterogeneous households differently: rule-of-thumb agents have preferences for
strong countercyclical fiscal policy which is paid back slowly over the medium term;
Ricardian agents, on the other hand, prefer an acyclical response of fiscal variables to
the business cycle with limited government intervention. If there are to be stimulating
actions, these agents prefer measures which cut taxes and raise them in the future,
where the latter is performed quickly in order to pay for the tax reductions.11 These
two sets of preferences are reflected in recent policy debates. Two clear camps appear
in these political discussions whose arguments follow similar lines to those predicted by
the model; this is with respect to the cyclical nature of the fiscal response, policy mixes
and the degree of debt aversion. We proposed that the rule-of-thumb agents will come
predominantly from those in the lower end of the income distribution; this proposition
is coherent with the preferences outlined above because it is the political left wing
who argue for policy measures similar to those desired by the non-Ricardian agents,
and the political right wing who argue for those preferences observed for the Ricardian
households. This alignment of preferences from the model to the empirical debates
provides support for the model and also the hypothesis about the identification of the
two types of agent. Moreover, it provides further evidence towards the preferences over
the policy mix as with a progressive tax system (not assumed in the model) it will
be the Ricardian agents paying the majority of the taxes in the economy, therefore
receiving the majority of any cuts, further reducing the aggregate impact of these and
diminishing the welfare gains of countercyclical policy to rule-of-thumb agents.
Although the modelling assumption is a crude division of an otherwise more diverse
population, its ability to predict the real world polar fiscal debates is persuasive. Be-
yond this segregation of agents the implied intuition is clear; if some agents gain and
others lose during different phases of the business cycle, the former have an incentive to
prolong the conditions from which they are benefiting and are averse to policy measures
that prohibit this.
11These results are also consistent with the empirical findings in IMF (2012a) which observes a rise
in income inequality during fiscal consolidations, especially those which favour spending cuts over tax
rises.
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4.5 Further extensions
4.5.1 Fiscal policy at the zero lower bound
A characteristic that has been prevalent in the recent recession, and for which has
received much academic attention, is that monetary policy has been operating at its’
lower bound: where nominal interest rates reach, or are close to, zero. Under such a
scenario fiscal multipliers are shown to increase as the deflationary impact of higher
interest rates associated with higher levels of output are removed: see for example
Christiano et al. (2011). When nominal interest rates reach zero, the expansionary
impact of a cut in these rates is no longer possible and as such the impact of shocks
that take the economy below this point become larger, as the monetary authority has
lost its ability to stabilise the economy: this increases the scope for fiscal policy.
To see how the results are altered when the nominal interest rate is at its lower bound,
the economy above is exposed to a preference shock such that interest rates are zero for
six periods in the presence of acyclical fiscal policy: from this benchmark the impact
of fiscal policy on the welfare outcomes of the two agents are illustrated in Figure 7.12
In the presence of acyclical policy, the amplification of the impact of the shock leads to
an amplification in the welfare consequences; non-Ricardian losses and Ricardian gains
are increased, where the former are greater than the latter, leading to an increase in the
weighted average welfare losses of the economy. From this benchmark fiscal policy has
more scope to rebalance this larger redistribution of welfare. As before, the weighted
average welfare movements from policy are not large, although are larger, and as such
any improvements to non-Ricardian households from countercyclical policy are at the
expense of Ricardian households. Sufficiently countercyclical policy in experiment 2 can
lead to non-Ricardian households’ welfare dominating that of Ricardian households.
This occurs because the asymmetry in the behaviour of monetary policy means the
period when the lower bound is binding is of more importance than when it is not
because these impacts are amplified. As is illustrated in Figure 4, countercyclical
policy experiment 2 leads to significant short term utility losses of Ricardian agents
whose benefits from the policy accrue over the medium and long term. If this initial
period is amplified and fiscal policy is sufficiently countercyclical, this can result in
these agents losing welfare as a result of the shock and non-Ricardian agents gaining
welfare. Countercyclical policy in this framework can also act to shorten the period
when the monetary zero lower bound is binding: at calibrations of ϕg = −5 and
ϕT = 5, this period is three and four quarters respectively, compared to six with
12The algorithm designed in Holden and Paetz (2012) is applied which provides a shock to interest
rates whenever their dynamics are below zero to increase them to this lower bound. These shocks are
fully anticipated by agents in the economy.
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acyclical policy. Although this analysis has shown that the conclusions above are
robust to when monetary policy is at its lower bound, it does show that the polarization
between the two agents is amplified by this empirically relevant scenario.
Figure 7: Fiscal policy at the zero lower bound
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Dynamics achieved through using the calibration described in Section 4.4.1 with ηbt = 0.1 in period
t = 1. The algorithm used in Holden and Paetz (2012) was applied in order to derive the results.
In the left pane ϕg is varied whilst ϕb,g = −0.03; in the right pane ϕT is varied whilst ϕb,T = 0.015
where these calibrations are necessary to secure results from the algorithm. Benchmark results are
presented for an economy subjected to the same shock but where no zero lower bound is imposed (‘No
ZLB’). Note that only a first order approximation of the model is used to derive these results, given
the complexity of the computing process.
4.5.2 Distortionary taxation
The analysis above has been performed using lump sum taxation however, were dis-
tortionary taxes to be included, similar results would be derived. From the structure
of the model it is possible to include taxes on consumption, employment income and
employment by firms such that these rates react to the business cycle and the level of
debt similar to (2.15): see Appendix C.4 for details of the structure of this model. If
these are included, similar results as those presented for lump sum taxes are derived:
countercyclical policy is to the advantage of non-Ricardian households and the expense
of Ricardian households. Consumption and employment income taxes are more ef-
fective at rebalancing these welfare impacts, compared with employer social security
contributions, as the latter accrue to Ricardian agents through dividends; however a
countercyclical response of these taxes leads to an incentive to increase employment
during downturns. This leads to a stabilisation of the economy, and as such a lower
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response from rule-of-thumb agents: fiscal policy is still played in a near zero sum
game.13
Simulations performed over the course of a business cycle provide similar results to
those presented above: countercyclical policy focusing on any combination of distor-
tionary taxes, but especially on consumption and income taxes, is to the benefit of
non-Ricardian agents, whereas Ricardian households prefer procyclical policy. Intu-
itively the result that those agents who are most exposed to business cycles gain from
policy which stabilises these is maintained. Moreover, the concept that in the presence
of acyclical policy credit-constrained agents insulate Ricardian households through their
labour market transactions is also maintained. What distortionary taxation does pro-
vide is further scope for politics to interact with the economy and influence decisions,
and it allows for more polarizing combinations of policies. For example, a policy which
cuts consumption taxes today and raises capital taxes in the future is seen to benefit
non-Ricardian households at the expense of Ricardian households, with the opposite
result from the opposite policy. Moreover, a policy which actively looks to redistribute
income between the two types of agent can more directly cause conflict. For example,
targeting tax cuts to rule-of-thumb agents and paying for these through tax rises on
Ricardian households will increase the positive and normative consequences of policy.
As distortionary taxes are explicitly redistributive, they distort the political discussion
about policy: from the perspective of those agents most vulnerable to business cycles
the most important characteristic of policy is that it is countercyclical.
4.6 Sensitivity
The sensitivity of the results above have already been tested against the cyclical re-
sponse of the fiscal authority (ϕg and ϕT ), the degree of debt aversion (ϕb,g and ϕb,T ),
as well as the initial shock process. In all cases small changes to the quantitative re-
sults were observed but not to those of the qualitative messages from the analysis. This
section performs further robustness tests of the results.
4.6.1 Multipliers
A potential critique of the above results is that through introducing a proportion of
non-Ricardian agents the model is implicitly generating large fiscal multipliers through
13It should be noted that the results provided are less clear cut in such a model because, even with
acyclical policy, movements in other variables now lead to movements in debt. For example, it can
be observed in equation (C.1) that movements in consumption, employment and real wages lead to
movements in debt, independent to the cyclical response of the fiscal authority.
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increasing the private consumption response to stimuli over the traditional real busi-
ness cycle model. However, as can be observed in Figure 4 government spending (in
the calibration used) crowded-out private consumption leading to a lower than unity
multiplier in policy experiment 1. To further address this issue, the model can be
manipulated to find fiscal policy multipliers associated with the different experiments.
The response functions (2.14) and (2.15) can be adapted to include shocks to fiscal
variables. This is performed because the resulting multiplier calculations from using
the above analysis are sensitive to the arbitrary calibration of the cyclical response
parameters: they are not sensitive under the new specification.14 Table 9 presents the
results from this analysis.
Table 9: Fiscal multipliers
Multiplier
Impact One Year
Experiment 1 0.84 0.83
Experiment 2 0.21 0.21
The ‘Impact’ multiplier is calculated using yt/ĝt in policy experiment 1 and yt/|t̂t| in policy experi-
ment 2. The ‘One Year’ multiplier is calculated using
∑t=4
t=1 yt/
∑t=4
t=1 ĝt in policy experiment 1 and∑t=4
t=1 yt/|
∑t=4
t=1 t̂t| in policy experiment 2. Multipliers achieved through shocking either government
spending or taxes: the calibration is as that set out in Section 4.4.1. Debt aversion parameters are set
with ϕb,g = −0.1 and ϕb,T = 0.1. A positive multiplier for tax shocks corresponds to the rise in output
as a result of a fall in taxes.
As demonstrated by the table, even with the inclusion of the rule-of-thumb households
the model does not produce large aggregate multipliers from fiscal actions, because
there are few other rigidities in the model. Therefore, the model is providing the results
despite the multipliers associated with it, not because these are being amplified through
the inclusion of non-Ricardian households. This is somewhat by design: the chapter
attempts to explore if DSGE models can present differing preferences over the conduct
of fiscal policy and whether these shed light on the current austerity versus stimulus
debate. We do not aim to provide a positive aggregate justification to fiscal policy
but a normative disaggregate justification. Increasing the multipliers generated by the
model would do both, but even without these the analysis provides clear, intuitive and
robust results. There is a normative justification to countercyclical fiscal policy, even
in the absence of a significant positive one.
The modelling procedure used to find multiplier figures can also be used to test for the
results if fiscal policy was conducted through shock processes rather than automatic
14They will be sensitive to these cyclical response parameters because the higher their value the lower
the impact of the shock will be under rational expectations. This will lead to a lower fiscal response to
the shock and therefore the policy is becoming more effective despite the quantitative response being
smaller.
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rules. If this was performed, similar conclusions as those reached above would be made:
the analysis is not sensitive to the way the fiscal authority is modelled.
4.6.2 The labour market assumption
A key assumption for all results has been that of the perfectly competitive labour mar-
ket, because it is through the labour market that non-Ricardian households perform
their constrained optimisation and through these dynamics from which the redistribu-
tion of welfare derives. As a result, the design and assumptions of this market and
how it operates is important to the analysis. If the model were adapted to include im-
perfectly competitive labour markets, as discussed in Chapter 2, where a continuum of
trade unions bargain to add a markup on wages by aggregating individual preferences
to create a weighted average labour supply function, the results remain qualitatively
and quantitatively unchanged as those presented above. There is a redistribution of
welfare observed in the presence of an adverse shock and this can be reduced through
countercyclical fiscal measures. These results can be observed in Figure 8.
Although it is the labour market response of non-Ricardian households which drives
the redistribution from exogenous shocks, perfectly competitive labour markets provide
these agents with the most flexibility in which to minimise their loses. With imperfectly
competitive labour markets, there is still a desire to increase non-Ricardian labour
supply in response to a fall in disposable income, and trade unions incorporate this
preference in their negotiations, resulting in a fall in real wages: this subsequently
maintains the redistribution of welfare to capital owners. The model presented provides
a simple intuitive framework from which to consider the heterogeneous impacts of
shocks and subsequent policy: the results obtained are not sensitive to the labour
market assumption.
4.6.3 The share of non-Ricardian households
As was discussed above, the greater the share of non-Ricardian households the greater
the impact of a shock on the aggregate economy due to the non-linear feedback mech-
anism between any exogenous movement and aggregate demand. From a disaggregate
perspective, three factors are influencing the welfare of individual agents: first, the
increased aggregate impact of the shock is leading to a larger labour supply reaction by
rule-of-thumb agents; second, as the proportion of rule-of-thumb households increase,
the proportion of Ricardian households is decreasing, and therefore so too are the agents
who can take advantage of the additional employment and dividends in the economy;
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and third, an increase in the share of non-Ricardian agents leads to a greater effective-
ness of fiscal policy as is demonstrated in condition (2.25). These combine to lead to a
greater quantitative impact of exogenous shocks on agents at higher levels of λ, which
is particularly true of Ricardian households who are now sharing surplus production
across fewer agents. However, the interaction of fiscal policy with the aggregate and
disaggregate economy remains qualitatively unchanged: countercyclical policy is to the
benefit of non-Ricardian agents and at the expense of Ricardian agents. These results
can be observed in Figure 8 for a calibration where λ = 0.15.
We can also remove the assumption that both types of agent consume and work the
same amounts in steady state. Similar results as those discussed in Section 3.6.2 would
result.
4.6.4 Other parameters
Lower values of the the inverse elasticity of work with respect to the real wage, ϕ,
lead to a lower aggregate impact of shocks for two reasons: first, through decreasing
the disutility from work the labour supply response of rule-of-thumb agents will be
increased; and second, a lower value of ϕ leads to a higher value of λ∗ thus decreasing
the impact of the shock. These results can be observed in Figure 8 for a calibration
where ϕ = 1. Similarly, with the exception of movements in the desired markup of
intermediate good firms, lower values of price stickiness lead to a lower impact from
exogenous shocks as they are propagated for longer in the economy. These both lead
to a decrease in the scope of fiscal policy to rebalance the smaller redistribution of
welfare associated with lower calibrations of both.15 Again, however, although there
are small quantitative changes in welfare from these calibrations, the impact of fiscal
policy on relative welfare remains unchanged: countercyclical policy is to the benefit of
non-Ricardian households at the expense of Ricardian households. These results can
be observed in Figure 8 for a calibration where θ = 0.5.
4.7 Conclusions
The aim of this chapter was to perform a normative assessment of fiscal policy in
the presence of adverse shocks in a DSGE model. This was done using a model that
included heterogeneous households which provides an avenue for differing preferences
over policy to emerge within the model. The findings are intuitive and representative
15It can be shown algebraically from (2.20) that impact multipliers are increasing in ϕ: providing
λ < λ∗, ∂Φ/∂ϕ > 0 and ∂ΦΘC/∂ϕ > 0.
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Figure 8: Chapter 4 sensitivity
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Results achieved through shocking the economy with an adverse interest rate shock (ηrt = 1) in period
t = 1. The top pane represents results from policy experiment 1 where ϕg is varied and ϕb,g = −0.1,
and the bottom pane represents results from policy experiment 2 where ϕT is varied and ϕb,T = 0.1.
With the exception of the change notated in the legend all other parameters are calibrated as discussed
in Section 4.4.1. In all cases Ricardian households welfare dominates that of non-Ricardian households
and therefore the same style of line-style is used for both to simplify notation.
of that observed in the real world. Adverse shocks to an economy impact constrained
non-Ricardian households more than their unconstrained counterparts. In aggregate
the welfare loss from such actions are small, but this hides a big loss of rule-of-thumb
agents netting off gains of their Ricardian neighbours. When fiscal policy is allowed to
interact with the business cycle key themes and intuitive results are observed. Rule-
of-thumb agents have a preference towards countercyclical fiscal policy that is repaid
over a long time horizon. Ricardian households, on the other hand, have opposing
preferences, preferring acyclical policy to maintain their position; if fiscal policy is
to be countercyclical, these agents prefer measures that favour tax cuts and that are
repaid quickly. In effect, these fiscal decisions are played in a virtual zero-sum game
where the gains of one household are netted off against the losses of the other, and
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this is the source of polarizing preferences in the model. These are coherent with those
observed in the real world and the intersection of preferences to empirical debates is
compelling. With regards to the current austerity versus stimulus debate, the model
predicts its existence and those involved on the two sides of the debate; moreover, the
model predicts the debate is of greater significance when monetary policy is at the zero
lower bound. These results come from a model which assumes away progressive taxes
and one with modest multipliers. The normative justification comes despite the lack
of a significant positive one.
The importance of this research is that it broadens the scope of DSGE models to
not only comment on the positive and normative consequence of shocks and policy
from an aggregate perspective, but also from a disaggregate perspective. Such analysis
complements the current literature because it provides further understanding behind
various policy implications and, moreover, provides a commentary of potential political
obstacles policy makers face which may prohibit certain actions. Given that models
which include heterogeneity in the actions of households are now commonplace, the
methods and procedures applied here are easily tractable into this current research. The
potential extensions of this research are vast and include extending the model developed
here for further rigidities and fiscal instruments, but moreover, include adopting the
procedures performed here to other policy scenarios and other methods of diversifying
individuals.
Chapter 5
Who’s afraid of austerity? The
redistributive impact of fiscal
policy in a DSGE framework
5.1 Introduction
There has been a great revival of interest in fiscal policy issues in both policy and
academic circles following the 2008-09 global financial crisis. Substantial fiscal stimulus
packages that were put in place in response to the crisis were followed by much reduced
fiscal revenues during the subsequent Great Recession, leading to a clear loss of fiscal
discipline, particularly in advanced economies.1 For example, in 2009 debt to GDP
ratios reached an average of 92.3 per cent in OECD countries with 89 per cent in the
UK, 99 per cent in the US, 126 per cent in Italy and 210 per cent in Japan (see for
example OECD; 2012).
Such fiscal sustainability issues that surfaced soon after the adoption of the large fiscal
stimulus packages have forced widespread policy reversals. The resulting fiscal con-
solidation has proved difficult both politically and economically in many countries.
Challenges fiscal austerity posed for different sections of the society have been at the
top of the political agenda in both the US and the UK since 2010, for example. A
key question related to fiscal adjustment is therefore, how the cost of consolidation is
distributed. Although the effectiveness of fiscal programs, both stimulus and consoli-
dation, is widely explored in existing work, the distributional impact of fiscal policy is
1The fiscal stimulus programmes were as large as 5.9 per cent of GDP in the US, 3.3 per cent on
average in OECD and 4.8 per cent in China in 2008 among many others (see for example OECD; 2009).
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largely ignored.2 This is somewhat surprising given the clear distributional implications
of fiscal austerity, as is evident from the recent policy discussions.
It is also widely acknowledged that austerity programs that are viewed as ‘unfair’ are
unlikely to succeed (see, for example, IMF; 2012b). Agnello et al. (2012) and IMF
(2012b) present empirical evidence suggesting that periods of fiscal consolidation are
associated with increases in income inequality. Moreover, Granados (2005) find that
the composition of consolidations play a key role on their consequences for income
inequality. Indeed, Woo et al. (2013) show that spending-based consolidations tend to
worsen inequality more significantly, as compared with tax-based consolidations.
This chapter explores both the aggregate and distributional impact of fiscal austerity
by utilizing a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with real and nominal
frictions. To that end, our framework incorporates heterogeneity of agents regarding
access to credit into a medium scale New Keynesian DSGE model. Ricardian consumers
own the entire capital stock of the economy and possess access to the financial markets,
that are assumed to be complete. Non-Ricardian households, on the other hand, simply
consume their total disposable income arising from labour and transfers. Firms produce
differentiated goods, choose labour and capital inputs and set prices similar to the
method proposed by Calvo (1983). The monetary authority sets the nominal interest
rate according to a Taylor rule. The fiscal authority has a set of policy instruments at
its disposal with which to respond to the cyclical changes in debt.
This chapter makes two distinct contributions. The first is to combine a comprehensive
examination of the distributive consequences of fiscal austerity, which has received very
little attention in the existing literature, with one which focuses on other macroeco-
nomic outcomes. Our distributional analysis has two dimensions: welfare and income
distribution. We examine the normative implications of different fiscal packages for
both types of households, and as such shed light on the ranking of policies based on
the relative well-being of different groups. We also examine the changes in the relative
incomes of the two types of agents, which allows us to relate our results to the existing
empirical findings on the income distribution implications of fiscal consolidations. Our
second contribution lies in the scope of our fiscal policy analysis; we examine a much
richer set of fiscal instruments than has been provided in the existing literature on
fiscal consolidations.3 In addition to public consumption, public investment, income
and lump-sum taxes that are widely explored in previous work, we incorporate capital
2Due to the the sharp contraction in global economic activity since 2008, recent work has primarily
focussed on the output implications of theoretical fiscal policy and thus on the size of fiscal multipliers
identifying a wide range of values: varying from 1.6 (Romer and Bernstein; 2009) to much smaller
figures that are close to zero (Cogan et al.; 2010).
3One exception is Coenen et al. (2013) who extend the ECB’s New Area-Wide Model to include a
wide variety of fiscal instruments.
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taxes, consumption taxes, social security contributions as well as public employment
as sources of fiscal adjustment packages. Our choice of this particular set of fiscal in-
struments is motivated by the actual composition of both the fiscal stimulus and fiscal
consolidation packages since 2009.
Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, we find that both the cumulative
aggregate and the distributional consequences of fiscal austerity are determined by its
composition much more than its speed. Specifically, we show that the greater the share
of tax-based adjustments, the greater the size of resulting output contraction. Second,
the welfare consequences of fiscal consolidations are unevenly distributed among agents
with more detrimental impacts on credit-constrained households than those with full
access to credit markets. As opposed to its output effects, tax-based austerity leads to
more favourable distributional consequences in the form of less skewed welfare and in-
come outcomes. In contrast, spending-based fiscal adjustment tends to worsen income
inequality. We also explore the implications of the zero lower bound on the welfare con-
sequences of fiscal consolidations. We find that, in spite of their well-known favourable
impact on the effectiveness of fiscal policy, the presence of the zero lower bound doesn’t
alter the welfare ranking of credit-constrained versus unconstrained consumers follow-
ing fiscal austerity. However, we also show that the composition of consolidations gains
more importance at the monetary lower bound. Overall, a trade-off emerges between
normative equity and positive efficiency effects of fiscal consolidations; spending cuts
increase inequality while tax increases generate greater aggregate fluctuations, posing a
serious challenge for policymakers in designing appropriate fiscal adjustment programs.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 sets out the benchmark
model. Both the positive and the distributive consequences of fiscal austerity are
explored in Section 5.3. An analysis of international consolidation packages and an
extension to the monetary zero lower bound are presented in Section 5.4. Finally,
Section 5.5 provides conclusions and policy implications.
5.2 The model
Our benchmark model shares many features with Smets and Wouters (2003), Chris-
tiano et al. (2005) and Bhattarai and Trzeciakiewicz (2012) featuring nominal rigidities
in price and wage setting, real frictions in adjustment costs and monopolistic compe-
tition, and distortionary taxation on labour, capital and consumption. The economy
is populated by: a continuum of households indexed by h, a share of which, (1 − θ),
have access to capital markets (Ricardian households) and the remainder, θ, do not
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(non-Ricardian households); two types of firms producing final and intermediate goods
respectively; and a fiscal and a monetary authority.
The model is also similar to that presented in Chapter 2 of which this can be seen as
an extended version. For clarity, all features of the model are discussed here instead of
referring the reader back to specific elements in Chapter 2 on a piecemeal basis. The
notation of variables and parameters between the two chapters is not consistent: this
is in order to keep the notation in line with versions of the papers in circulation.
5.2.1 Households
Utility for both types of household is assumed to be the same and evolves according
to:
E0
∞∑
t=0
εbt
(
βi
)t(
ln
(
Cit(h)
)− 1
1 + σl
(
Lit(h)
)1+σl) (5.1)
where E0 is the expectation operator, β
i ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, σl denotes the
inverse of the Frisch labour supply elasticity, Ct and Lt denote consumption and labour
respectively, and εbt represents a first-order autoregressive exogenous shock process to
preferences. Superscript i differentiates variables between Ricardian (i = R) and non-
Ricardian (i = NR) households.
Ricardian households
Each period Ricardian household, h, faces a budget constraint which states that the
household’s total expenditure on consumption, CRt , investment in physical capital, It,
and accumulation of a portfolio of riskless one-period contingent claims, Bt, must equal
the household’s total disposable income:
(1 + τ ct )C
R
t (h) + It(h) =
(
1− τ lt − τ eet
)
wt (h)L
R
t (h) + divt (h) (5.2)
+
[(
1− τkt
)
rk,tut (h)− a(ut (h))
]
K¯t−1 (h)
+
(1 + it−1)Bt−1(h)
pit
+ Tt (h)−Bt(h) (1 + ηB,t)
where τ ct , τ
l
t and τ
ee
t represent taxes on consumption, labour income and employee social
security contributions, and wt the real wage; divt represents dividends paid out of firms’
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profits; τkt is a tax on capital, rk,t the real return on capital services, ut the capital
utilisation rate where the cost of capital utilization is given by a(ut)K¯t−1, and K¯t−1 the
stock of physical capital; it−1 represents the net nominal interest rate on one-period
bonds, pit the gross inflation rate, and the gross nominal interest rate is given by Rt =
1 + it; Tt represents a lump sum transfer; finally, ηB,t represents an exogenous shock to
government borrowing, discussed more fully in Section 5.2.4. Following Christiano et al.
(2005), we assume complete markets for the state contingent claims in consumption
and capital but not in labour, which implies that consumption and capital holdings are
the same across Ricardian households: consequently, CRt (h) = C
R
t and K
R
t (h) = Kt.
In line with most of the existing literature, we maintain that physical capital accumu-
lates in accordance with:
K¯t = (1− δk)K¯t−1 +
[
1− S
(
εit
It
It−1
)]
It (5.3)
where we follow Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006) and define the cost of investment
adjustment function as S (It/It−1) =
[
(φk/2)(It/It−1 − 1)2
]
and εit is an investment
specific first-order autoregressive shock process.4 Each Ricardian household maximises
utility (5.1) subject to the flow budget constraint (5.3), the capital accumulation func-
tion (5.3), and the labour demand from companies (discussed below). The first-order
conditions as a result of this maximisation are presented in Appendix D.1.
Non-Ricardian households
As discussed above, non-Ricardian households are credit-constrained agents who sim-
ply consume current after-tax income which comprises of after-tax labour income and
transfers. As discussed in Chapter 2, this behaviour can be rationalised in a frame-
work where non-Ricardian households are more impatient than Ricardian households,
βR > βNR, and can default on their debt up to the value of their collateral (see for
example Iacoviello; 2005). With no durable goods in the non-Ricardian utility func-
tion, impatience prohibits the accumulation of collateral and as such non-Ricardians
are prohibited from engaging in bond and capital markets.5 The budget constraint of
non-Ricardian households is therefore:
4Where S (1) = S′ (1) = 0, and S′′ (1) = φk > 0 are assumed for the adjustment cost function
process.
5For a full discussion of the empirical observation of this type of consumption behaviour see Section
2.2.1.
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(1 + τ ct )C
NR
t =
(
1− τ lt − τ eet
)
wtL
NR
t + Tt
Following Erceg et al. (2006) we assume that each non-Ricardian household sets its
wage equal to the average wage of optimising households (discussed below). Given
that all households face the same labour demand, the labour supply and total labour
income of each Ricardian and non-Ricardian households will be the same: by extension,
consumption for all rule-of-thumb agents will also be the same, CNRt (h) = C
NR
t .
5.2.2 Wage-setting behaviour
Households provide differentiated labour inputs (Lt(h)) to firms and therefore can act
as price setters. Firms subsequently aggregate these labour inputs using a Dixit-Stiglitz
function:
Lt =
 1∫
0
(Lt(h))
ν−1
ν dh

ν
ν−1
where ν > 0 is the elasticity of substitution among the differentiated labour inputs
and Lt the aggregate labour index. This leads to demand functions for each household
labour given by:
Lt(h) =
(
Wt(h)
Wt
)−ν
Lt
where Wt(h) is the corresponding nominal wage rate for household h. This leads to an
aggregate wage index given by:
Wt =
[∫ 1
0
(Wt(h))
1−ν di
] 1
1−ν
Nominal wages are set in a staggered-price mechanism as in Calvo (1983), where every
period, each Ricardian household faces a fixed probability (1 − $W ) of being able to
adjust the nominal wage. The household then sets nominal wages to maximize expected
future utility subject to labour demand from firms. Those who cannot reoptimize set
wages in accordance with the indexation rule, Wt = pi
γw
t Wt−1, where γw ∈ 〈0, 1〉 is a
parameter that measures the degree of wage indexation. The objective is to maximise
the following with respect to W˜t (the wage rate for those permitted to reset):
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Et
∞∑
l=0
(
βR$w
)l −
1
1+σL
((
W˜tXtl
Wt+l
)−ν
Lt+l
)1+σL
+λτt+l
(
1− τ lt+l
)
W˜t
Pt+l
Xt,l
(
W˜tXtl
Wt+l
)−ν
Lt+l

where Xtl = pit × pit+1 × ... × pit+l−1 for l > 1 and Xtl = 1 for l = 0 as in Altig et al.
(2011). The maximisation results in:
Et
∞∑
l=0
(
βR$w
)l
Lτt+lλt+l
{
W˜tXtl
Pt+l
Uc,t+l(
1 + τ ct+l
) − ν
(1− ν)
Ul,t+l(
1− τ lt+l
)} = 0
The first-order condition implies that Ricardian households set their wages so that the
present value of the marginal utility of income from an additional unit of labour is
equal to the markup over the present value of the marginal disutility of work. When
all households are able to negotiate their wage contracts each period, the prevailing
wage is W˜t/Pt = (ν/ (1− ν))
(
Ul,t (1 + τ
c
t ) /Uc,t
(
1− τ lt
))
.6 Finally, the wage index can
be transformed into the following:
Wt =
[
(1−$w) W˜ 1−νt +$w
((
Pt−1
Pt−2
)γw
Wt−1
)1−ν] 11−ν
Non-Ricardian agents are assumed to take on the same aggregate contract negotiated by
Ricardian agents, working the aggregate amount of labour hours (Lt) at the aggregate
wage rate (Wt).
5.2.3 Production
A competitive final good producer purchases differentiated goods from intermediate
producers and combines them into a single consumption good. The final good, Y Pt , is
produced by aggregating the intermediate goods, Y Pj,t, with technology:
Y Pt =
[∫ 1
0
(
Y Pj,t
) s−1
s dj
] s
s−1
Profit in the final good sector, ΠFt , can be stated as:
ΠFt = PtY
P
t −
∫ 1
0
Pj,tY
P
j,tdj
where Pj,t is the price of the intermediate good j.
6Where Ux = ∂U/∂X.
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The intermediate good production sector is populated by monopolistic firms indexed
by j that use the following production function:
Y Pj,t = ε
a
t (Kj,t−1)
α (LPj,t)1−α (KGj,t−1)αG − Φ (5.4)
where KG denotes public capital, Φ represents a fixed cost of production, and ε
a
t rep-
resents total factor productivity shock that follows a first-order autoregressive process.
Firms rent capital services Kj,t−1, and incur a cost of labour equal to (1 + τ ert )Wt,
where τ ert denotes employers social security contributions. As is standard in the New
Keynesian framework, intermediate-good sector firms face three constraints: the pro-
duction function, a demand constraint, and price rigidity determined by a Calvo (1983)
mechanism. Each firm acts to minimise its total costs, (1 + τ ert )WtL
P
j,t + Rk,tKj,t−1,
subject to the production function (5.4). The nominal marginal cost is represented by
the following:
Ptmct =
(
1
1− α
)1−α( 1
α
)α (
εAt
)−1
K
−αg
g,t−1 ((1 + τ
er
t )Wt)
1−α (Rk,t)α
Intermediate goods producers act as price setters where each period a given firm faces
a constant probability, (1 − $), of being able to reoptimise its nominal price. Those
who can, maximize expected future profits at these prices (P˜t):
Et
∞∑
l=0
(βR$)lλt+l
[
P˜tXtl
Pt+l
−mct+l
]
Pt+lYj,t+l − Pt+lmct+lfc
subject to the standard demand (Yj,t = (Pj,t/Pt)
sYt ) and maximisation results in:
Et
∞∑
l=0
(βR$)lλt+l
[
P˜tXtl
Pt+l
− s
1− smct+l
]
Pt+lYj,t+l = 0
In the case that all firms are allowed to reoptimise their prices, the above condition
reduces to, P˜t = (s/(s− 1))Ptmct, which indicates that the optimised price is equal to
a markup over the marginal costs. In addition, (βR$)lλt+l denotes a discount factor
of future profits for firms. Here λt denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the Ricardian
household’s budget constraint and is treated by firms as exogenous. The price index
can be written as:
Pt =
[
(1−$) P˜ 1−st +$
((
Pt−1
Pt−2
)γp
Pt−1
)1−s] 11−s
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5.2.4 Macroeconomic policy
The government budget constraint requires that total expenditure on government con-
sumption, Gt, public investment, I
G
t , and public employment, L
G
t , be paid through
either taxes or transactions in the bond market:
Gt + I
G
t + (1 + τ
er
t )wtL
G
t + Tt =
(
Bt(1 + ηB,t)− (1 + it−1)Bt−1
pit
)
+ τ ct Ct
+
(
τ lt + τ
ee
t + τ
er
t
)
wtLt + τ
k
t rk,tutKt−1
where ηB,t represents an i.i.d. exogenous shock to government borrowing, which can
either represent a change in spending, tax revenue, or borrowing conditions, exogenous
to the model. This, for example, could take the form of an exogenous rise in outgoings
(e.g. a bank bail out), or a revenue windfall. Public capital accumulates according to:
KGt = (1− δGk )KGt−1 + IGt
which is equivalent to the accumulation of private capital in (5.3) but without cost
to adjustment (as is common in the literature) and where δGk represents depreciation
specific to public capital.
We maintain that the nine fiscal instruments in steady state ensure a non-increasing
level of debt, and out of steady state these instruments respond to maintain the solvency
condition of the government:7
Xt
X
=
(
Bt−1
B
)φB,x
(5.5)
where X =
{
τ c, τk, τ l, τ er, τ ee, G, IG, LG, T
}
, where variables with no time subscript
represent their steady state values, and where φB,x represents the ‘debt aversion’ pa-
rameters.
The design fiscal rules as in (5.5) is used to ensure that debt converges back to its
steady state level, and is assumed (at least in our experiments) to play no other role;
fiscal instruments neither respond to the business cycle (as in Chapter 4), nor respond
to their own exogenous shock movements (as in Chapter 6). When debt is moved away
7Note that labour income taxes and employees social security contributions enter the model in the
same way, hence we drop the latter in our simulations and focus on the former.
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from its steady state value, the calibration of φB,x ensures that debt converges back
either through taxes rises and/or through cuts in expenditure. Steady state debt is not
moving, by definition, and is determined by the excess of spending over tax revenues.
Note that these experiments also incorporate an approximation of the scenario where
steady state government debt levels are permanently raised. This occurs when the
φB,x parameters are set to just ensure determinacy, such that debt converges back
to steady state, but at a slow rate; given the discounting of the future, the welfare
effects under this policy, with debt taking decades to converge back to steady state
levels, is a close approximation to a permanent debt increase. In the steady state, as
Ricardian households own government debt, any increase in this increases their income.
Simultaneously, tax rises and/or spending cuts will be required in order to service the
additional interest requirements. The net impact of these two effects will provide the
impact of a debt increase to Ricardian households, whereas the latter impact is only
relevant for non-Ricardian agents who, by assumption, do not own government debt
due to impatience.
As standard in the literature, the monetary authority sets nominal interest rates (Rt)
by following a Taylor rule which responds to both output and inflation with some
persistence:
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)ρ [(pit
pi
)ρpi (Yt
Y
)ρy]1−ρ
ηR,t
where ρ is the interest rate smoothing parameter and ηR,t represents an i.i.d. shock to
the nominal interest rate: all other variables are as defined earlier.
5.2.5 Market clearing, aggregation and equilibrium conditions
Total output is the sum of private and public sector output where the equilibrium
conditions are given by:
Yt = Ct +Gt + It + I
G
t + a(ut)K¯t−1 + (1 + τ
er
t )wtL
G
t
Lt = L
P
t + L
G
t
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where Ct and Lt denote aggregate consumption and employment which are given by
the weighted averages of the consumption and employment of Ricardian and non-
Ricardian households. Similarly, the market for capital and bonds are in equilibrium
when demand equals supply.8
5.3 Implications of fiscal austerity
To explore the aggregate and the distributional consequences of fiscal consolidation,
we consider a situation where there is a positive shock to government debt (ηB,t) such
that debt is exogenously accumulated.9 We then examine a number of fiscal scenar-
ios corresponding to different fiscal adjustment packages designed towards paying off
the additional debt created by this positive debt shock. The reason for making debt
repayment as the basis of our fiscal scenarios is the observation that stabilizing debt
to GDP ratios has been an important objective of most fiscal consolidation packages
since 2010.
Our fiscal consolidation scenarios vary across two dimensions: the composition of fiscal
adjustment and the speed of debt repayment. Regarding the composition, we consider
two alternative sets of policies. In the first, the burden of debt repayment is shared
equally among all fiscal instruments. This takes the form of reductions in all expendi-
ture items (public consumption, public investment, public employment and transfers)
and increases in all tax instruments (consumption taxes, capital taxes, labour income
taxes and employer social security contributions): in what follows, we refer to this
policy as ‘all-instruments’ fiscal consolidation. Second, we examine fiscal adjustment
through either only cutting expenditure or only raising taxes. Regarding the speed
of adjustment, for all fiscal scenarios we consider the impact of austerity over a range
speeds associated with each consolidation, controlled for by the ‘debt aversion’ param-
eters (φB,x).
10
5.3.1 Calibration and welfare calculation
We follow a calibration procedure in line with the existing literature with common
parameters fixed in a standard way, as is listed in Table 10. Steady state tax rates
8The non-stochastic steady state of the model is solved, and the perturbation method in Dynare is
used to apply a second-order approximation of the model. Stochastic simulations are also computed
using Dynare.
9If we were to employ any of the microfounded shock processes to generate debt in the economy, the
results would be similar to those from shocking ηB,t, once we removed the effects of the initial shock
and only concentrated on repaying the debt.
10In order to quantify this speed we present the ‘half-life’ of consolidation which represents the time
(in quarters) for the packages to halve the level of new debt as a result of the shock.
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on consumption, capital, labour income and employee and employer social security
contributions (τ c, τk, τ l, τ ee and τ er) are set at 0.2, 0.4, 0.18, 0.05 and 0.07 respectively
and the level of government debt in steady state is set at 60 per cent of output. We
select a lower value of the depreciation of public capital compared to private capital
with δGk = 0.02, and we fix the share of public employment in total employment at 0.15.
The elasticity of public capital in the production function, σG, is set at 0.02 which is
slightly higher than the value calibrated by Straub and Tchakarov (2007) for the US
and the euro area. We fix the share of public investment in GDP at 0.02, whereas
the share of public consumption at 0.1. This calibration implies the ratio of private
investment to GDP is 0.11 whereas private consumption to GDP is 0.65. Finally, the
share of non-Ricardian consumers is set equal to 0.3, in line with those in the existing
literature.
Our welfare calculations are performed by deriving a welfare criterion based on a second
order Taylor series expansion of the utility function around the non-stochastic steady
state values. This procedure provides a criterion expressed as the equivalent one period
consumption loss, as a proportion of steady state consumption, that leaves the agent
indifferent between living through the shock or the one period consumption loss. The
resulting expression for welfare is of the following form (derived in Appendix D.2):
W i = E0
∞∑
t=0
βi,t
(
cit +
1− σc
2
(
cit
)2)
− 1− α
1 + τ er
1
µw
1− τ l − τ ee
1 + τ c
Y
Ci
E0
∞∑
t=0
βi,t
(
nit +
1 + σl
2
(
nit
)2)
(5.6)
where i denotes the type of consumer. In (5.6) lowercase variables represent log-
deviations of their uppercase counterparts and µw = ν/(ν− 1). This criterion provides
disaggregate calculations for each set of households in the economy.
5.3.2 Fiscal adjustment and macroeconomic outcomes
Figure 9 illustrates the economy’s response to a 3 per cent rise in the debt-to-GDP ratio
where all fiscal instruments contribute equally towards the resulting debt repayment.11
Consolidations have a negative effect on output, arising from both lower private demand
(due to lower incomes and higher taxes) and lower government demand (as part of the
austerity package). The magnitude of the fall in output as well as the profile of recovery
11This size of debt shock is in line with the scale of fiscal stimulus packages put in place in 2009: the
OECD average stood at 3.3 per cent of GDP.
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Table 10: Chapter 5 calibration
Share/parameter Description Value
Expenditure shares
C/Y Private consumption to GDP 0.65
G/Y Public consumption to GDP 0.1
I/Y Private investment to GDP 0.11
IG/Y Public investment to GDP 0.02
Preferences
βR Discount factor Ricardian 0.99
βNR Discount factor non-Ricardian 0.973
σl Inverse Frisch elasticity 2
θ Share of non-Ricardian households 0.3
Technology
δk Depreciation rate: private capital 0.025
δGk Depreciation rate: public capital 0.02
α Share of capital in production 0.31
φk Investment adjustment cost parameter 5
κ Capital utilisation adjustment parameter 0.6
$ Stickiness in prices 0.75
$W Stickiness in wages 0.5
γp Price indexation 0.15
γw Wage indexation 0.15
s Elasticity of substitution in consumption 6
ν Elasticity of substitution in labour 6
Φ Fixed costs in production 0.15
Monetary policy
ρ Monetary policy persistence 0.8
ρpi Inflation Taylor rule weight 1.5
ρy Output Taylor rule weight 0.125
Fiscal policy
τ c Steady state consumption tax 0.2
τk Steady state capital tax 0.4
τ l Steady state labour income tax 0.18
τ ee Steady state employee social security tax 0.05
τ er Steady state employer social security tax 0.07
B/Y Government debt to annual GDP 0.6
αG Elasticity of public capital in production 0.02
wLG/Y Share of public to total employment 0.15
vary with the speed of adjustment; both output and employment are initially lowest
with the fastest fiscal adjustment. However, although short sharp episodes have the
biggest initial impact on GDP in the short run, they also result in a quicker convergence
of output to steady state levels.
Consolidations also reduce aggregate consumption, but by less than output since the
cuts in government spending elicit some crowding in of both consumption and invest-
ment. This small reduction in aggregate consumption, however, hides a disparity across
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Figure 9: Dynamics from austerity experiments - all instruments
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Dynamics are achieved through shocking debt by 3% of its steady state level: the x-axis represents
time in quarters, and the y-axis represents percentage deviations from steady state. Half-life of debt
represents the time for debt to be reduced by 50%; under ‘Fast’ this is 10 quarters, ‘Medium’ 20
quarters, and ‘Slow’ 40 quarters.
households where non-Ricardian consumption falls and Ricardian consumption rises.
This is because Ricardian agents can smooth their consumption whereas non-Ricardian
households are fully exposed to the fall in labour demand and, thus, in wages. Moreover,
lower interest rates and lower government spending further contribute to increasing Ri-
cardian consumption.
Figure 9 also portrays an interesting investment profile. There are two channels through
which fiscal adjustment impacts on investment: through its effect on interest rates and
through its effect on the return on capital (net of capital taxes). A fiscal consolidation
leads to a fall in interest rates leading to a rise in interest-sensitive investment. On
the other hand, fiscal adjustment also raises capital taxes leading to a fall in the net
return to capital, reducing incentives to invest. The higher the pace of consolidation,
the greater the likelihood of the first effect dominating the second, due to the fact
that the faster the pace of fiscal adjustment, the sharper the response of the monetary
authority.
The composition of adjustment We now turn to an analysis of spending versus
tax-based fiscal adjustments where the outstanding debt is repaid only through reduc-
ing government spending in the former and only through tax increases in the latter.
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Macroeconomic outcomes under the two types of consolidation programs are displayed
in Figure 10.
Figure 10: Dynamics from austerity experiments - government spending instruments
versus tax instruments
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Dynamics are achieved through shocking debt by 3% of its steady state level: the x-axis represents time
in quarters, and the y-axis represents percentage deviations from steady state. For both experiments
the half-life of debt is calibrated to 20 quarters.
It is clear that tax-based consolidations lead to sharper responses compared with
spending-based ones in all variables, with the greatest fall in non-Ricardian consump-
tion. Two other features are evident from Figure 10. First, Ricardian consumption
rises in the wake of spending-based consolidations in contrast to tax-based austerity
where the opposite is the case. This is due to the crowding in of Ricardian consumption
in response to a cut in government spending, which in turn drives the movement in
aggregate consumption. Second, private investment also rises following spending cuts,
as opposed to following tax increases. This is because tax-based consolidations raise
the marginal cost of production through increases in both capital and labour taxes,
while spending cuts bring about lower real interest rates.
Overall, tax-based fiscal adjustment produces lower output (combining both lower con-
sumption and lower investment) and lower employment than spending-based adjust-
ment programs. Existing empirical work on fiscal adjustment programs indicates that
this has indeed been the profile of the macroeconomic responses to fiscal adjustment
programs in practice (see for example Agnello et al.; 2012; IMF; 2012b; Woo et al.;
2013).
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5.3.3 Fiscal austerity and welfare
We now turn to the welfare implications of fiscal consolidations. Figure 11 plots the
welfare of the two types of households against the speed of fiscal adjustment for the two
consolidation packages, focusing on just tax and just spending instruments, respectively.
In Figure 11, the bottom line represents the aggregate impact where shaded areas
represent the composition of this aggregate in individual fiscal instruments that are
components of the fiscal package in each case. As is seen from the first column in
Figure 11, austerity reduces non-Ricardian welfare in all cases and the scale of this
reduction is greater the quicker the speed of consolidation. This is due to the fact
that non-Ricardian agents are exposed to austerity through their dependence on the
overall health of the economy through wages and employment, both of which decline
in response to austerity. Moreover, higher labour and consumption taxes and lower
transfers (under the tax-based fiscal adjustments) decrease the disposable income and
subsequently the consumption of the credit-constrained agents.
As is also seen from the bottom right pane of Figure 11, in contrast, spending-based con-
solidations result in Ricardian consumers being better off, irrespective of the speed of
adjustment, due to both higher levels of consumption and lower levels of employment.
Consumption is improved following the reductions in interest rates and government
spending. Households in the model are assumed not to gain utility from government
consumption and public employment and reductions of these, from the perspective of
Ricardian agents, leads to welfare improvements as they can crowd in private consump-
tion and investment. Both consumers are worse off under tax-based consolidations,
though Ricardian welfare dominates that of non-Ricardians unless debt is repaid over
long time horizons. Ricardian agents do not directly respond to movements in transfers
and are therefore less affected by cuts in these than their non-Ricardian neighbours.
Overall, the welfare consequences are unevenly shared by the two types of agents; aus-
terity tends to harm non-Ricardian households more than the Ricardian households.
An interesting question related to the welfare implications of spending and tax-based
austerity is whether the welfare outcomes vary significantly between adjustments based
on individual instruments. Figure 11 also presents a decomposition of total welfare
implications of austerity, highlighting the contribution made by each fiscal instrument.
The worst case scenario for both households is fiscal adjustment by increases in capital
taxes, resulting in the lowest welfare for each household as it both reduces incomes in
the short run, and impacts on the productive capacity of the economy over the medium
term. However, it must also be noted that rises in capital taxes exert a bigger impact
on Ricardian households who directly pay this tax. For similar reasons, increases in
labour taxes have large negative normative consequences for non-Ricardian households
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Figure 11: Welfare effects of fiscal austerity
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Welfare results are expressed as the equivalent of one-period steady state consumption that would leave
the agent indifferent between living through the shock or forgoing the one period loss. The bottom
line represents the aggregate impact where shaded areas represent the decomposition of this aggregate
into component fiscal instruments. The top row represents welfare from just using tax instruments
and the bottom row just from spending instruments; the left column depicts results for non-Ricardian
households and the right column for Ricardian households.
for whom a rise directly reduces disposable income. In contrast, austerity through
cuts in government consumption and government employment produces the two best
welfare outcomes. Figure 11 once again confirms that austerity always harms the
constrained households while the unconstrained are either better off (under spending-
based adjustment) or less worse off than the constrained households (under the tax-
based adjustment).12
12Note that Figure 11 also demonstrates the approximate effect of a permanent increase in gov-
ernment debt as the welfare effects are plateauing as the halflife of debt increases. In the case of
non-Ricardian agents, a permanent increase in debt has a negative effect on long run welfare, however,
this is minimised if the additional debt interest is repaid through spending cuts. This is similar for
Ricardian households, however these agents gain from a permanent increase in debt paid for through
a cut in government spending, as it is these agents who own the government debt, and therefore the
additional interest repayments of the government acts as additional income.
Who’s afraid of austerity? 107
5.3.4 Fiscal austerity and income distribution
An important aspect of distributional outcomes arising from fiscal policy changes is
related to their implications for income distribution. This is important for two reasons.
First, as is widely recognized, income distribution plays a key role in political and eco-
nomic stability and thus has a wider significance (see for example Alesina and Perotti;
1996). Second, income distribution outcomes are more easily measurable than welfare
ones, which enables us to put our results in perspective in light of the existing empirical
findings on the income distribution implications of fiscal adjustment programs.
Figure 12 presents discounted incomes of both households in the face of all three types
of fiscal consolidation packages. The top row considers income movements over the
whole lifetime of the experiment, whereas the bottom row considers a shorter five year
horizon. Clearly, non-Ricardian income is most exposed to austerity, both in the short
and long term, leading to a widening of inequality in the economy. The second and third
columns of Figure 12 confirm the welfare results presented in Figure 11; spending-based
consolidations tend to worsen income inequality more than tax based-ones, a finding
supported by recent empirical evidence (see for example Woo et al.; 2013). However, it
has also been shown that tax-based fiscal adjustments are less likely to be longer-lasting
than those based on spending ones (see for example Alesina and Perotti; 1996). Our
findings point to a source of such reduced longevity for tax based adjustment programs;
they do not only reduce the welfare of both types of households, they also bring about
greater aggregate fluctuations.
5.4 Further extensions
5.4.1 International consolidation packages
The above results consider the aggregate and distributional impact of fiscal consoli-
dations in a range of benchmark calibrations. In order to obtain a direct perspective
on the austerity measures implemented in recent times, we simulate our model using
actual composition of fiscal packages based on international data (IMF; 2013, 2014), as
summarised in Table 11.13
13Specifically, we obtain information on the size of fiscal adjustments between 2009 and 2013 from
both revenue and expenditure measures from IMF Fiscal Monitor (2013: Figure 2) and combine this
with data on individual spending measures (IMF; 2014, Figure 2.2) and tax measures (IMF; 2014,
Table 9).
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Figure 12: Income effects
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Discounted income effects under consolidation packages using ‘all instruments’, just ‘Government spend-
ing’ instruments’ and ‘Taxation’ instruments, calculated over the whole lifetime of the experiment (the
top row), and over the first five years of the experiment (the bottom row): future periods are discounted
by relative discount factors.
Comparing the debt to GDP ratios in 2007 to those in 2013 reveals that there were
significant increases in indebtedness in most countries, where doubling of the debt ra-
tio is observed in nearly half of the sample. The rise in debt ratios, in turn, required
substantial fiscal adjustment, as large as 17.8 per cent of GDP in Greece, 7.6 per
cent in Ireland and 7.4 per cent in Portugal. An interesting aspect of these consoli-
dation packages has been the wide variation in their composition. Table 11 suggests
that countries that have carried out substantial adjustment packages such as Greece,
Ireland, Portugal and Spain carried out most of this adjustment through expenditure-
based measures, compared against those with smaller consolidations (the most notable
exception is Germany, who have adopted spending based austerity in order to finance
tax cuts).
We employ the same empirical composition of consolidation packages currently in place
in each country and impose the same 3 per cent shock to steady-state government debt
as above over a variety of speeds of repayment. Figure 13 groups the countries into
high consolidators (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain), medium consolidators (UK,
Netherlands and US), and low consolidators (France, Belgium, Austria and Germany)
and presents predicted welfare movements, and Figure 14 presents the sum of dis-
counted output (using βR) from the model.
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Table 11: International consolidation data
Debt to GDP Proportions
2007 2013 Consolidation Revenue Expenditure
GRC 95.6 173.8 17.8 26% 74%
IRL 24.9 122.8 7.6 9% 91%
PRT 63.6 128.8 7.4 48% 52%
ESP 36.1 93.9 6.9 38% 62%
GBR 44.1 90.1 6.2 40% 60%
NLD 45.5 74.9 4.6 49% 51%
USA 62.1 104.5 4.3 61% 39%
FRA 35.2 93.9 3.0 124% -24%
BEL 82.8 99.7 2.2 135% -35%
AUT 59.5 74.2 1.0 65% 35%
DEU 65.0 78.1 0.9 -81% 181%
‘Consolidation’ represents the sum of both revenue and expenditure based fiscal adjustments, expressed
as the proportion of potential GDP on cyclically adjusted data (obtained from IMF fiscal monitor); and
‘Revenue’ and ‘Expenditure’ represent the individual proportions of this overall consolidation figure.
Figures 13 and 14 enables us to make a number of observations. First, the composi-
tion of consolidation is of far more importance to its positive results, compared with
the speed of consolidation. In line with our earlier results, those policies which tar-
get government expenditure have the lowest impact on output, and as in the case of
Germany, spending cuts to finance some tax cuts can have a beneficial impact to out-
put. Similarly, Figure 13 reveals that the composition of consolidation is also of much
more importance to its distributive outcomes than its speed; specifically, consolidations
which focus on tax revenues as opposed to spending cuts have the most equitable nor-
mative effects, as is seen above, and is supported by cross-country simulated evidence.
For example, in countries where fiscal adjustment is carried out mostly through expen-
diture related measures, as was the case in high consolidation countries (the top row),
the outcome is the substantial gap in the welfare of the constrained and unconstrained
households. This gap is clearly smaller in low consolidation countries such as Austria,
Belgium, and France who mostly utilized tax-based instruments. France is the best
example of this with the only consolidation package where non-Ricardian welfare can
dominate Ricardian welfare (beyond 30 quarters for the half-life of debt).
Interestingly, the greatest gap between the welfare of the constrained and the uncon-
strained households is in Germany, who have enacted cuts to transfers, government
consumption and government employment to pay for cuts in income taxes and social
security contributions and increased public investment. Germany’s composition also
has a positive impact on output, the only one to do so.
Who’s afraid of austerity? 110
Figure 13: International consolidation comparison: welfare effects
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Results are obtained by utilizing IMF Fiscal Monitor data on the composition of current fiscal ad-
justment packages and assuming a similar composition for future consolidation, and through the same
shock of 3% of steady state debt to aid comparisons. The calibration is as that of Table 10 but where
the fiscal parameters are calibrated differently for the EU countries (where we use Coenen et al.; 2013),
the UK (where we use Bhattarai and Trzeciakiewicz; 2012) and the US (where we use Leeper et al.;
2010).
Overall, the trade-off between equity and positive efficiency of fiscal adjustment pro-
grams found above is maintained. Whereas spending-based consolidations can lead
to lower overall effects with respect to output, incomes and welfare, tax-based auster-
ity is associated with more equality of sacrifice whereby all agents lose more, but do
so together. Although non-Ricardian agents tend to lose less in absolute terms with
spending based programmes than in tax-based ones, the relative welfare considerations
carry great significance in practice. This is illustrated by the political consequences of
austerity over recent years, especially in the high consolidation countries, those which
rely more on cuts in spending; all three countries Greece, Spain and Portugal have wit-
nessed greatest anti-austerity protests observed across Europe, following the adoption
of fiscal consolidation.
5.4.2 Austerity at the zero lower bound
A key distinguishing feature of the recent recession, for which has received much aca-
demic attention, is that monetary policy has been operating at its lower bound where
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Figure 14: International consolidation comparison: discounted output effects
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Results are obtained by utilizing IMF Fiscal Monitor data on the composition of current fiscal ad-
justment packages and assuming a similar composition for future consolidation, and through the same
shock of 3% of steady state debt to aid comparisons. The calibration is as that of Table 10 but where
the fiscal parameters are calibrated differently for the EU countries (where we use Coenen et al.; 2013),
the UK (where we use Bhattarai and Trzeciakiewicz; 2012) and the US (where we use Leeper et al.;
2010).
nominal interest rates reach, or are close to, zero. Under such a scenario fiscal multipli-
ers are shown to increase as the contractionary impact of higher interest rates associated
with higher levels of output are removed: see, for example, Eggertsson (2011), Chris-
tiano et al. (2011) and Hall (2011). An interesting question is whether the presence of
the zero lower bound has any impact on the welfare consequences of fiscal consolidation.
Figure 15 presents the welfare movements in three fiscal scenarios: where all fiscal
instruments are used; when only the three production taxes (labour, capital and em-
ployer social security) are used; and when all government spending instruments are
used, as well as consumption taxes. As is clear in Figure 15, the the monetary zero
lower bound doesn’t alter the welfare outcomes to a strong degree. However, at the
monetary lower bound the composition of consolidation becomes more important: if
austerity is executed through increases in production taxes, one can have a more fruitful
consolidation as these rises have an expansionary effect due to the inflationary pres-
sures they provide the economy, thus lowering the real interest rate: this is a result
highlighted in Eggertsson (2011). However, spending based consolidations, or those
focussing on consumption taxes, are worse when conducted at the lower bound.
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Figure 15: Welfare effects of austerity at the zero lower bound
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Welfare results are expressed as the equivalent of one-period of steady state consumption that would
leave the agent indifferent between living through the shock or forgoing the one period loss. The three
panes represent the three different experiments from using ‘all instruments’ from using only ‘production
taxes’ (labour, capital and employer social security contributions) and from using all spending instru-
ments and consumption taxes. In the legend ‘NR’ and ‘R’ represent results for non-Ricardian and
Ricardian households respectively and ‘Bench’ represents benchmark results from when the monetary
zero lower bound is not binding.
However, these results do hide a timing disparity, whereby during the period of the zero
lower bound (which is what Europe, the UK and the US has been of late) the impact is
heightened. Therefore, consolidations based on spending cuts and front loaded will be
felt much worse. It is interesting to note that those high consolidating countries such as
Greece, Ireland and Spain performed the significant majority of their austerity through
spending cuts, and in a front-loaded fashion. Over the whole period of consolidation,
however, when the initial phase is averaged out, these effects look smaller.
5.4.3 Sensitivity analysis
We have simulated our model, both for the positive and normative implications, across
a wide range of parameter values of wage and price stickiness, the proportion of credit-
constrained consumers, Taylor rule parameters, as well as the horizon of welfare cal-
culations to better reflect the shorter political horizon. We find that varying these
parameter values has a negligible qualitative and quantitative impact on the results
(not reported).
5.5 Conclusions
This chapter explored the aggregate and distributional impact of fiscal austerity by
utilizing a medium scale DSGE model with a rich set of fiscal instruments. We examined
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aggregate, welfare and the income distribution outcomes in different types of fiscal
adjustment that vary with its composition and the speed of adjustment.
Our main results are as follows. First, we find that fiscal austerity gives rise to a vari-
ety of distributional outcomes, determined predominantly by the composition of fiscal
adjustment. In almost all cases, austerity tends to harm credit-constrained households
more than those with full access to capital markets. We find that spending-based fiscal
adjustment improves Ricardians’ welfare while non-Ricardians lose out. In contrast,
tax-based fiscal consolidations reduce welfare of both types of households but dispro-
portionately more of non-Ricardians. In addition to making everyone worse off, tax
based consolidations also bring about greater contractions in output and employment.
These two aspects of tax-based consolidations versus spending-based ones may have
important implications for the continuity of these programs. Indeed, existing empirical
literature on fiscal adjustments presents evidence for tax based consolidations to be
more shorter lived than spending based ones.
We also examined the implications of the monetary zero lower bound on the wel-
fare consequences of fiscal consolidations. We find that, in spite of their well-known
favourable impact on the effectiveness of fiscal policy, the presence of the monetary
zero lower bound doesn’t alter the welfare ranking across different sets of consumers
following fiscal austerity. However, we also show that the composition of consolidations
gains more importance at the lower bound. For example, we find that fiscal adjustment
through capital taxes are less bad in welfare terms at the monetary zero lower bound,
in contrast to adjustment through government spending or consumption taxes where
the opposite is true.
Overall, our findings also point to a clear trade off between the efficiency and the equity
aspects of austerity. Policies that lead to greater aggregate fluctuations (tax-based)
are also those that generate smaller inequality both in terms of welfare and income
distribution. Given the severity of the recent downturn in most advanced economies
that have adopted austerity, and the resulting preoccupation with GDP figures, this
trade-off between growth and distributional consequences of fiscal consolidation is likely
to pose serious challenges to policymakers in many countries.
Chapter 6
Contagious irrationality: fiscal
policy and catching up with the
Joneses
6.1 Introduction
Previous chapters have predominantly considered the normative consequences of fiscal
policy. This chapter is more in line with much of the existing literature by focussing on
the effectiveness of fiscal policy on the aggregate economy and the size of the fiscal mul-
tiplier. Neoclassical models suggest that the theoretical impact of tax movements on
the aggregate economy is nil, as Ricardian equivalence holds, and that increases in gov-
ernment spending will have a less than one-for-one correspondence on output as private
consumption is crowded out by public expenditure. However, these findings contradict
empirical results which show positive output movements to tax cuts and increases in
private consumption in response to increased government purchases (see for example
Blanchard and Perotti; 2002). This empirical literature typically employs vector au-
toregressions and is varied both with respect to the identifying conditions applied and
to the results obtained, from findings insignificant from zero (Ramey; 2011) to 2 year
cumulative multipliers of 2 or more (Gal´ı et al.; 2007; Caldara and Kamps; 2008). New
Keynesian models are able to obtain larger government spending multipliers, however,
crowding out of private consumption is still prevalent and multipliers of one or greater
require empirically inappropriate levels of accommodative monetary policy (Woodford;
2011). Moreover, the continued use of fully rational infinite lifetime agents ensures
that Ricardian equivalence still holds. Studies such as Gal´ı et al. (2007) and Monacelli
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and Perotti (2008) have induced positive comovements between public and private con-
sumption by introducing credit-constrained households and complementary preferences
between consumption and work respectively, however, the latter maintains Ricardian
equivalence, and the former is criticised for the level of imperfection required to obtain
this comovement.
The innovation of this chapter is to illustrate how through combining the modelling
assumptions of external habit persistence and rule-of-thumb agents, empirically ap-
propriate fiscal multipliers can be obtained at reasonable parameter values. These
modelling assumptions have been used predominantly in the literature, but often in
isolation of one another, where their inclusion has been based on microeconomic evi-
dence: see for example Kiley (2010). Moreover, macroeconomic models which comprise
these elements are seen to better match empirical data. The introduction of external
habit formation, where relative and absolute movements in consumption are valued
by agents, has been shown to provide hump-shaped dynamics often observed in the
data. This assumption imposes a weight in the utility function such that agents obtain
disutility from movements away from the prior period’s average level of consumption:
for this reason it has also been labelled ‘catching up with the Joneses’. However, the
concept of catching up with others is trivial when combined with the representative
agent assumption. Through introducing heterogeneity across the actions of households
by imposing a fraction of agents consume directly from their disposable income ‘rule-
of-thumb’, the combination of these two modelling assumptions provides compelling
results, particularly with respect to fiscal policy.
We find that long run fiscal multipliers increase with both greater rule-of-thumb be-
haviour and higher levels of habit persistence, and that there is an effective trade off
between these two parameters to obtain a given multiplier value. The first of these
results is commonly found in the literature as non-Ricardian households both violate
Ricardian equivalence and increase private spending in the face of increased public
spending. The second result is derived through the specific modelling assumption of
‘global habit persistence’ creating an interaction between the two heterogeneous agents.
In response to increased consumption of non-Ricardian households to a fiscal shock,
the otherwise prudent Ricardian households follow in kind and increase their own con-
sumption. This means that fewer rule-of-thumb agents are required to produce a similar
aggregate impact in the presence of habit persistence than without; in effect, less ir-
rational or myopic individuals are required when this behaviour is contagious on the
otherwise typical lifetime optimising agents. Moreover, through increasing their own
private consumption, Ricardian agents push up the aggregate level of consumption
which results in higher habit levels for the future, further fuelling levels of aggregate
consumption and subsequently output. Over the long run, habit persistence increases
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multipliers as the impact of heterogeneous agents consuming at different levels creates
a consumption bubble in the economy. These results are found both through dynamic
simulation and also through algebraic properties derived on a smaller version of the
model. In effect, this combination of modelling assumptions is imposing a form of ani-
mal spirits in the economy whereby the two types of households respond to the actions
of each other, acting more like one agent, deepening the impact of any shock.
The next section derives a New Keynesian DSGE model with both habit persistence
and credit-constrained consumers. Section 6.3 considers a smaller version of this model
for which algebraic properties, independent of parameter calibrations, can be observed.
Section 6.4 tests these properties on the larger model using dynamic simulations on
four fiscal experiments. Section 6.5 concludes.
6.2 The model
The model is similar to that presented in Chapter 2 with the inclusion of habit persis-
tence, capital accumulation and trade unions who suffer adjustment costs in the wage
setting process. The impact of the inclusion of habit persistence is the main focus of
the chapter whereas the inclusion of the two latter features extends λ∗ in the model
(see Proposition 1 in Chapter 2). The model is similar to Furlanetto and Seneca (2012)
who despite including both habit persistence and rule-of-thumb households, the former
is imposed on each household individually such that each agent forms habits based
on prior levels of their own disaggregate consumption. In the model presented below,
habit persistence acts across households which intuitively adds additional dynamics in
the model in response to shocks, where private agents will converge towards similar
consumption profiles.1
6.2.1 Households
There is a continuum [0, 1] of infinitely lived households, all of which consume the
final good and supply labour to firms. A proportion of these households (1− λ) are
‘Ricardian’ who have access to capital markets and can trade in a full set of state
1A handful of models do include this global habit persistence (where habits are based on aggregate
consumption) in conjunction with non-Ricardian agents: see for example Muscatelli et al. (2004) and
Erceg et al. (2006). However, although Ricardian households maximise subject to this level of habit
persistence, non-Ricardian household are frequently modelled as either taking the wage decisions of
these fully rational agents (as in the case of Erceg et al.; 2006) or modelled to have constant working
hours (as in the case of Muscatelli et al.; 2004) and therefore this utility function and interaction across
agents is only working in one direction. Through ignoring the optimisation of the rule-of-thumb agents,
these models are ignoring the additional avenue of interaction, which is the focus of this paper.
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contingent securities. The remaining proportion (λ) are ‘non-Ricardian’ who have no
access to capital markets. The period utility function is assumed to be the same for
both types of household and is given by:
U it =
(
Cit −Ht
)1−σ
1− σ −
(
N it
)1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
(6.1)
where Ct and Nt are consumption and employment in period t, and Ht = hCt−1
describes external habit formation. The parameter σ is the coefficient of relative risk
aversion and ϕ is the inverse elasticity of work with respect to the real wage. Superscript
i differentiates these variables between Ricardian (i = R) and non-Ricardian (i = NR)
households.
Ricardian Households
Ricardian households earn income from their labour supply (at a wage rate Wt), from
the dividends paid on share ownership, DRt , from maturing one period bonds purchased
in the previous time period, BRt , and from the return on their capital stock K
R
t (at
rental rate Rkt ). They use this income to purchase the consumption good (at a price
Pt), reinvest in capital, reinvest in the bond market (at a given return Rt), to pay lump
sum taxes levied by the fiscal authority, TRt , and to pay union fees Ft. This leaves a
budget constraint to Ricardian households given by:
Pt
(
CRt + I
R
t
)
+
BRt+1
Rt
≤WtNRt +DRt +BRt +RktKRt +−PtTRt − Ft (6.2)
The Ricardian household’s capital evolves according to the following constraint:
KRt+1 = (1− δ)KRt + Ξ
(
IRt
KRt
)
KRt (6.3)
where the rate of depreciation is given by δ, and where a capital adjustment cost
function is imposed, Ξ (·), which satisfies Ξ (δ) = δ, Ξ′ > 0, Ξ′ (δ) = 1 and Ξ′′ ≤ 0.
Ricardian households maximise expected lifetime utility (given by the sum of (6.1) from
t = 0 to t = ∞) discounting future periods of utility by a factor β ∈ (0, 1), subject to
constraints (6.2) and (6.3) with respect to consumption, bond purchases, investment
and capital, where all prices are taken as given.
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Non-Ricardian Households
Non-Ricardian households do not have access to bonds markets and as such cannot
intertemporally substitute consumption. Moreover they do not own company shares
or capital. They simply consume, period by period, their disposal income generated
through their supply of labour, which provides the non-Ricardian consumption func-
tion:
PtC
NR
t = WtN
NR
t − PtTNRt − Ft (6.4)
where equality is given by assumed strictly positive marginal utility from consumption.
Non-Ricardian households optimise their period by period utility by making decisions
on how much labour to supply at a given wage rate: maximisation of (6.1) subject to
the budget constraint (6.4) with respect to consumption and employment, where prices
and wages are taken as given. This process is performed on their behalf by the labour
unions discussed below.
6.2.2 Firms
The design of the production sector is similar to that set out in Section 2.3.2. In this
chapter only fiscal shocks are considered and as such the desired markup charged by
intermediate good firms is constant: µt = µ ∀ t. Moreover, we also ignore exogenous
movements in total factor productivity, and the introduction of capital in the model
changes the production function for intermediate good firms to:
Yt (j) = Kt (j)
αNt (j)
1−α (6.5)
6.2.3 Labour unions
A continuum of trade unions are assumed, z ∈ [0, 1], who bargain with firms on behalf of
their members, a continuum of workers representative of the whole population.2 These
unions set wages for their members who service labour demand at the given wage.
Each union provides labour which is differentiated from each other and therefore assert
market power. The services provided by each union is an aggregate of its individual
members, and the labour used by intermediate good firms is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate
of services provided by all unions. Each period, the union set wages such that it
2The ratio of non-Ricardian to Ricardian households in each union is given by λ : (1− λ).
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maximises a weighted average of the present value of utility for its members subject
to labour demand by firms (similar to equation (2.8) where a parameter w governs
the elasticity of substitution across labour types) and subject to an adjustment cost
process, similar to Rotemberg (1982), which is assumed to be a quadratic function of
the wage increases demanded by the union and proportional to the aggregate wage bill
in the economy.3 Each union member pays an equal share towards these negotiation
costs which provides the relationship:
Ft (z) =
φw
2
[
Wt (z)
Wt−1 (z)
− 1
]
WtNt (6.6)
where Ft (z) is the fee paid to union z and where the parameter φw governs the extent
of the adjustment cost for the labour unions.4
6.2.4 Monetary authority
The monetary authority follows a Taylor rule similar to that of (2.12) but where in the
analysis presented below there is no discussion of exogenous monetary policy shocks:
rt = ϕpipit + ϕyyt (6.7)
6.2.5 Fiscal authority
The fiscal authority purchases a proportion of the final goods for public consumption,
Gt, raises lump sum taxation from the two households, T
R
t and T
NR
t , and issues nominal
risk-free one-period bonds, Bt+1. As such, the flow constraint of the government is given
by:
PtGt +Bt ≤ Pt(TRt + TNRt ) +
Bt+1
Rt
(6.8)
The model includes a proportion of non-Ricardian households and therefore the dynam-
ics and evolution of government expenditures, taxes and debt is relevant. As is typical
3Although the bargaining process is not explicitly modelled, Furlanetto and Seneca (2012) liken this
environment to where more economic resources are required to achieve a higher increase in wages.
4Note, assuming a sticky wage setting process for trade unions as in the case of intermediate firms
would provide similar aggregate dynamics but would provide disaggregated heterogeneity across agents.
Whereas Ricardian agents are assumed to insure away this risk, non-Ricardian agents cannot and this
Rotemberg (1982) structure provides similar results with homogeneous wages and working hours: this
is an advantage highlighted by Furlanetto and Seneca (2012).
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in the literature, movements of fiscal variables away from steady state values will be
modelled as a result of exogenous shocks where long run debt is stabilised through debt
aversion parameters. More formally:
ĝt = ε
G
t + ϕb,g b̂t; ε
G
t = ρgε
G
t−1 + η
G
t (6.9)
t̂t = ε
T
t + ϕb,T b̂t; ε
T
t = ρtε
T
t−1 + η
T
t (6.10)
where, as before, hatted lower case variables represent deviations from steady state as
a proportion of steady state output: for example x̂t = (Xt−X)/Y . To simplify, it will
be assumed throughout the analysis t̂NRt = t̂
R
t = t̂t; changes in lump sum taxation are
equal across all households and there is no redistribution between households through
taxation. Moreover, it will be assumed that the government set steady state lump sum
taxes on the two types of households such that the increased income effect of dividends
and returns on capital for the Ricardian agents are eliminated. This assumption, com-
bined with the identical utility function assumed for the two types of households, leads
to the same consumption and employment profile of the heterogeneous households in
steady state: CNR = CR = C and NNR = NR = N. This assumption simplifies the
calculations but is not critical to the main results of the model. The above rules allow
the fiscal variables to respond to the level of government debt which acts to preserve
the solvency constraint.5
The inclusion of two shock processes and two debt aversion parameters lead to four
individual policy experiments for the conduct of fiscal policy, where one exogenous
process and one debt aversion parameter are enacted at a time: a shock to government
spending where resulting debt is repaid through medium term decreases in govern-
ment spending or increases in taxes, henceforth referred to as policy experiments 1 &
2 respectively; alternatively, a shock to taxes where resulting debt is repaid through
medium term increases in taxes or decreases in government spending, henceforth re-
ferred to as policy experiments 3 & 4 respectively. These policy experiments provide
clear comparisons across fiscal actions which will form the structure of the analysis.
5The government is also assumed to satisfy the solvency constraint that in the long run all debts
are fully repaid: algebraically, limt→∞Bt+1/Rt = 0. In this example, the condition ϕb,T − ϕb,g >
ρR/(1+ρR), where ρR = (1−β)/β is the steady state interest rate, ensures that the solvency constraint
is adhered to, stating that the fiscal authority must pay back debt faster than interest accrues on it.
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6.2.6 Market clearing, aggregation and equilibrium conditions
In equilibrium, aggregate consumption and employment are equal to the weighted av-
erage of the two variables across households, similar to (2.17) and (2.18). Moreover, all
output must be consumed by either the government, private individuals, investment or
trade unions:
Yt = Gt + Ct + It + Ft (6.11)
The model is solved by deriving log-linear approximations of key optimality conditions
and policy rules around the non-stochastic steady state with zero inflation and zero
government bonds: Appendix E.1 presents these conditions.
6.3 A benchmark model
This section reviews the consequences of including both rule-of-thumb agents and habit
persistence on the effectiveness of fiscal policy in a simplified version of the above
model. This simplified version abstracts away from both capital and labour unions
which provides a reduced form of the above model consisting of an aggregate demand
condition, a standard New Keynesian Phillips curve and policy rules. A perfectly
competitive labour market similar to Chapter 2 is assumed, where there are no frictions
or adjustment costs in the wage setting process, and where each households can supply
labour at a given wage rate independent of other agents. Capital is assumed fixed
and normalised in the production function (6.5) as in (2.9). With this smaller model
algebraic properties can be derived and analysed which provides a rigorous and intuitive
benchmark which further analysis can be built upon.
6.3.1 Aggregate demand
Under the conditions described above, an aggregate demand function can be derived
which is a function of policy variables and shock processes. This is achievable because
the above abstractions simplify the economy in such a way that rule-of-thumb consump-
tion is a relationship in only output and taxes which can be combined with a standard
Euler equation for Ricardian households. Once the calculations have been performed,
the following equation can be derived (see Appendix E.2 for the full derivation):
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yt = ΦAEt {yt+1} −ΘA (rt − Et {pit+1})− Φ′′yt−1 − ΦEt {ĝt+1} (6.12)
+Φ
′
ĝt + Φ
′′
ĝt−1 + ΘBEt
{
∆t̂NRt
}
ΦA = [Γ− λ(1− h)(1 + ϕ)ϕγc] (Γ′′)−1
ΘA = γc(1− λ) 1
σ
(1− h) [γcϕ(1 + µ)(1− h) + σ(1− α)] (Γ′′)−1
Φ
′′
= [λϕσ(1− α)h− (1− λ)h [γcϕ(1 + µ)(1− h) + σ(1− α)]] (Γ′′)−1
Φ = Γ(Γ
′′
)−1
Φ
′
= Γ
′
(Γ
′′
)−1
ΘB = γcλϕ(1 + µ)(1− h)(Γ′′)−1
Γ
′′
= Γ
′ − λ(1− h)(1 + ϕ)ϕγc
Γ
′
= γcϕ(1 + µ)(1− h) [1 + (1− λ)h] + σ(1− α) [1− λ(1 + ϕ)(1 + h) + h]
Γ = γcϕ(1 + µ)(1− h) + σ(1− α) [1− λ(1 + ϕ)]
This aggregate demand condition can be combined with log-linear policy rules (6.7),
(6.8), (6.9) and (6.10) as well as a standard New Keynesian Phillips Curve in order
to close the model. From the demand function (6.12) algebraic relationships in partial
equilibrium relating fiscal policy actions with output can be found, as well as other
important properties of the model, which can be analysed prior to simulation.
6.3.2 Properties of the model
Determinacy and asset market non-participation
As was discussed in Section 2.4 there is a critical value of λ such that the aggregate
demand relationships and determinacy are inverted. In the simplified model discussed
above this point will be at:
λ∗ =
(1 + h) [γcϕ(1 + µ)(1− h) + σ(1− α)]
(1 + ϕ) [σ(1− α)(1 + h) + ϕγc(1− h)] + hγcϕ(1 + µ)(1− h) (6.13)
An important relationship to highlight is the result that ∂λ∗/∂h > 0: increases in
habit persistence increase the critical value of asset market non-participation. This
occurs because habit persistence acts as a buffer between output movements and non-
Ricardian consumption, where rule-of-thumb agents look to temper relative movements
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in their personal consumption, thereby minimising the feedback effect between this and
output.
The short term impacts of fiscal policy on aggregate demand
Similar to the relationships in equation (4.1) it is possible to show for aggregate demand
(6.12) that, in the region of 0 < λ < λ∗, the following partial equilibrium results:
∂yt
∂ĝt
> 0,
∂yt
∂t̂t
< 0,
∣∣∣∣∂yt∂ĝt
∣∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∣∂yt∂t̂t
∣∣∣∣ (6.14)
where the implications and intuition of these relationships are discussed in Section 4.3.
The first and second of these conditions follows from the observation that ∂yt/∂ĝt = Φ
′
and ∂yt/∂t̂t = −ΦΘB, and noting that the condition λ < λ∗ results in each of these
aggregate demand coefficients to be positive; the third of these conditions is provided
observing that Φ′ > ΘB when λ < λ∗.
Within these the following relationships, in the region of 0 < λ < λ∗, can be observed
and are derived in Appendix E.3:6
∂Φ
′
∂λ
> 0,
∂Φ
′
∂h
< 0,
∂ΘB
∂λ
> 0,
∂ΘB
∂h
< 0 (6.15)
Which illustrate two further important properties: higher values of λ and h increase and
decrease the impact of fiscal policy on aggregate demand respectively, both of which
lead from the λ∗ condition (6.13) above. As the share of the rule-of-thumb agents
increase, the proportion of households whose consumption is directly determined by
output also increases. This occurs because output has a positive impact on wages and
therefore an increase in the former increases the latter which increases non-Ricardian
consumption, all other things being equal. Therefore fiscal policy has a larger aggregate
effect at higher values of λ. This relationship is non-linear in λ and it can be shown that
∂2Φ
′
/∂λ2 > 0 and ∂2ΘB/∂λ
2 > 0.7 The second relationship in (6.15) states that higher
levels of habit persistence are associated with lower initial aggregate demand effects of
fiscal policy. Higher calibrations of h lead to individuals valuing relative movements
in consumption as well as absolute movements. This means that when a shock hits
the economy which increases demand, consumers will respond sluggishly as they trade
6The first, second and fourth of these results require extra conditions to hold: these are 1+µ < σ(1−
α)/[λh(σ(1−α)−ϕγc)−ϕγc], λ < ((1−h)2γcϕ(1+µ)+2σ(1−α))/((1−h)2γcϕ(1+µ)+2σ(1−α)(1+ϕ))
and λ < (2σ(1− α) + γcϕ(1− h)(1− λ)[(µ)(1− h) + λ(1 + ϕ)])/2σ(1− α)(1 + ϕ)(1 + h), respectively,
neither of which represent significant restrictions at reasonable parameter values.
7The first of these results requires the first condition from the previous qualification set out for
(6.15): again, this is not restrictive at reasonable parameter values.
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off the extra utility from increased consumption over the penalty of this being higher
than yesterdays’ consumption. This will have the (partial equilibrium) effect of the full
impact of the shock taking more time to mature and as such will result in lower impact
multipliers to any fiscal action.8
However, this goes against the finding of Monacelli and Perotti (2008) and Furlanetto
and Seneca (2012) who show that government spending multipliers increase with habit
persistence because this generates sluggishness in the dynamics of private consumption
which, due to the substitution effect, falls in aggregate in response to a public spending
rise. This intuitive result is not shown above because (6.15) represents a partial equi-
librium result. This sluggishness in private consumption can be shown algebraically
by observing ∂ΘA/∂h < 0, meaning that Ricardian agents discount the impact of ris-
ing real interest rates associated with the government spending rise at higher values
of habit persistence.9 For tax rises however, this tardiness works against the rise in
private consumption and therefore suppresses impact multipliers of such actions.
The long run aggregate demand impacts of fiscal policy
The properties of the initial effects of fiscal policy on aggregate demand above provide
intuitive insight however are not informative on the long run impacts. As is observed
in the aggregate demand condition (6.12), there is both a lead (because of rational
expectations) and a lag (because of habit persistence) term in this relationship making
it a second order differential process. Performing similar procedures as those above,
the following four conditions, in the region of 0 < λ < λ∗, can be observed and are
derived in Appendix E.4:10
∂ΦA
∂λ
< 0,
∂ΦA
∂h
< 0,
∂Φ
′′
∂λ
> 0,
∂Φ
′′
∂h
> 0 (6.16)
The coefficient on the lead expression gets smaller and the coefficient on the lag ex-
pression bigger at higher values of λ and h: these both increase the long run impact of
any aggregate demand stimulant, including those from fiscal policy. When habit per-
sistence is included in the model both types of agent consider past values of aggregate
8This impact is increasing in h where it is possible to show ∂2Φ
′
/∂h2 > 0 meaning that the coeffi-
cients are decreasing at a decreasing rate. The proof of the latter requires the same additional condition
as the final expression in (6.15).
9The proof for this condition is only true when 2 + h− 2(1 + ϕ)λh > 0 which is a condition stating
that neither h nor λ can go to extreme values.
10For the first and third of these properties the algebraic proof requires the additional (and reason-
able) condition that µ < ϕ. The second and fourth results also require additional conditions, however
these are complicated expressions, which are met for all reasonable parameter values, and hold at their
limit providing λ < 1/h(1 + ϕ).
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consumption in today’s decision making. When a demand shock strikes the economy
an increase (decrease) in consumption today will lead to households tomorrow also
increasing (decreasing) their consumption, relative to when h = 0; this impacts the fol-
lowing period, which impacts the next, and so on and so forth. Moreover, an increase
in the proportion of credit-constrained agents increases the aggregate impact of private
consumption of any given shock as more agents are reacting simultaneously rather than
smoothing the effects over a longer time horizon. This will subsequently increase those
effects which take time to unwind due to the presence of habit persistence, and the
following two intuitive relationships can be demonstrated for when λ < λ∗:11
∂2ΦA
∂λ∂h
< 0,
∂2Φ
′′
∂λ∂h
> 0 (6.17)
which states that the long run fiscal fiscal effects on aggregate demand increase at an
increasing rate at higher values of λ and h and that there is an interaction between
these two variables.12
In sum, the inclusion of both heterogeneous agents and habit persistence can have
significant long run consequences relating to the impact and effectiveness of fiscal policy.
Not only do these factors impact the results individually but the analysis highlights
the intuitive relationship that they work in union such that the feedback process of
one is amplified by the other. In effect, through introducing an empirically appropriate
interaction between heterogeneous agents only a small proportion of individuals who
behave differently from the perceived optimal approach are required in order to produce
a much larger aggregate impact than when this interaction is not present: there is a
contagion of private spending as one type of household attempts to ‘keep up with’ the
other. In this respect the combination of these two modelling assumptions is imposing
a form of herding behaviour or animal spirits on the model.
6.3.3 Dynamic simulations
To illustrate the above properties, simulations are performed on the simplified model to
obtain a more complete understanding of the transmission mechanisms involved when
11The coefficients attached to these properties are too complicated for algebraic proof, but it can be
numerically demonstrated that these relationships hold providing both λ and h are not at the upper end
of their limits: similar to the conditions for (6.16). This demonstration uses Monte Carlo simulation
techniques where all parameters are selected within a reasonable distribution (dictated either by natural
restrictions or through typical prior estimates used in Bayesian estimation) and the coefficient being
estimated over a large number of separate iterations.
12It can also be numerically demonstrated that, providing λ < λ∗, long run fiscal multipliers are
increasing at an increasing rate with respect to λ, ∂2ΦA/∂λ
2 < 0 and ∂2Φ
′′
/∂λ2 > 0, and increasing
at a decreasing rate with respect to h, ∂2ΦA/∂h
2 > 0 and ∂2Φ
′′
/∂h2 < 0, where the latter two results
are found for when λ and h are not at the upper ends of their limits.
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both rule-of-thumb agents and habit persistence are included into a simple DSGE
model. This allows for clear understanding prior to performing further analysis on the
bigger model.
Calibration
For dynamic simulations, a similar calibration as those discussed in Sections 3.3.2 and
4.4.1 will be used. The exception to this is to set the inverse elasticity of labour with
respect to real wages, ϕ, to 1. Depending on the policy experiment, the debt aversion
parameters will be set such that ϕb,g = −0.1 and ϕb,T = 0.1, when not zero, and the
persistence of fiscal shocks (ρg and ρt) are set equal to 0.8; these values represent a half
life of existing government debt of less than two years and of the disequilibrium shock
of less than one year using equation (2.16). Given the importance of the parameters λ
and h these will be set at different levels throughout. Typically, values in the range of
0.25-0.5 and 0.6-0.8 are used in the literature for the proportion of credit-constrained
agents and habit persistence, respectively.
Simulations
Figure 16 presents impulse response functions for key aggregate and disaggregate vari-
ables under policy experiments 1 & 3 where in both examples the fiscal shock acts
to increase output (a government spending rise and tax cut respectively) and the size
of the shock is normalized to one percentage point of steady state output. Note that
policy experiments 2 & 4 differ from 1 & 3 respectively only through the way resulting
debt is repaid and as such presentation of these results are not included for brevity.
The figure presents the impact of the shock under four separate calibrations: a fully
Ricardian economy with no habit persistence (λ = 0, h = 0); a fully Ricardian economy
with habit persistence (λ = 0, h = 0.7); a mixed economy with no habit persistence
(λ = 0.5, h = 0); and a mixed economy with habit persistence (λ = 0.5, h = 0.7).
Consider the dynamics where there has been a negative shock to lump sum taxation
which in the medium term is repaid through future tax rises: policy experiment 3.
This provides an interesting benchmark because Ricardian equivalence holds in a fully
Ricardian economy (λ = 0) and, moreover, because the way the fiscal shock interacts
with the aggregate economy is directly through the actions of private agents. When
there is some proportion of non-Ricardian households (λ > 0) they respond to the tax
cut through increasing their consumption as their disposable income rises. The intro-
duction of these credit-constrained agents also impacts on the disaggregated actions
of the Ricardian households who now reduce their consumption in response to the tax
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Figure 16: Dynamics under different fiscal experiments
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Dynamics achieved through applying policy experiment 1 with respect to the first two columns and
policy experiment 3 with respect to the second two columns, and where the shock to fiscal policy is
normalized to one percentage point of steady state output. The x-axis represents time in quarters and
the y-axis the percentage deviation of the variable from its steady state value.
cut. These agents anticipate future tax rises but see a fall in their net lifetime income
as profits fall over the short term. This occurs because the non-Ricardian households
substitute consumption for leisure as a result of the tax cut, increasing the real wage
and therefore driving down profits. The net impact is to increase aggregate consump-
tion in the economy, as the rise in non-Ricardian consumption is greater than the fall
in Ricardian consumption, because the action of the latter agents is smoothed over
the course of their lifetimes. When habit persistence is included (h = 0.7), the figures
illustrate that this movement in aggregate consumption is initially smaller than where
there was no habit persistence: as predicted by (6.15) the initial impact multiplier of
the tax cut is lower. This occurs because non-Ricardian agents raise their consumption
by less due to the preference towards habit persistence. However, as time continues,
output with habit persistence dominates that without because although non-Ricardian
consumption falls when h = 0.7 compared to h = 0, Ricardian consumption rises by
more. This occurs because these Ricardian agents experience consumption levels below
the lagged-average values and therefore increase their consumption in order to keep up
with their non-Ricardian neighbours. This pushes up aggregate consumption in the
economy which means both agents are reverting back to a higher level of lagged aggre-
gate consumption. Over the long term this output domination becomes significant.
Similar results are also found when considering a policy whereby government spending
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rises today are repaid in the future by spending cuts: policy experiment 1. Positive
fiscal multipliers are observed with this experiment, even in a fully Ricardian econ-
omy, because the government is directly increasing aggregate demand through public
consumption. However, multipliers are less than one as Ricardian agents substitute
consumption for leisure, because the increase in government spending increases their
labour requirement. When habit persistence is included in the actions of these agents,
impact multipliers increase. This goes against the partial equilibrium result of (6.15)
and occurs, as discussed above, because in general equilibrium the corresponding fall in
Ricardian consumption is slower as these agents value relative movements in consump-
tion. This suppresses the reduction in private consumption which therefore reduces
output by less. When rule-of-thumb agents are included in the model, the impact of
the shock is increased, as was anticipated in (6.15). This occurs because there is an in-
crease in labour demand in order to produce the additional government consumption,
which subsequently raises wages and therefore disposable incomes of non-Ricardian
households. As was the case in policy experiment 3, the inclusion of rule-of-thumb
agents reduces the consumption of Ricardian households because profits fall in general
equilibrium. When both credit-constrained agents and habit persistence are included
in the model both short and long run multipliers are at their highest. This occurs be-
cause there is the double effect of an increasing proportion of agents initially responding
positively with their private consumption to the increase in public consumption and,
moreover, falls in future consumption are minimised by relative movements becoming
important to all agents.
An alternative explanation behind these results is that through assuming global habit
persistence across the actions of heterogeneous households, in effect we are imposing
a form of animal spirits on the model. As can be seen in Figure 16, in the absence of
this ‘catching up with the Joneses’ assumption there is a negative covariance between
the consumption responses of the two agents in the model, where non-Ricardian spend-
ing rises whilst Ricardian spending falls. This negative covariance occurs because an
increase in rule-of-thumb consumption reduces rule-of-thumb labour supply thus in-
creasing marginal costs and reducing profits. These responses mirror each other in
such a way that the aggregate consumption profile is hedged with the divergent agents.
When global habit persistence is included however, the interaction this imposes on the
two households means that they move more as one entity: the consumption rises of one
impact on the other who attempt to ‘catch up’. These animal spirits lead to deeper
impacts of shocks in the model, which is in line with the original intuition of herding
behaviour, and further adds to the ability of DSGE models to account for more extreme
reactions from exogenous shocks.
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6.4 Asset market non-participation, global habit persis-
tence and fiscal policy
With the understanding derived with the smaller model this section now brings in all el-
ements of the model discussed in Section 6.2. With this comes two distinct advantages:
first, the additional elements of the model (capital accumulation with adjustment costs,
and frictions in the labour market) have been argued to be more empirically appro-
priate, making any inference from the model more robust; and second, such rigidities
increase the value of λ∗. This latter benefit occurs because the additional rigidities
provides a buffer between non-Ricardian consumption and output which supresses the
associated feedback mechanism. This allows the analysis to consider a greater range of
values for λ over that which would be possible with the smaller model outlined above.
To incorporate the additional elements of the model, the calibration of Section 6.3.3
is updated. Specifically, we calibrate the ratios of steady state output as γc = 0.62,
γi = 0.18 and γg = 0.2. Further, we set w = 4 and φw = 174.7 which is equivalent to
wage stickiness equal to 0.75 in a Calvo setting. Further, the adjustment cost to capital
η is set equal to 1. This calibration is in line with Furlanetto and Seneca (2012).
6.4.1 Short, medium and long run fiscal multipliers
Figure 17 presents contours for multipliers associated with the four fiscal experiments
under a range of calibrations of both λ and h and where the multiplier is evaluated over
three different time horizons: an impact multiplier, a two year cumulative multiplier
and a cumulative long run multiplier. From the figure we can observe the following
results.
First, an increase in the proportion of non-Ricardian consumers increases the value of
fiscal policy multipliers in all four policy experiments and across all three time horizons.
This result is a consequence of the non-linear feedback mechanism between output and
non-Ricardian consumers and was predicted in relationship (6.15). However, the im-
pact of increasing habit persistence has an ambiguous effect with respect to which
experiment is applied. This was also predicted above, both in the partial equilibrium
results and also in the dynamic simulations of the smaller model. In policy experiments
1 and 2 private consumption falls in aggregate and habit persistence delays this pro-
cess therefore increasing short run multipliers; in policy experiments 3 and 4 private
consumption increases and smaller impact multipliers result. Over time however, the
impact of higher habit persistence across agents is to increase the long run impact of the
fiscal action, independent of the policy experiment, as was anticipated in relationship
Fiscal policy and catching up with the Joneses 130
Figure 17: Fiscal experiments and multipliers at different calibrations of λ and h
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The graphs presents contours representing different fiscal multipliers for different values of both λ and
h. The first row presents multipliers as a result of policy experiment 1, the second row, contours as a
result of policy experiment 2, the third row policy experiment 3 and the fourth row policy experiment 4.
The first column represents impact multipliers as a result of the respective policy experiment calculated
using yt/xt, the second column cumulative two year multipliers calculated using
∑t=8
t=1 yt/
∑t=8
t=1 xt and
the final column lifetime multipliers approximated as
∑t=100
t=1 yt; where for the first two rows xt = gt
and the second two rows xt = −tt, and therefore a positive tax multiplier represents an increase in
output from a decrease in taxes. Note that the lifetime multiplier is calculated as the total movement in
output once the debt has been repaid and therefore fair comparisons can be made across all four policy
experiments. Also note that we could have discounted future periods of output but this would have a
negligible impact on the two year multipliers and an amplifying impact on the lifetime multipliers, as
the contractionary period of repaying debt is discounted; the results and method used above are the
most prudent, giving the lowest multiplier values.
(6.16). Moreover, there is an observed trade-off between the parameters of λ and h
required in order to obtain a given long run impact to fiscal policy, as was anticipated
in relationship (6.16). To obtain a cumulative two year multiplier of 1, for example,
and moving from h = 0.0 to h = 0.7 results in reduction of λ of approximately 80%,
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35%, 25% and 10% respectively in the four policy experiments. This trade off becomes
more extreme as the length of the time horizon is extended to allow the transmission
mechanism of one household keeping up with the other to propagate fully: the animal
spirits take time to transmit throughout the economy. Moreover, we observe that this
trade-off and amplification process become stronger at higher values of λ and h, as
predicted by relationship (6.17), which is observed by the decreasing distance of the
contours in the graphs. Habit persistence and non-Ricardian behaviour are observed
to increase multipliers and these two factors interact with one another in union when
animal spirits take over.
The contours are relatively inelastic suggesting that habit persistence does not have a
large individual impact on fiscal multipliers comparative to non-Ricardian households.
However, this conclusion will be weighted by the fact that typical levels of h are much
larger than λ, and moreover, it can be observed that this impact is increasing at
higher levels of λ: as anticipated by (6.17). This reinforces the message that it is
the combination of the two factors which have a significant impact, and that it is the
presence of heterogeneous agents reacting differently to the shock but then converging,
as one tries to keep up with the other. Although rule-of-thumb agents can increase
multipliers in isolation, when h = 0.7 these more than double over the long run; less
irrational or myopic behaviour is needed to be assumed to be able to get conclusive
supportive results for fiscal action.
With rare exceptions, positive fiscal multipliers are observed across different time hori-
zons and fiscal experiments. These exceptions refer to policy experiment 4 where,
under certain parameter calibrations, negative multipliers are observed across all time
horizons.13 This was predicted in relationship (6.14) whereby government spending
movements were observed to be more effective per unit than tax movements. There-
fore, a policy which cuts taxes only to repay for this over the medium run through
lower government spending is removing net demand within the economy. This occurs
at lower levels of both λ and h and also at longer time horizons when the contractionary
impact of repaying government debt is fully accounted for. The long run results in pol-
icy experiment 4 are in stark contrast to those of policy experiment 2, where to some
extent, over long time horizons, these two experiments can be seen as the reverse of
each other. In the former, negative or low multipliers are observed for most calibrations
of λ and h, whereas the latter records high multipliers at modest calibrations of these
13Negative impact multipliers can also result in policy experiment 3 at both low levels of λ and high
levels of h. This is due to the capital accumulation friction and does not occur for the smaller model
in Section 6.3. Whereas the movement in private consumption is small at low levels of λ and slow to
respond at high levels of h, investment initially falls as a result of the shock because there is a rise in
interest rates that outstrips a rise in the rental rate of capital. This leads to an initial fall in investment
as Ricardian households substitute investment in capital for investment in bonds which leads to an
initial, but short lived, fall in output.
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parameters, as the stimulating impact of government spending is much greater than
the contractionary impact of future tax rises. In general, it is possible to observe that
those multipliers for government spending led stimuli are greater than those for tax cut
led measures over all time horizons and at any calibrations of λ and h.
Finally, it is possible to observe large fiscal multipliers, even over the long run, with all
four policy experiments. This shows the power of habit persistence and non-Ricardian
agents in increasing theoretical multipliers and moreover of the combination of the two.
In effect, through introducing empirically appropriate interactions between heteroge-
neous agents, only a small fraction of agents who behave differently from the perceived
optimal way are required in order to reproduce empirically appropriate results; we can
obtain these results whilst still assuming a high degree of fully rational agents. For ex-
ample, long run multipliers of 3 can be obtained in policy experiments 1 & 2 at h = 0.7
with λ = 0.3 and λ = 0.05 respectively. Moreover, the model can replicate values across
the whole spectrum of empirical estimates with both positive and negative values over
the short and long run, depending on the specific policy experiment and the individual
calibrations of λ and h.
6.4.2 Sensitivity
Different habit persistence assumptions
As discussed above, a global version of habit persistence where both agents form habits
based on past levels of aggregate consumption is unusual in the DSGE literature. To
see the significance of this, Figure 18 presents results under three separate assump-
tions on habit persistence: the global levels of habit persistence developed above; the
typical assumption where only Ricardian households develop habits on past Ricar-
dian consumption (see for example Coenen and Straub; 2005); and the less common
concept that each agent forms habits based on their own disaggregate levels (see for
example Furlanetto and Seneca; 2012). On impact, the result of a change in habit
assumptions have a limited effect on multipliers because independent of the assump-
tion cRt−1 = cNRt−1 = 0, and therefore lagged dynamics are not being accounted for.
However, over the medium and long term the differences become more apparent. The
two additional frameworks exclude herding behaviour, by assumption, and as such the
interaction between λ and h is no longer present: the contours are seen to be inelastic.
Over the long run under the assumption of purely Ricardian habits the relationship
works in the opposite direction as discussed above: greater levels of (Ricardian) habit
persistence results in lower long run multipliers for a given value of λ. This occurs be-
cause when h = 0, Ricardian households would respond to the fiscal stimulus through
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cutting consumption in all four experiments: this was seen in Figure 16. When acting
independently of their rule-of-thumb neighbours therefore, higher levels of persistence
in falling Ricardian consumption lead to lower fiscal multipliers over the long term.
When both agents form separate habits based on disaggregate averages of past con-
sumption, the impact of this persistence in Ricardian consumption is matched by the
persistence of increasing non-Ricardian consumption and as as such the results for long
run multipliers are insensitive to movements in h (assuming hR = hNR). Therefore, the
assumption on who and how agents form habits is important to the dynamics of the
model, and subsequently on the size of fiscal multipliers. It is argued that the concept
of ‘catching up with the Jones’ is empirically relevant and the introduction of herding
behaviour in DSGE models is an interesting innovation.
Distortionary taxation
The analysis above has been performed using lump sum taxation however, were dis-
tortionary taxes to be included similar results would be derived. From the structure of
the model it is possible to include taxes on consumption, employment income, capital
and employment by firms such that these rates perform an initial shock and react to
the level of debt similar to (6.10); see Appendix E.5 for details of the structure of this
model. If these are included similar results as those presented for lump sum taxes are
derived: higher values of h require lower values of λ for a given multiplier over the
medium and long term. As these fiscal actions involve movements in taxation, higher
levels of habit persistence result in lower initial multipliers as consumption is slow to
respond to the stimulus. There is more scope in this design for negative multipliers
through those taxes which distort production decisions of firms: taxes on capital and
labour. When an expansionary fiscal action is repaid through employer social security
contributions or capital taxes the deflationary impact over the medium run can result
in negative cumulative multipliers over longer horizons with low calibrations of λ and
h. This occurs because the fiscal stimulus is now not only impacting demand within the
economy but also the supply of firms. It is also observed that those fiscal instruments
which specifically target the consumption function of non-Ricardian households (taxes
on consumption and labour income) have larger multipliers than production taxes:
government spending multipliers dominate all tax multipliers over all calibrations of λ
and h. However, the results presented above are not sensitive to extending the range
of tax instruments available to the government.
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Figure 18: Fiscal experiments and multipliers at different calibrations of λ and h
and different assumptions on habit persistence
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The graphs presents contours representing different fiscal multipliers for different values of both λ and
h. The different panes correspond to those used in Figure 17 and multipliers are calculated in the same
way. ‘Global’ habit persistence represents the same results presented above whereas ‘Ricardian’ habit
persistence represents the results under a model where only Ricardian agents form habits based on
their own past levels of consumption, and ‘Separate’ habit persistence a model where both households
form habits on their own past levels of consumption (and where hR = hNR).
Other parameters
Other parameter calibrations also impact the size of fiscal multipliers beyond those
of asset market non-participation and habit persistence which have been the main
focus of this chapter. Although these have a quantitative impact across the four fiscal
experiments and across the three time horizons, these effects tend to be small and,
and more importantly, they do not lead to qualitative changes in the results discussed
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above. Further, these quantitative changes tend to go in line with intuition. Table 12
presents fiscal multipliers across different calibrations and time horizons, the results of
which are discussed below.
More conservative monetary policy leads to lower fiscal multipliers as the nominal
interest rate is increased in order to dampen the economy. Higher degrees of price
and wage stickiness increase the scope for fiscal policy because they represent larger
real rigidities in the model, and therefore larger fiscal multipliers are associated with
increased calibrations of θ and φw and smaller calibrations of w. The preference
parameters impact on the response of private agents to public policy, with greater values
of σ and smaller values of ϕ leading to bigger fiscal multipliers. Increased adjustment
costs in the capital accumulation process prohibits the productive sector responding
quickly to the fiscal activity and therefore adds a lag to the full impact of the shocks
to be felt: this corresponds with larger fiscal multipliers being associated with smaller
calibrations of η. Reducing the persistence of the fiscal shocks, either by decreasing
ρi or increasing ϕb,i (i = {G,T}), fiscal multipliers increase in the short and medium
run. This happens for two main reasons: first, through reducing the persistence of the
shock the expected lifetime income of the Ricardian agents falls by less, subsequently
reducing the initial fall in their private consumption; and second, through reducing the
persistence of the shock, there is less debt to repay and less fiscal stimulus, making
the denominator in any multiplier calculation smaller. However, despite all these small
nuances, the quantitative results are not significantly altered and the qualitative results
remain unchanged. Moreover, fiscal policy multipliers are observed to be most sensitive
to the calibration of the two parameters λ and h.
6.5 Conclusions
The model presented above provides empirically appropriate values for fiscal policy
multipliers which are reflective of the entire range of estimates in the literature. These
results come from reasonable assumptions on consumption behaviour, which have been
empirically tested, and further which have previously been included in theoretical mod-
els. The innovation of this chapter has been to acknowledge the importance of heteroge-
neous agents in unison with the assumption of external habit persistence of ‘catching up
with the Jones’, and the subsequent impact this has on the actions of fiscal authorities.
In effect, the model has introduced an element of herding behaviour or animal spirits
into the dynamics of various shocks. This Keynesian concept has been discussed at
length, and the current downturn is no exception (see for example Akerlof and Shiller;
2010), however previously models have failed to produce this effect. In many respects
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Table 12: Chapter 6 sensitivity
Cumulative Multipliers
Policy experiment 1 Policy experiment 3
Impact Two years lifetime Impact Two years lifetime
Benchmark 1.302 2.335 6.862 0.572 1.839 6.843
λ = h = 0.0 0.700 0.886 1.482 0.000 0.000 0.000
λ = 0.0 0.868 0.912 1.563 0.000 0.000 0.000
h = 0.0 1.180 1.545 3.670 0.590 0.841 2.825
Separate habits 1.451 1.701 3.905 0.756 0.973 3.003
Ricardian habits 1.420 1.599 3.060 0.713 0.836 1.951
ϕpi = 2.5 1.029 1.826 5.353 0.320 1.341 5.587
ϕy = 0.5 0.878 1.413 3.679 0.306 1.070 3.440
θ = 0.85 1.345 2.776 7.330 0.594 2.251 7.183
φw = 250 1.358 2.584 6.865 0.623 2.074 6.671
σ = 0.5 1.167 2.017 4.853 0.469 1.575 4.941
ϕ = 2 1.195 2.295 6.661 0.466 1.743 6.061
η = 0.75 1.370 2.631 6.987 0.623 2.127 6.914
ρi = 0.7 1.432 3.077 5.553 0.678 2.529 5.376
ϕb,i = 0.05 1.160 1.834 6.407 0.442 1.382 6.973
‘Benchmark’ represents the calibration discussed in Section 6.4 with h = 0.7 and λ = 0.5. For brevity
the results from policy experiments two and four are not presented: the results are not sensitive to
this. In the final two rows i = G for policy experiment 1, and i = T for policy experiment 3.
the assumption of a representative household trivialises many of these consumption
based issues and the introduction of heterogeneous agents provides scope for many
further extensions such as those presented above.
Intuitively, similar results will be provided if different heterogeneity is introduced into
the model, for example through regional differences, and further research into greater
agent diversity may provide interesting results. Habit persistence that breaches national
boundaries is a concept not discussed above but for which is potentially true of an ever
more integrated and open global economy. Empirical research into the changing nature
of both habit persistence and rule-of-thumb behaviour, and their cyclical properties,
may also be of interest. The consumption behaviour of individuals in response to
fiscal policy is clearly an important issue in order to reflect upon the impacts of any
such policy actions. This chapter has suggested that previously this has been under-
represented in the literature, focusing too frequently on representative agents, and has
introduced herding behaviour into an otherwise standard New Keynesian DSGE model.
Chapter 7
On the consequences of
procyclical fiscal policy
7.1 Introduction
The 2008-09 global financial crisis and the subsequent downturn in the world economy
has prompted policymakers in a large number of countries to enact substantial fiscal
stimulus packages. Most of these recovery packages entailed provisions for bailing out
the financial sector that was subject to massive losses following the onset of the crisis
in 2008, raising the overall fiscal cost of intervention to unprecedented levels in most
industrialized countries, especially in the US and the UK. This, in turn, led many
countries to reverse the course of policy and opt for fiscal retrenchment. Others such
as Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain were forced to follow suit due to sovereign risk
considerations. Such policy actions in the form of fiscal stimulus followed by fiscal
austerity revitalized the debate on the desirability of countercyclical fiscal policy.
A central question underlying this policy debate is whether countercyclical policy ac-
tions (expansionary in bad times and contractionary in good times), as was sought
by the fiscal stimulus packages, are likely to be effective. Although there are counter
arguments against the active use of fiscal policy as a stabilization tool, such as tax
smoothing arguments based on Ricardian equivalence (see for example Barro; 1979),
once fiscal policy is deemed to be among the policy tool box, the case for countercycli-
cal policy is clear. A countercyclical fiscal policy stance with policy actions against the
cycle aims to act as a stabiliser by reducing output volatility and keeping growth on a
steady, non-fluctuating path.
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Yet, the recent return to fiscal procyclicality - austerity during the severest downturn
in the post-war era - is not an isolated case. Indeed, there is widespread evidence
that procyclical fiscal policies have been the norm in many developing and emerging
market countries (see for example Gavin and Perotti; 1997; Kaminsky et al.; 2004; Talvi
and Ve´gh; 2005; Woo; 2009). Such evidence has been considered puzzling and hence
led to an active research agenda on the sources of procyclical fiscal policy. Potential
explanations that have been put forward include: borrowing constraints that restrict
policymakers ability to follow countercyclical fiscal policy in bad times (see for example
Gavin and Perotti; 1997); the procyclicality of capital flows that also act as borrowing
constraints in bad times (Kaminsky et al.; 2004); political constraints such that fiscal
pressures from multiple power groups for higher public spending in good times resulting
in contractionary fiscal policy in bad times due to insufficient savings (Lane and Tornell;
1998; Lane; 2003; Talvi and Ve´gh; 2005; Woo; 2009); and political distortions such as
corruption leading to public pressure for greater public spending in good times, in order
to reduce the rents available to corrupt governments (Alesina et al.; 2008).
A key aspect of the observed cyclical pattern of fiscal policy is related to its con-
sequences for economic outcomes. It is therefore surprising that, in contrast to the
wealth of studies on the sources of procyclical policy, potential consequences of such
seemingly sub-optimal policies have been largely ignored in the existing literature. Al-
though procyclical fiscal policies are widely viewed to be detrimental to macroeconomic
outcomes, to the best of our knowledge, there is no systematic study of the economic
costs of following such policies.1 Given the prevalence of procyclical fiscal policy in
many countries this is clearly of key relevance for both policymakers and researchers.
Motivated by the current debate on fiscal stimulus versus fiscal austerity in response to
the global downturn in economic activity, representing countercyclical versus procycli-
cal policies respectively, this paper attempts to address the following important policy
question: does the cyclicality of fiscal policy have any systematic impact on economic
outcomes? Put differently, does it matter whether a country adopts a procyclical fiscal
policy stance rather than a countercyclical one? In trying to answer this question, we
move beyond the sources of fiscal procyclicality and examine the potential consequences
of such policies. We utilize an annual dataset for a large sample of 114 countries over
the period 1950-2010 to construct a comprehensive set of indicators to measure the
cyclical properties of fiscal policies. After establishing the direction of fiscal cyclical-
ity, we examine the implications of the cyclicality of fiscal policy on three important
indicators: output growth, volatility of output growth, and inflation.
1Two exceptions to this are Aghion and Marinescu (2007) and Woo (2009) both of whom find a
negative correlation between economic growth and fiscal procyclicality. However, for both of these
papers this is not the main focus, and in the case of the former the analysis is performed only upon 19
OECD countries, and in the case of the latter the analysis is based on whole sample averages.
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Our results are clear and compelling. First, we establish that procyclical fiscal poli-
cies have indeed been a norm for the majority of countries in our sample. We do not
find much evidence for the so-called ‘graduation hypothesis’ (Frankel et al.; 2012) that
many countries have ‘graduated’ from fiscal procyclicality recently, which only holds
for a restricted set of observations in our sample. Furthermore, our findings clearly
indicate that the cyclicality of fiscal policies matters. We find that fiscally procyclical
countries have lower rates of economic growth, higher rates of output volatility and
higher rates of inflation. Having formally linked inferior macroeconomic outcomes to
fiscal procyclicality, our results point to the importance of moving from procyclical
to countercyclical fiscal policy. When combined with the scale of observed fiscal pro-
cyclicality, our findings on the consequences of procyclical fiscal policy suggest that
establishing fiscal institutions to ensure countercyclical fiscal policy should be a policy
priority.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 7.2 discusses the methodology
and the data, derives measures of fiscal cyclicality and presents descriptive statistics.
Section 7.3 relates macroeconomic outcomes in the form of output growth, output
volatility and inflation to the derived cyclicality measures. Robustness checks and
extensions to the benchmark estimations are presented in Section 7.4. Section 7.5
concludes.
7.2 Methodology
7.2.1 Identifying fiscal procyclicality
This paper aims to explore the consequences of procyclical fiscal policy on macroeco-
nomic outcomes. The first necessary step in any such study is to identify the cyclical
properties of fiscal policy for individual countries. Although debate exists around the
choice of fiscal procyclicality statistics, there is, in general, agreement on which fiscal
variable should be used in calculations. The cyclicality of fiscal policy is commonly
measured by fiscal instruments such as government consumption and tax rates rather
than outcomes such as fiscal balances. For example, Kaminsky et al. (2004) demon-
strate that only government consumption and tax rates provide unambiguous results
on the cyclical properties of fiscal policy, and given the data availability issues regard-
ing the latter (tax rates), the former (government consumption) has been the preferred
choice in existing studies.
There are two country specific procyclicality statistics widely used in the literature:
the first is a composite measure (henceforth referred to as CM) which detrends data
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in order to focus only on the cyclical components of both government consumption
and output: the discretionary reaction of fiscal authorities to the business cycle. Us-
ing a Hodrick-Prescott filter to perform this detrending the following statistic can be
obtained:
CM =
(
1
2
HPCorr
)
+
(
1
2
AMP
)
(7.1)
where HPCorr is the pairwise correlation of the cyclical components of real government
consumption and real GDP, and AMP is the ‘amplitude’ of government consumption
measured as the difference between the average growth rate of real government con-
sumption in good and bad times, where good and bad times are defined as years with
above and below trend growth, respectively.2 The amplitude is converted into a [−1, 1]
measure by normalising both the positive and negative results separately; this keeps
the two components of the composite measure on the same scale. This statistic is
calculated using government consumption and GDP data over a number of years for
an individual country and provides an average measure of fiscal procyclicality for that
country over the given time horizon. A positive (negative) value illustrates procycli-
cal (countercyclical) fiscal policy; discretionary government consumption is positively
(negatively) correlated with trend levels of output and/or government consumption
grows more (less) in good times than in bad.
The second procyclicality statistic widely used in the literature is based on estimating
a fiscal policy response function, similar to Lane (2003) and Woo (2009):
∆log(Gi,t) = αi + βi∆log(GDPi,t) + εi,t (7.2)
where Gi,t and GDPi,t represent real government consumption and real gross domestic
product respectively for country i in time t, α is a constant term and the estimate of β
(β̂) provides the measure of cyclicality. Equation (7.2) is estimated using ordinary least
squares with correction for first order serial correlation. As with the composite measure,
this statistic is calculated using data over a number of years for an individual country
and provides an average measure of fiscal procyclicality for that country over the given
time horizon. A positive (negative) value of β̂i illustrates procyclical (countercyclical)
2This composite measure is adapted from Kaminsky et al. (2004) who give both HPCorr and
AMP an equal weight of 40 per cent and inflation tax a weight of 20 per cent in the calculation
of their composite measure. Our measure excludes inflation tax in order to focus on those elements
the government has direct control over. Sensitivity to this omission is tested and the statistic with an
inflation tax component included is strongly correlated with one where it is not: a correlation coefficient
of 0.97 is obtained.
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fiscal policy; there is a positive (negative) correlation between government consumption
and output.
Both of these two measures have their merits and drawbacks. The use of the Hodrick-
Prescott filter has the benefit of only considering cyclical components: the discretionary
element of fiscal policy. However, as highlighted by Forbes and Rigobon (2002), un-
adjusted correlation coefficients (which represent half of the composite measure) can
generate misleading results when samples have different levels of volatility: a certainty
when considering cross country GDP and government consumption figures. It is also
the case that the resulting correlations only measure the strength and direction of the
relationship but not the responsiveness of fiscal policy to the business cycle. Moreover,
the composite measure combines two separate statistics with arbitrary weighting where
one of these statistics (AMP ) will be sensitive to the normalisation process involved
in producing it. The βˆ statistic obtained by estimating equation (7.2) does not have
the benefit of using detrended data and therefore will implicitly include the trend in
the analysis: this may lead to an upwards bias in the estimate assuming an upward
trend in both real GDP and government spending. A significant advantage of this
approach, however, is that it measures the elasticity between the two variables unlike
the composite measure. However, the correlation (given by the individual statistical
significance of the βˆ estimate) is often ignored with this measure.
We therefore propose a new method which combines the positive features of both those
above: its inclusion further tests the results and conclusions obtained in the paper.
This new method uses a fiscal policy response function similar to (7.2) but uses the
detrended data for both government consumption and GDP used in (7.1):
∆log
(
GCY Ci,t
)
= α˜i + β˜i∆log
(
GDPCY Ci,t
)
+ ˜i,t (7.3)
where superscript ‘CY C’ represents the cyclical component of a variable. Equation
(7.3) is estimated using ordinary least squares with correction for first order serial
correlation. This estimated procyclicality statistic, which will be notated as
̂˜
β, takes
both elements of the above statistics and measures the elasticity of the cyclical (discre-
tionary) element of government consumption to the cyclical element of real GDP.
It has been argued that fiscal procyclicality statistics obtained through methods similar
to (7.2) (and therefore (7.3)) suffer from an endogeneity issue as output growth is not
exogenous to fiscal actions. However, as Lane (2003) notes, there seems no good reason
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why this feedback between the two variables should not be included in the analysis.3
Also, the method is the same for each country and therefore the measures can be used
relative to each other. Moreover any such feedback is dependent on the size of the fiscal
multiplier which is shown to be small in developing countries (see for example Ilzetzki
et al.; 2013) who are also observed to be more procyclical. Nonetheless, this discussion
points to the importance of using more than one method in measuring the conduct of
fiscal procyclicality, a point also emphasized by Ilzetzki and Ve´gh (2008) in their choice
of multiple methodologies in measuring the cyclical properties of fiscal policy.
7.2.2 The consequences of procyclical fiscal policy
To assess whether there is a statistically significant link between the compiled fis-
cal cyclicality measures and macroeconomic outcomes we estimate the following cross
country panel specification:
Mi,t = α+ θFPi,t + γXi,t + zi,t (7.4)
where Mi,t represents a macroeconomic indicator for country i during a time interval
t, FPi,t denotes the relevant fiscal cyclicality statistic and Xi,t is a set of appropriate
control variables. In order to examine the effect of the cyclical properties of fiscal
policy on macroeconomic outcomes the data needs to reflect all phases of the business
cycle. A country experiencing good times would be expected to grow faster, all other
things being equal, than a country in bad times independent of the actions of the fiscal
authority. As a result, we estimate the above relationship for 15-year horizons starting
from 1960, which yields three periods per country: 1960-74, 1975-89 and 1990-2005.
This maximises the number of observations for regressions whilst at the same time
allowing for appropriate intervals for variables to be measured over.4 Regressions of
specification (7.4) are performed applying Generalised Least Squares with random ef-
fects where time dummies for each period are included. Each of the fiscal procyclicality
variables obtained by applying (7.1), (7.2) and (7.3) enter the specifications separately
and are tested in isolation of one another. This paper is concerned with both real
and nominal economic impacts as well as levels and volatilities of variables. Therefore,
the dependent variables (Mi,t) in regression (7.4) will be average growth rates, growth
volatility and average levels of inflation.
3Lane (2003) finds a strong correlation between the procyclicality statistics obtained from fiscal
policy response functions similar to (7.2) and statistics which either instrument out GDP growth or
attempt to measure the cyclical properties of fiscal policy in other ways.
4Alesina et al. (2008) also point to the importance of observing a full business cycle in the sample
and thus include at least 16 years of data for each country. The robustness of our results with respect
to the interval and the start date will be tested.
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The main regressor of interest in these specifications is the fiscal procyclicality statistic
which when compiled using (7.2) and (7.3) is estimated with an estimated error. In
order to reflect this, weighted regressions will be applied when using both the β̂ and̂˜
β statistics where the weight is the inverse of the standard error on the procyclicality
coefficients in (7.2) and (7.3): each country’s procyclicality statistic is obtained with
its own associated error. This means that those observations for which the fiscal pro-
cyclicality statistics are estimated more precisely obtain a greater weight: this is in line
with Lane (2003) and Aghion and Marinescu (2007).
7.2.3 Data
In calculating the fiscal procyclicality statistics we utilize annual data from the IMF
International Financial Statistics (IFS) for the period 1950 to 2010 where available;
in total, information from 114 countries was collected. This data source provides the
broadest dataset both with respect to the countries used and the time horizon.5 In-
formation for the dependent and control variables are collated from a wide range of
sources: Appendix F provides details of both the methods applied to the raw numbers
and the original sources.
7.2.4 Descriptive statistics
The prevalence of fiscal procyclicality Table 13 presents average fiscal procycli-
cality measures using all three methods of identification outlined above where the statis-
tic has been based on data from all available years for each individual country; these
figures have then been aggregated across income groups as defined by the World Bank.
Results presented in Table 13 allow us to make three clear observations. First, fiscal
procyclicality is heavily prevalent throughout the globe. This is not only true of de-
veloping countries, as is often found, but also in high income economies; for all three
5The government consumption measure from the IMF IFS includes all activities that decrease the
net worth of the government as defined by the IMF, which consists of compensation of employees; use
of goods and services; consumption of fixed capital; interest; subsidies and grants; and social benefits.
Therefore, transfer payments to both households and enterprises are included in this measure. This,
however, excludes government investment in gross capital formation: sensitivity to this on a smaller
dataset is performed.
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fiscal procyclicality statistics across all four income groups, procyclical policy is ob-
served on average.6 Second, there is a negative correlation between income and fiscal
procyclicality; high income countries are less procyclical than middle income countries
who themselves are less procyclical than low income countries. This is a common result
found in the literature and is true for all fiscal procyclicality statistics utilised in this
study. Interestingly, this relationship breaks down between upper-and-lower-middle
income countries who are observed to have similar degrees of fiscal procyclicality but
where the lower-middle income countries, on average, have lower statistics than their
upper-middle income neighbours. Third, there is a strong degree of consistency across
the three fiscal procyclicality statistics. This is confirmed when reviewing the pairwise
correlations across the three procyclicality statistics which are all positive and strong.7
Table 13: Fiscal procyclicality statistics
βˆ
ˆ˜
β CM
Mean Ave(SE) Mean Ave(SE) Mean
High Income 0.390 0.230 0.253 0.251 0.184
Upper middle income 0.773 0.312 0.719 0.334 0.235
Lower middle income 0.738 0.397 0.672 0.456 0.197
Low income 1.158 0.634 1.177 0.724 0.238
Income groups relate to those as classified by the World Bank. Procyclicality statistics βˆ,
ˆ˜
β and CM
are calculated over all available information for each individual country. Ave(SE) represents the mean
standard errors of the βˆ and
ˆ˜
β statistics: note that an equivalent value for CM is not applicable as
this is not estimated in the same way.
Fiscal procyclicality over time The above results establish that fiscal procyclical-
ity has been the norm rather than an exception in many countries, based on data from
1950-2010. This section deals with the issue of how procyclicality has changed over
time.
Table 14 presents average values for β̂,
̂˜
β and CM , where these statistics are calculated
annually over an overlapping time horizon of 20 years throughout the sample period of
6Moreover, these results tend to be statistically significant for the estimated parameters of βˆ and
ˆ˜
β
as demonstrated by the the average standard error statistics in parenthesis: individually 75 (66%) and
67 (59%) statistically significant results respectively are found at at least a 10% significance level. The
aggregation process to find a mean value across income groups hides the number of individual country
countercyclical observations. These are (4 (11%), 1 (4%), 2 (7%), 0 (0%)) for the β̂ statistic, (11
(30%), 2 (8%), 5 (17%), 1 (5%)) for the
̂˜
β statistic and (4 (11%), 2 (8%), 3 (10%), 1 (5%)) for the CM
statistic, where the four figures presented represent the four income categories in descending income
order and the parenthesised percentage figures represent the ratio of countercyclical observations to
total observations for that income category.
7The correlation between βˆ and
ˆ˜
β is 0.938 which is stronger than those between these two and
the composite measure, 0.501 and 0.468 respectively. This suggests that the difference between using
equations (7.1) and (7.2) is greater than the difference arising from whether the data are detrended or
not.
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Table 14: Fiscal procyclicality over time for high and middle income countries
βˆ (mean)
ˆ˜
β (mean) CM (mean)
High Middle High Middle High Middle
1970s 0.205 0.517 0.148 0.548 0.101 0.161
1980s 0.280 0.676 0.204 0.623 0.143 0.245
1990s 0.267 0.730 0.208 0.700 0.182 0.337
2000s 0.379 0.733 0.291 0.724 0.130 0.277
Income groups relate to those as classified by the World Bank. ‘High’ represents those classified as
‘High Income’ countries and ‘Middle’ represents those countries classified as ‘Middle Income’ countries.
Procyclicality statistics are obtained by taking an overlapping 20 year time horizon annually for every
country in the sample. The statistics are then sorted by income group and decade where the end year
of the 20 year time horizon is taken for the decade classification.
the data; subsequently the figures are grouped by income category and mean averages
taken every decade where the end of the 20 year horizon is taken for the decade cate-
gorisation. Results presented in Table 14 allow us to derive the following conclusions.
First, procyclical fiscal policy has been prevalent for all income groups throughout the
time period for which data is available: in all 24 examples presented in the table positive
(procyclical) statistics are obtained. Second, at all time periods for each of the three
fiscal procyclicality statistics the average value of middle income countries are higher
than the average value of high income countries; levels of fiscal procyclicality are neg-
atively correlated with income. This compares with other studies in the literature and
is consistent with the overall results presented in Table 13. Third, the difference be-
tween high and middle income countries’ average procyclicality statistics has remained
relatively constant over the sample period, suggesting a degree of comovement between
the two country groups. Finally, with the exception of three cases in Table 14, the
average procyclicality statistic has increased from one decade to the next suggesting
countries are becoming more procyclical over time, further stressing the importance of
understanding the consequences of the cyclical properties of fiscal policy.
The results presented in Table 14 go against the graduation hypothesis proposed in
Frankel et al. (2012) who suggest that some developing countries are ‘graduating’ from
procyclical policy through a movement towards countercyclical policies. In contrast,
our results imply that procyclicality has been on the increase. Disaggregating the
mean averages from Table 14 to country specific observations over two periods, we
find that only 16% of countries that were procyclical in the first period subsequently
become countercyclical in the final period. This compares to 28% of countries in Frankel
et al. (2012): fewer countries are observed to be ‘graduating’ from procyclical fiscal
policy in our sample. The reason behind this discrepancy is because Frankel et al.
(2012) use different time periods to ours, comparing procyclicality statistics obtained
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between 1960-99 to those for the period 2000-09; when we take similar time horizons
we obtain results more in line with Frankel et al. (2012). However, observing the
cyclical properties of fiscal policy over only a 10-year period is statistically problematic,
as explained above. Also, the recent experience of governments adopting austerity
measures in bad times is likely to result in this observation of graduation to be short
lived.
7.3 The consequences of procyclical fiscal policy
This section presents empirical results on the macroeconomic consequences of procycli-
cal fiscal policy. With the prevalence of fiscal procyclicality presented above this is a
significant question. As discussed above, these effects will be tested along three dimen-
sions: average growth per capita, volatility in economic growth, and levels of inflation.
7.3.1 Economic growth
The first effect to be tested is that between the cyclical properties of fiscal policy
and economic growth. A natural hypothesis is that higher levels of fiscal procyclicality
would lead to lower levels of economic growth. This could occur through many plausible
channels and, if true, would result in a significant cost of following such policies.
Bivariate analysis To begin this discussion we perform a bivariate comparison be-
tween fiscal cyclicality in a country and its level of growth. The most fiscally procyclical
countries and the most fiscally countercyclical countries are split into different groups
by percentiles. The average growth rates of these two groups are then taken and the
difference across them are presented in Table 15.
Table 15: Fiscal procyclicality and economic growth - bivariate analysis
Difference
Percentile βˆ
ˆ˜
β CM
10 1.112 1.331* 0.217
20 1.253*** 1.190*** 0.651
30 0.968*** 0.883*** 0.272
40 0.932*** 1.072*** 0.269
‘Difference’ is the average growth rate of the x-percentile countercyclical countries minus the average
growth rates of the x-percentile procyclical countries: a positive difference means countercyclical coun-
tries have a larger growth rate. We use the standard star convention; *** signifies that the difference
is statistically significant to 1% significance, ** to 5% and * to 10%.
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The results are intuitive and robust; fiscally countercyclical countries grow at faster
average annual rates than fiscally procyclical countries. In all twelve separate tests (at
four separate percentile levels for the three different measures of fiscal procyclicality) the
expected sign is delivered and in seven of these the difference is statistically significant.
Moreover, these differences are economically significant, at least with respect to the β̂
and
̂˜
β statistics; even at the broadest measure the top 40% most procyclical countries
in our sample are observed to grow at approximately 1 percentage point less per capita
per year than the top 40% most countercyclical countries. Compounded over a number
of years this has a significant impact.
Growth regression In estimating the role of fiscal cyclicality on economic growth,
we adopt specification (7.4) where the control variables, Xi,t, are in line with Barro
(2007) and therefore include the following. To control for convergence, the log of
GDP per capita at the start of the period is taken (InitialGDP ) from Heston et al.
(2009). The log average number of years of education for the total population aged
15 or over for the start of the period (Log(Edu)) is taken from Barro and Lee (2001).
Log levels of fertility (Log(Fert)), measured as the number of births per women, and
life expectancy at birth (Log(Life)), are obtained from the World Bank. The size
of the public sector (SPS) is calculated using data from the IMF IFS as the ratio of
government consumption to GDP and the level of openness in the economy (Open)
is obtained from Heston et al. (2009), measured as the ratio of total exports plus
imports to GDP. For the variables Log(Fert), Log(Life), SPS and Open the annual
observations are averaged over the time period of each panel. Finally, as a measure of
exchange rate volatility (ExRateV ol) the standard deviation in the nominal exchange
rate between the country and the US over the period in question is calculated from
data obtained from the IMF IFS. The dependent variable is the average annual growth
rate in GDP per capita (GrGDP ) taken from Heston et al. (2009), averaged over the
time period.
Table 16 presents estimation results for six specifications; two for each procyclicality
statistic, one with a minimum number of control variables where the number of ob-
servations is maximised and a second which includes all control variables. In all six
specifications the estimated coefficient of the procyclicality statistic is negative and
significant to at least the 10 per cent level, and in the case of both βˆ and
ˆ˜
β to the
5 per cent level or stronger. Results presented in Table 16 point to an economically
and statistically significant relationship between the level of fiscal procyclicality and
average economic growth: higher levels of fiscal procyclicality lead to lower levels of
economic growth. This is in line with what is commonly assumed, but not tested,
in the fiscal procyclicality literature and is robust to the use of different measures of
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Table 16: Fiscal procyclicality and economic growth
1 2 3 4 5 6
InitialGDP -0.701** -1.831*** -0.765** -1.892*** -0.477** -1.710***
(0.020) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.022) (0.000)
Log(Edu) 0.843** 0.166 0.866** 0.158 0.693*** 0.064
(0.014) (0.565) (0.016) (0.591) (0.005) (0.805)
βˆ -0.502*** -0.515**
(0.006) (0.016)
ˆ˜
β -0.457*** -0.498**
(0.010) (0.012)
CM –1.351** -1.080*
(0.013) (0.063)
Log(Fert) -2.984*** -2.969*** -2.842***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(Life) 3.311* 3.652* 4.042**
(0.083) (0.058) (0.017)
SPS -1.544** -1.505** -0.371
(0.048) (0.027) (0.785)
Open 0.485 0.553* 0.746**
(0.104) (0.061) (0.022)
ExRateVol 0.007 0.005 -0.002
(0.758) (0.813) (0.933)
Observations 181 139 181 139 179 136
R2 0.262 0.469 0.227 0.482 0.233 0.458
Regression is a panel of three 15 year periods: 1960-74, 1975-89 and 1990-2004. The panel is a random
effects panel weighted by the inverse of the standard errors of βˆ in columns (1) and (2), and the inverse
of the standard errors of
ˆ˜
β in columns (3) and (4), and includes an overall constant and time period
dummies, neither of which are presented in the table. If the volatility of economic growth (measured
as the standard deviation in annual growth statistics) is included in the regression specification it is
insignificant to any reasonable level of confidence whether the fiscal procyclicality statistic is included
or not. The star convention is standard and is as stated in Table 15. P-values of t-statistics are in
parentheses where heteroskedastic robust standard errors have been used. Definitions of all variables
can be found in Appendix F.
fiscal procyclicality. Taking, for example, the results from specification (4) in Table
16, the difference between the average level of procyclicality for a low income country
compared to that of a high income country (from Table 13) is the equivalent of 0.46
percentage points in average economic growth each year.8
These results are in line with those presented in Woo (2009) which tests whether so-
cial polarisation is correlated with the level of fiscal procyclicality and subsequently
8Using a panel that starts 5 years later (1965) but which still covers time horizons of 15 years at
a time, the results are amplified; the point estimates are all increased and these results are significant
to the 1 per cent confidence level. Further, using a panel starting in 1960 but covering 20 year
horizons provides similar results as those presented in Table 16. Also, performing the regressions for
specifications (1) to (4) without applying weights provides similar results.
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whether the level of fiscal procyclicality is correlated with GDP growth, in a sample
of 96 countries between 1960 and 2003. Woo (2009) also finds a negative relationship
between growth rates in GDP per capita and the level of fiscal procyclicality which
is both economically and statistically significant. However, these results are obtained
by applying fewer control variables in the analysis than above, and further, by only
considering procyclicality statistics obtained using equation (7.2). Moreover, the pro-
cyclicality statistic is not time varying and as such the time horizon for the regression
used in Woo (2009) are an average over 43 years. Our evidence illustrates that these
results are robust to these omissions. The results are also in line with those of Aghion
and Marinescu (2007) who perform a similar analysis on a panel of 19 OECD countries
between 1960 and 2007. Our findings illustrate that these results also hold when this
sample is extended to those countries outside the OECD.
An instrumental variable approach With the specification used for the growth
regressions in Table 16 there is a potential endogeneity issue arising from the use of
GDP series in the calculations of the fiscal procyclicality statistic. One way to control
for this would be to instrument out the procyclicality statistic in equation (7.4). We
construct a dataset comprising of various variables which have been hypothesised in
the literature to cause procyclical fiscal policy (see Section 7.1) and use these to select
the best instruments for each procyclicality statistic in turn.9
Table 17 presents the estimation results from re-estimating Table 16 where FPi,t is
instrumented for and where only the estimate of the variable of interest is presented:
benchmark figures from Table 16 also shown for comparison. The expected direction of
results are observed (higher levels of fiscal procyclicality lead to lower levels of growth)
and these results are statistically significant for both the βˆ and
ˆ˜
β. Moreover, the
quantitative effect becomes larger with higher values of estimated coefficients being
recorded. One issue with this approach is the restricted availability of information
for the instruments used further reduces the number of observations involved in the
regressions, especially for less developed countries for whom data availability is more of
an issue. Nonetheless, estimation results are conclusive, with a slight qualification on
the CM statistics for which the explanatory power of the instruments is not as strong
as the βˆ and
ˆ˜
β statistics.
9The strategy applied was to use variables associated with borrowing constraints (IIRating, NumDe-
fault, YrsDefault and PDefault) and political constraints (POLCON, XCONST, Polity, Corruption, Ac-
countability, PoliticalStability, GovernmentEffectiveness, RegulatoryQuality and RuleOfLaw), as well as
other factors hypothesised in the literature (Gini and FiscalVol) to identify which of these provided
the best instruments from a first stage F-test: for detailed explanations of each variable see Appendix
F. The best instruments for βˆ were measures of government effectiveness and institutional investor
ratings; for
ˆ˜
β measures of regulatory quality and institutional investor ratings; and for CM those of
government effectiveness, regulatory quality and the probability of default on sovereign debt.
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Table 17: Fiscal procyclicality and economic growth - an instrumental variable ap-
proach
1 2 3
Benchmark - Table 16
FP -0.515** -0.498** -1.080*
(0.016) (0.012) (0.063)
Instrumental Variable Approach
FP -3.540*** -3.425*** -7.788
(0.008) (0.007) (0.111)
F-test 18.57*** 22.32*** 5.36***
Overidentified 0.325 0.478 0.598
Regression is a random effects panel of three 15-year periods with weights as described above in both
the first and second stages of the IV estimation. Only the estimates of the variables of interest are
presented; the specifications of columns 1, 2 and 3 are otherwise identical to those of columns 2, 4 and
6 in Table 16. ‘F-test’ presents the p-value from a first stage F-test for each procyclicality statistic
and ‘Overidentified’ presents the p-value of a Sargan-Hansen test for overidentification where the null
hypothesis is that all instruments are jointly valid. The star convention is standard and is as stated in
Table 15.
Despite the existing small literature on the detrimental impact of fiscal procyclicality on
economic growth no research, to our knowledge, exists on other outcomes and channels
for which this relationship may run. This is the subject of the following two subsections.
7.3.2 Volatility of economic growth
The second relationship we examine is the potential link between fiscal procyclicality
and the volatility of economic growth. It is straightforward to postulate that, providing
fiscal policy is effective, a country that conducts procyclical policy will exacerbate the
business cycle and therefore increase the volatility of growth rates in the economy.
Growth volatility regression The specification in equation (7.4) is estimated by
using the standard deviation of growth rates as the dependent variable (GDPV ol, ob-
tained from Heston et al.; 2009). Regressors used in this specification are InitialGDP ,
Open, SPS and ExRateV ol, as defined earlier. We also include Polity, an annual
statistic measuring the degree of democracy within a country, averaged over the period
in question (obtained from Henisz; 2010), and OpenV ol which calculates the standard
deviation of the Open statistic. Table 18 presents the results from the analysis.
Again the relationship is tested through subjecting it to six different specifications; two
each for the three procyclicality statistics. In all specifications, the expected direction is
identified and is found to be statistically significant: higher rates of fiscal procyclicality
leads to greater volatility in economic growth. Using specification (4) from Table 18, the
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Table 18: Fiscal procyclicality and growth volatility
1 2 3 4 5 6
InitialGDP -0.506 -0.071 -0.484 -0.050 -0.378 -0.076
(0.230) (0.839) (0.269) (0.890) (0.167) (0.786)
Open 0.854* -1.728 0.763 -1.731 1.051*** -0.774
(0.096) (0.176) (0.126) (0.185) (0.010) (0.297)
Polity -0.107** -0.134*** -0.111** -0.139*** -0.085** -0.115***
(0.037) (0.003) (0.039) (0.003) (0.011) (0.000)
βˆ 0.370** 0.461**
(0.025) (0.016)
ˆ˜
β 0.318* 0.493**
(0.058) (0.020)
CM 2.364*** 2.418***
(0.000) (0.001)
SPS -0.811 -1.039 0.709
(0.367) (0.219) (0.710)
OpenVol 0.207*** 0.204** 0.147***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.010)
ExRateVol -0.020 -0.021 -0.031***
(0.363) (0.417) (0.003)
Observations 189 147 189 147 186 143
R2 0.209 0.304 0.215 0.310 0.250 0.349
Regression is a panel of three 15-year periods: 1960-74, 1975-89 and 1990-2004, as above. The panel
is a random effects panel weighted by the inverse of the standard errors of βˆ in columns (1) and (2),
and the inverse of the standard errors of
ˆ˜
β in columns (3) and (4), and includes an overall constant
and time period dummies, neither of which are presented in the table. The star convention is standard
and is as stated in Table 15. P-values of t-statistics are in parentheses where heteroskedastic robust
standard errors have been used. Definitions of all variables can be found in Appendix F.
difference between the average level of procyclicality for low income countries compared
to high income countries (from Table 13) is the equivalent of increasing the standard
deviation of economic growth by 10%.10
An instrumental variable approach Similar to the average growth specification
there is a potential endogeneity problem in these growth volatility regressions. It
has been argued that the volatility in growth rates may lead to higher levels of fiscal
procyclicality through increased variability in the tax revenue base (Talvi and Ve´gh;
2005). Performing a similar instrumental variable approach as in Table 17, where
the fiscal procyclicality statistic is instrumented for, we find similar results to those
10Using a panel starting 5 years later but which still covers time horizons of 15 years at a time
provides similar results both in respect to point estimates and levels of significance. Taking a panel
starting from 1960 but covering 20 year horizons provides similar results as to those presented in Table
18; however, these results will be weakened by the fewer number of observations in the sample. Also,
performing the regressions for specifications (1) to (4) without applying weights provides similar results.
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presented in Table 18. The expected direction is observed where point estimates double
on average compared to Table 18, with similar levels of significance.
7.3.3 Inflation
The above evidence suggests that fiscal procyclicality impacts on the real economy.
It therefore follows that through stimulating the economy in good times a procyclical
government would be expected to raise price levels, as the economy is at its potential,
resulting in higher inflation. We now turn to estimating this relationship by follow-
ing the specification in equation (7.4) where the dependent variable is the average
transformed GDP deflator for the period. The GDP deflator, pit, is obtained from the
World Bank World Development Indicators, and following Cukierman et al. (1992), is
transformed using pit/(1 + pit) to remove the impact of high inflation outliers: using
the raw inflation figures would give undue weight to a few outliers of very high infla-
tion rates. For independent variables InitialGDP , Open and ExRateV ol are used as
above and these are combined with three measures of central bank independence that
are established as important determinants of inflation performance in the existing em-
pirical literature. Turnover, a measure of central bank governor turnover, and CBI,
an overall measure of central bank independence, are both taken from Cukierman et al.
(1992) for the period 1950 to 1989. An issue with these two measures is that they do
not cover the whole time period and do not vary with time. To try and combat this a
third measure, CBI ′, is used which is a further aggregate measure of central bank in-
dependence that uses data from both Cukierman et al. (1992) and Polillo and Guille´n
(2005). This aggregate measure is computed across different time periods using the
same methodology and we match as best as possible these periods to the ones used in
our study. Estimation results are presented in Table 19.
In all six specifications the expected relationship is observed and in four of the six this
relationship is significant to at least the 5 per cent level. The sign and significance of
the point estimates for the fiscal procyclicality measures indicate that higher levels of
fiscal procyclicality lead to higher levels of inflation, all other things being equal. This is
true also after controlling for the size of the country, proxied by initial GDP, where it is
observed that more prosperous economies have lower levels of inflation. There is limited
availability of data for central bank independence measures, particularly in developing
countries, and therefore when these are included in the regressions the number of
observations are significantly reduced, and the resulting samples are dominated by high
income countries. As is seen from columns (2) and (4) in Table 19, despite this lack of
variability, the estimated relationship between fiscal cyclicality and inflation is robust
to including central bank independence measures. Of the independence measures only
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Table 19: Fiscal procyclicality and inflation
1 2 3 4 5 6
InitialGDP -0.055*** -0.066*** -0.055*** -0.066*** -0.040*** -0.061***
(0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
Open -0.002 0.018 -0.005 0.016 0.020 0.041***
(0.956) (0.578) (0.893) (0.611) (0.532) (0.010)
ExRateVol 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.000
(0.622) (0.859) (0.585) (0.713) (0.888) (0.930)
βˆ 0.046*** 0.035*
(0.007) (0.054)
ˆ˜
β 0.046*** 0.038**
(0.007) (0.034)
CM 0.133*** 0.042
(0.008) (0.392)
CBI ′ 0.278 0.319 0.105
(0.334) (0.248) (0.642)
Turnover 0.248** 0.276** 0.187**
(0.014) (0.015) (0.011)
CBI -0.315 -0.360 -0.166
(0.322) (0.235) (0.620)
Observations 122 65 122 66 121 66
R2 0.131 0.530 0.132 0.534 0.151 0.500
Regression is a panel of three 15 year periods: 1960-74, 1975-89 and 1990-2004. The panel is a random
effects panel weighted by the inverse of the standard errors of βˆ in columns (1) and (2), and the inverse
of the standard errors of
ˆ˜
β in columns (3) and (4), and includes an overall constant and time period
dummies, neither of which are presented in the table. The star convention is standard and is as stated
in Table 15. P-values of t-statistics are in parentheses where heteroskedastic robust standard errors
have been used. Definitions of all variables can be found in Appendix F.
the turnover of the central bank governor is found to be significant and this is also
true when each measure is included in the specification individually, which is in line
with the findings in Cukierman et al. (1992). Using specification (4) from Table 19, the
difference between the average level of procyclicality for low income countries compared
to high income countries (from Table 13) is the equivalent of increasing inflation rates
by 4 percentage points.11
11Using a panel starting 5 years later but which still cover time horizons of 15 years provides similar
results as those presented in Table 19. Also, performing the regressions for specifications (1) to (4)
without applying weights provides similar results.
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7.4 Further extensions and robustness checks
7.4.1 The level of development
The results presented above are intuitive and conclusive: fiscal procyclicality has detri-
mental effects on macroeconomic outcomes. An interesting aspect of this relationship
is related to whether this detrimental effect is stronger in some countries than others.
This section looks to investigate this question by examining the results across differ-
ent levels of development. It does this through including in all the specifications from
Section 7.3 an additional interaction variable which is the product of the fiscal procycli-
cality statistic and the log of the initial GDP used to represent the level of development
within a country.
Table 20 presents this analysis where only the estimate of the variables of interest in
those specifications which include all control variables have been included. The data
exhibits a high degree of collinearity between the fiscal procyclicality and this interac-
tion variable which subsequently increases standard errors.12 We therefore conduct a
test to see whether both the coefficient attached to the procyclicality statistic and the
interaction variable are jointly significant.
Table 20: Fiscal procylicality and the level of development
1 2 3
Growth
FP -2.899* -2.366 -6.385
(0.070) (0.128) (0.203)
FP×InitialGDP 0.280 0.220 0.617
(0.134) (0.226) (0.286)
Joint significance 0.008*** 0.011** 0.105
Growth volatility
FP 2.039 2.528 1.081
(0.326) (0.195) (0.857)
FP×InitialGDP -0.181 -0.234 -0.159
(0.444) (0.294) (0.823)
Joint significance 0.131 0.069* 0.005**
Regression is a random effects panel of three 15 year periods with weights as described above. Only
the estimates for the variables of interest are presented: the specifications of columns 1, 2 and 3 are
otherwise identical to those of columns 2, 4 and 6 in Tables 16, 18 and 19. Joint significance relates
to the p-value of a F-test of joint significance of both the nominal procyclicality statistic and the
interaction statistic. The star convention is standard and is as stated in Table 15.
12This collinearity results because, as seen in Tables 1 and 2, lower income countries tend to have
higher levels of fiscal procyclicality, resulting in a negative correlation between the two variables.
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The results from Table 20 suggest that the detrimental effects of fiscal procyclicality
on growth and growth volatility is diminishing the more developed the country is. This
inference follows from the opposite coefficients attached to the interaction variables
compared with the nominal variables in each case, suggesting that as the country
gets richer, the impact of procyclical fiscal policies are diminished.13 These results are
similar in nature to Aghion and Marinescu (2007) who find in their sample of 19 OECD
countries that countercyclical fiscal policy has a more beneficial impact on growth the
lower the level of financial development in the country. This particular finding is of
significant interest because it is the poorer countries who are observed to be the most
procyclical (see Table 13) and therefore it is for these countries that such policy is
suboptimal. Fiscal procyclicality in higher income countries is still estimated to have
detrimental effects, albeit with a smaller impact.
7.4.2 Government investment
The variable used to derive fiscal procyclicality statistics was government consump-
tion which includes all disbursements made by the government including transfers and
debt interest servicing, but excluding those which contribute to gross capital formation
(government investment). This was used in order to derive the broadest dataset pos-
sible both with respect to countries and time horizon. The OECD Economic Outlook
Database provides detailed disaggregated data for government expenditure from 1970
including government investment in gross capital formation: this can be used as a sen-
sitivity check for the above results. Government investment is seen to be procyclical
on average in OECD countries and is also observed to be more procyclical than general
government consumption: these two results are in line with Lane (2003). Including
fiscal procyclicality statistics derived from government expenditure incorporating in-
vestment into the regression specifications from Section 7.3 provides similar significant
results for the detrimental impact of procyclical fiscal policy on both economic growth
and inflation. In general the coefficients attached to fiscal procyclicality increase but
so too do the standard errors association with these statistics: this latter result is to
be expected given the small sample size.14
13Performing the same analysis for inflation does not provide a similar interaction effect, although
this may be driven by the restricted data on control variables in Table 19 resulting in the regression
being limited to only high income countries.
14The compiled data set contains only 29 countries over a shorter time horizon. The results for the
detrimental impact of fiscal procyclicality on the volatility of economic growth is not found in this
small sample of developed countries.
On the consequences of procyclical fiscal policy 156
7.5 Concluding remarks
The results presented above provide a clear narrative: procyclical fiscal policy is detri-
mental to economic growth, output volatility and inflation. These effects are larger
in less developed economies, those countries which are found to be more fiscally pro-
cyclical. An interesting question these findings pose is what are the channels through
which these results are observed? One possible interpretation is that the impact of
fiscal policy is asymmetric over the course of the business cycle. Recent research has
suggested that fiscal policy is more effective in downturns compared with good times
(see for example Auerbach and Gorodnichenko; 2012). Under this hypothesis a gov-
ernment conducting countercyclical fiscal policy is using expansionary measures when
they have their greatest impact on the aggregate economy: when multipliers are high
(in a recession) expansionary effects are amplified. In the case of procyclical fiscal pol-
icy the results are reversed, expansionary policy is used when it’s effectiveness is at its
lowest. Under this policy the main impact of expansionary policy will be on prices as
the economy is close to capacity and therefore cannot increase output, which further
supports our empirical findings on inflation.
A second potential channel through which procyclical policies may influence the real
economy is through their impact on the probability of financial crises. If fiscal pro-
cyclicality is found to raise the probability of a financial crisis, that would establish a
negative relationship between the procyclicality of fiscal policies and economic growth,
given the well-established unfavourable output consequences of financial crises (see for
example Reinhart and Rogoff; 2014). It is commonly hypothesised in the literature
that this causation works in other direction with procyclical policies being caused by
higher probabilities of financial crisis, as those countries thought to be vulnerable find
it hard to borrow in bad times: however this mechanism is likely to feedback on itself.
From our data we found more evidence for the first stage of directional causality (in-
creased probability of financial crises leading to higher levels of procyclicality) than of
the second stage, but this is nevertheless another potential mechanism that may be at
work.15
Another explanation of the results found is that fiscal countercyclicality is a proxy for
good general macroeconomic management. As is observed in the empirical results, there
are detrimental consequences to procyclical fiscal policy and therefore a government
which conducts countercyclical policy is presenting a signal to agents that they are
good stewards of the economy. Research has shown that democratic institutions play
15Granger causality tests were performed between our fiscal procyclicality statistics and measures
used to proxy the probability of financial crises taken from Reinhart (2010): IIRating, NumDefault,
YrsDefault and PDefault) definitions of which can be found in Appendix F.
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a significant role in raising economic growth within a country (see for example Barro;
2007) and therefore it seems reasonable that the actions of these institutions, and
not just their presence, is also of importance. Countercyclical governments are able
to both state and credibly demonstrate a commitment to good fiscal and economic
management. A government which conducts procyclical policy in good times loses
this credibility and with it the advantages which come from it. A fiscal authority that
provides the reputation of strong countercyclical measures would in time find that their
reputation did the work for them as rational agents would expect the economy not to
fluctuate as much and therefore their private actions will reinforce this. An economy
in such a situation would feasibly have higher levels of trend growth, lower levels of
fluctuations around this trend and steadier, lower rates of inflation.
Having formally linked inferior macroeconomic outcomes in the form of lower output
growth, higher output volatility and higher inflation to fiscal procyclicality, our results
point to the importance of moving from procyclical to countercyclical fiscal policy.
When combined with the scale of fiscal procyclicality, as established in the first part of
this chapter, our findings on the consequences of procyclical fiscal policy suggest that
establishing fiscal institutions to ensure countercyclical fiscal policy should be a policy
priority. Indeed, the recent global crisis experience has clearly indicated that countries
with stronger fiscal institutions were also among those better able to avoid the worst
effects of the crisis.
Chapter 8
Conclusions
This thesis has demonstrated that countercyclical fiscal policy can be used as an ef-
fective policy tool, achieving multiple objectives simultaneously. From a redistributive
perspective, the thesis has presented theoretical results from a DSGE model with het-
erogeneous agents based on their access to capital markets, developed in Chapter 2.
This chapter presented the empirical rational for such heterogeneity and subsequently
developed a benchmark model from which both simulation and algebraic analysis can
be performed. It was shown that such models have unique properties which are deter-
mined by the share of asset market non-participation.
This model was applied in Chapter 3 to demonstrate that exogenous shocks have differ-
ent impacts on households depending on their access to credit: those who have access
are able to smooth the impact of business cycles, whereas those without cannot. These
results were derived through algebraic proof, dynamic simulation and through a deriva-
tion of disaggregated welfare criteria. The results from Chapter 3 also demonstrated
how credit-constrained agents can insulate the unconstrained, and at times the aggre-
gate economy, through their labour market decisions. These results reconcile with,
and add to, the heterogeneous agent literature finding that business cycles dispropor-
tionately impact the poor, low skilled and unemployed, and an empirical investigation
demonstrated that there is a negative correlation between growth in the economy and
income inequality.
Chapter 4 demonstrated that countercyclical fiscal policy could be used to minimise the
inequality across agents resulting from business cycles, a result again developed through
both the derivation of algebraic properties and through dynamic simulation. Polarized
preferences were observed between those agents with access to credit and those without,
with the latter gaining from countercyclical policy at the expense of the former. The
impact of policy was seen in a near zero sum game with the gains of one agent being
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(nearly) netted off against the losses of another: the polarized preferences across agents
were observed both in respect to the responsiveness of the fiscal interaction and the
speed with which resulting debt is repaid. These results were observed both specifically
during a downturn and also over the course of the business cycle where, as in Chapter
3, the insulating affect of credit-constrained agents was observed.
The nature of the results from Chapter 4 were extended in Chapter 5 using a bigger
model to specifically investigate the positive and normative consequences of austerity.
A trade off was observed between the efficiency and equity of austerity, with policies fo-
cusing on government spending reductions having the smallest impact on output, aver-
age incomes and welfare, but having the greatest impact on the distribution of incomes
and welfare. Tax based austerity, on the other hand, tends to be more detrimental to
both output, income and welfare, but in a more equitable way. These impacts, when
considering the lifetime of the fiscal consolidation, are sensitive to the composition of
austerity but are largely unaffected by its speed; when considering shorter time hori-
zons, faster austerity leads to bigger immediate impacts. These results were seen to be
magnified when consolidation is performed at the monetary zero lower bound for those
policies which are inflationary when expansionary: however, for those policies which
increase taxes in production, the positive and normative consequences of austerity are
improved at the zero lower bound as they generate inflationary pressure.
From an aggregate perspective Chapter 6 presented results demonstrating how large
theoretical fiscal multipliers could be achieved through combing the two assumptions of
credit-constrained consumers and external habit persistence. As hand-to-mouth con-
sumers are more responsive to fiscal intervention, policy multipliers are increased as
their behaviour is imitated by Ricardian agents. In effect, the combination of assump-
tions introduced an element of herding behaviour into the dynamics of various shocks
in an otherwise standard DSGE model.
Finally, the empirical effectiveness of fiscal policy was addressed in Chapter 7 by con-
sidering the importance of the cyclicality of policy, in a panel of 114 countries over a
60 year time horizon. Countercyclical policy was seen to improve economic growth,
growth volatility and inflation, and this improvement was stronger in developing coun-
tries. However, the empirical results in Chapter 7 also imply that most economies do
not use countercyclical fiscal policy, a result supported by the existing literature. The
most generous interpretation of Table 13, for example, would conclude that only 19
countries conducted countercyclical fiscal policy on average between the period of 1950
to 2010. Moreover, unlike the ‘graduation’ results of Frankel et al. (2012), this thesis
suggests that fiscal procyclicality has been increasing over time. Fiscal procyclicality
is just one of many demonstrations in the literature of how fiscal policy is conducted
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inappropriately, and the intuitive concept that political considerations dominate policy
decisions made predominantly by elected officials poses problems for its future conduct.
Removing these political objectives from policy making would appear to be a priority
and the successful results from the movement to central bank independence would
support this. Indeed, actions in countries such as Canada, Hungary, Slovenia, Sweden
and the United Kingdom in setting up ‘Fiscal Councils’ to oversee policy makers and
forecasts which have been promoted by the IMF, the OECD and the European Council
have gone some way to doing this. However, there still exists debate as appropriate
conduct for policy and, although the results from this thesis would support arguments
for active countercyclical policy, more research into these results are needed. Further,
the improvements made in the conduct of monetary policy have made the use of fiscal
policy somewhat obsolete, at least up until 2008, where it was commonly believed that
controlling the interest rate was sufficient macroeconomic policy. Further research into
when fiscal policy is most effective, when monetary policy becomes ineffective, and the
interaction between these two would also appear warranted. The research literature
on the monetary zero lower bound contributes to this, but there are still issues arising
from the current downturn to warrant further analysis.
There exists critiques inherent to fiscal policy such as recognition, decision and im-
plementation lags for which monetary policy is still less exposed. Perhaps the most
imminent concern however is that fiscal policy is subject to a flow constraint which
limits future potential use, at least for those countries with existing high levels of debt.
Moreover, past conduct of fiscal policy would exert credibility problems on the future
conduct of policy. The theoretical models used in this thesis would imply that a fiscal
authority who could credibly commit to countercyclical policy would find some of their
work done for them as rational agents would anticipate a downturn to be accompanied
by expansionary policy, therefore expecting a smaller fall in output, which would sub-
sequently be partially fuelled by the actions of private agents. Previously, politicians
have tried to buy this credibility through setting fiscal rules, such as the Golden rule
in the UK and the Stability and Growth Pact for those countries in the Eurozone,
however, these have been shown to fail. A move towards more independent decision
making on the conduct of fiscal policy, free from political motives, used when most
needed and most effective would seem a logical next step in the evolution in macroeco-
nomic policy. However, whether politicians would be willing to forgo this power, and
whether the electorate would allow such decisions to be made by unelected officials, is a
political question of importance: certainly the recent debates in Europe have suggested
that fiscal sovereignty is highly valued. However, if discretionary fiscal policy is still
applied in such a way that it is having a detrimental impact on both the aggregate and
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disaggregate economy, it would suggest that until this can be rectified it should not be
used at all.
Appendix A
Appendices to Chapter 2
A.1 Log-linear conditions
The model is solved by deriving log-linear approximations of the key optimality condi-
tions around the non-stochastic steady state with zero inflation and zero government
debt. Log-linearising (2.4), (2.5), (2.6), (2.7), (2.9), (2.10), (2.11), (2.13), (2.17), (2.18)
and (2.19) respectively provides the following conditions:
ϕnRt + σc
R
t = wt − pt (A.1)
cRt = Et
{
cRt+1
}− 1
σ
(
rt − Et {pit+1} − Et
{
∆εbt+1
})
(A.2)
cNRt =
NNRW
CNRP
(
nNRt + wt − pt
)− Y
CNR
t̂NRt (A.3)
ϕnNRt + σc
NR
t = wt − pt (A.4)
yt = ε
a
t + (1− α)nt (A.5)
pit = (1− θ) (p∗t − pt−1) (A.6)
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p∗t − pt−1 =
(
1− θβR)∑(θβR)k Et {mcrt+k|t + εµt + (pt+k − pt−1)} (A.7)
b̂t+1 = (1 + ρR)
[
b̂t + ĝt − t̂t
]
(A.8)
ct = (1− λ) cRt + λcNRt (A.9)
nt = (1− λ)nRt + λnNRt (A.10)
yt = γcct + ĝt (A.11)
where Et
{
mcrt+k|t
}
is the expected real marginal cost in period t+k of a firm who last
set their price in period t, and γx = X/Y represents the share of variable X to steady
state output Y . These equations combine with the log-linear policy rules for the path
of the nominal interest rate, government spending and taxes, (2.12), (2.14) and (2.15)
respectively, to close the system.
A.2 The non-linear model
The non-linear version of the model can be summarised with (2.4), (2.5), (2.6), (2.7),
(2.9), (2.10), (2.13), (2.17), (2.18) and (2.19), with non-linear versions of the monetary
and fiscal rules:
Rt
R
=
(
Πt
Π
)ϕpi (Yt
Y
)ϕy
εrt
Ĝt
Ĝ
=
(
Yt
Y
)ϕg (B̂t
B̂
)ϕb,g
T̂t
T̂
=
(
Yt
Y
)ϕT (B̂t
B̂
)ϕb,T
and through decomposing the pricing problem of firms (2.11):
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X1,t = ΛtMCtYt + β
RΠt+1X1,t+1 (A.12)
X1,t = ΛtΠ
∗
tYt + β
RθΠ−1t+1
Π∗t
Π∗t+1
X2,t+1 (A.13)
X1,t = (− 1)X2,t (A.14)
where X1,t represents the first expression in (2.11) and X2,t the second expression, and
where Λt represents the Lagrangian-multiplier attached to the first-order condition of
Ricardian households with respect to bonds.
In order to find the steady state values in the non-linear model, prices can be normalised
to one as can employment. From this, equations (A.12), (A.13) and (A.14) can be used
to solve for marginal costs, which can subsequently be used to solve for real wages and
consumption:
MC =
− 1

W
P
= MC(1− α)N−α
C =
(
W
P
N−ϕ
) 1
σ
and where the normalisation of employment sets output to one, and where govern-
ment spending (and therefore lump sum taxes) are given by the excess of output to
consumption.
A.3 Deriving the aggregate demand condition with per-
fectly competitive labour markets
To derive the aggregate demand condition the household optimisation results and
labour market conditions are combined to obtain a weighted average Euler equation
that describes the path of aggregate private consumption in the economy. Note that
(A.9) and (A.10) can be manipulated to provide:
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cNRt =
ct − (1− λ) cRt
λ
nNRt =
nt − (1− λ)nNRt
λ
(A.15)
and through combining these two results with (A.4) gives:
wt − pt = ϕ
(
nt − (1− λ)nNRt
λ
)
+ σ
(
ct − (1− λ) cRt
λ
)
Which once simplified provides the condition that:
wt − pt = ϕnt + σct (A.16)
Combining the above and (A.15) provides:
nNRt =
ϕnt + σct − σcNRt
ϕ
And substituting this into the non-Ricardian consumption function (A.3) gives:
cNRt =
NNRW
CNRP
(
1 + ϕ
ϕ
(ϕnt + σct)− σc
NR
t
ϕ
)
− Y
CNR
t̂NRt (A.17)
To simplify this expression, note that the model assumes C = CNR = CR and therefore
Y/CNR = Y/C = (γc)
−1. Moreover, note that in steady state labour gets a return of its
marginal product net of the monopolistically competitive firms’ markup. Algebraically,
NNRW/P = (1−α)Y/(1 +µ) and therefore NNRW/CNRP = (1−α)Y/CNR(1 +µ) =
(1− α)Y/C(1 + µ) = (1− α)/(1 + µ)γc. Substituting this into the above provides:
cNRt =
(1− α)
(1 + µ)γc
(
1 + ϕ
ϕ
(ϕnt + σct)− σc
NR
t
ϕ
)
− 1
γc
t̂NRt
Simplifying this by combining all like terms and rearranging provides:
cNRt =
(1− α)(1 + ϕ)
ϕ(1 + µ)γc + σ(1− α) (ϕnt + σct)−
ϕ(1 + µ)
ϕ(1 + µ)γc + σ(1− α) t̂
NR
t
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Finally, the Euler equation describes intertemporal consumption across time periods;
therefore multiplying this expression by
(
1− L−1) where L is the lag-operator, the
following non-Ricardian intertemporal consumption function is obtained:
[
cNRt − Et
{
cNRt+1
}]
=
(1− α)(1 + ϕ)
ϕ(1 + µ)γc + σ(1− α) [σ (ct − Et {ct+1})− ϕEt {∆nt+1}]
+
ϕ(1 + µ)
ϕ(1 + µ)γc + σ(1− α)Et
{
t̂NRt+1
}
(A.18)
Combining (A.18) with the corresponding consumption function for Ricardian house-
holds (A.2) and the log-linear condition for aggregate consumption (A.9), and simpli-
fying the resulting expression provides the aggregate Euler equation for the economy
(under the assumption of perfectly competitive labour markets):
ct = Et {ct+1} − γ−1c ΘPCA
(
rt − Et {pit+1} − Et
{
∆εbt+1
})
−γ−1c (1− α)ΘPCB Et {∆nt+1}+ γ−1c ΘPCC Et
{4t̂NRt+1}
ΘPCA = γc (1− λ)
1
σ
(ϕ(1 + µ)γc + σ (1− α)) ΓPC
ΘPCB = γcϕλ (1 + ϕ) Γ
PC
ΘPCC = γcϕλ(1 + µ)Γ
PC
ΓPC = [ϕ(1 + µ)γc + σ (1− α) [1− λ (1 + ϕ)]]−1
Within this Euler equation, consumption can be substituted out using the goods market
clearing condition (A.11), and employment can be substituted out using the production
function (A.5). Performing this, and simplifying the resulting expression provides the
result:
yt = Et {yt+1} − ΦPCEt {4ĝt+1} − ΦPCΘPCA
(
rt − Et {pit+1} − Et
{
∆εbt+1
})
+ ΦΘBEt
{
∆εat+1
}
+ ΦPCΘPCC Et
{4t̂NRt+1}
ΦPC =
(ΓPC)−1
(ΓPC)−1 − γcϕλ (1 + ϕ)
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A.4 Deriving the aggregate demand condition with im-
perfectly competitive labour markets
As above, an aggregate labour supply curve (in log-linear terms) can be derived and is
given by:
wt − pt = σct + ϕnt
As in Appendix A.3 this can be substituted into the non-Ricardian consumption func-
tion (A.3), noting that nNRt = nt, which can be multiplied by
(
1− L−1) and combined
with the Ricardian Euler equation (A.2) to give an aggregate Euler equation. This in
turn can be combined with the goods market clearing condition (A.11) to give aggregate
demand:
yt = Et {yt+1} − ΦICEt {4ĝt+1} − ΦICΘICA
(
rt − Et {pit+1} − Et
{
∆εbt+1
})
+ ΦICΘICB Et
{
∆εat+1
}
+ ΦICΘICC Et
{4t̂NRt+1}
ΦIC =
(
ΓIC
)−1
(ΓIC)−1 − γcλ (1 + ϕ)
ΘICA = γ
2
c (1− λ)
1
σ
(1 + µ)ΓIC
ΘICB = γcλ (1 + ϕ) Γ
IC
ΘICC = γcλ(1 + µ)Γ
IC
ΓIC = [(1 + µ)γc − λσ (1− α)]−1
A.5 Deriving the New Keynesian Phillips curve
The New Keynesian Phillips curve can be derived by combining the log-linear equations
for the production sector, (A.5), (A.6) and (A.7). The first step is to derive an expres-
sion that relates the individual firms real marginal cost, to the economy-wide average
real marginal cost. Observe that the economy’s average real marginal cost (MCrt ) is
given by:
MCrt =
Wt/Pt
MPNt
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where MPNt is the marginal product of labour at time t which once log-linearised
provides:
mcrt = (wt − pt)−mpnt
and, note that the marginal product of labour is given by:
MPNt =
∂Yt(j)
∂Nt(j)
=
∂(Nt(j))
1−α
∂Nt(j)
= (1− α)εat (Nt(j))−α
Which once log-linearised provides:
mpnt = ε
a
t − αnt
Substituting these two expressions together gives:
mcrt = (wt − pt) + αnt − εat
Next, note that the log-linear production function (A.5) can be rearranged to provide:
nt =
yt − εat
1− α
And substituting this into the above gives:
mcrt = (wt − pt) +
α
1− αyt −
1
1− αε
a
t (A.19)
Performing the same task for the individual firm’s real marginal costs provides:
mcrt+k|t = (wt+k − pt+k) +
α
1− αyt+k|t −
1
1− αε
a
t+k
And therefore:
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mcrt+k|t −mcrt+k =
[
(wt+k − pt+k) + α
1− αyt+k|t
]
−
[
(wt+k − pt+k) + α
1− αyt+k
]
mcrt+k|t = mc
r
t+k +
α
1− α
(
yt+k|t − yt+k
)
Using (2.8) to derive the expected demand for the monopolistically competitive firm in
period t+ k who last reset their price in period t, provides:
yt+k|t − yt+k = − (p∗t − pt+k)
And substituting this into the above gives:
mcrt+k|t = mc
r
t+k −
α
1− α (p
∗
t − pt+k)
Substituting this expression into the log-linear price setting rule for the intermediate
goods firms (A.7), simplifying the resulting expression, and subtracting pt−1 from both
sides provides:
p∗t − pt−1 =
(
1− βRθ)Θ ∞∑
k=0
(
θβR
)k
Et
{
mcrt+k + ε
µ
t
}
+
(
1− βRθ) ∞∑
k=0
(
θβR
)k
Et {pt+k − pt−1}
where:
Θ =
1− α
1− α+ αε
And note that through rearranging the above, the following difference equation can be
derived:
p∗t − pt−1 = βRθEt {pt+1 − pt}+
(
1− βRθ)Θ (mcrt + εµt ) + pit
Next, the inflation dynamics expression (A.6) can be rearranged to provide:
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p∗t − pt−1 =
pit
1− θ
and substituting this into the above, and simplifying the result provides the solution:
pit = β
REt {pit+1}+ ω (mcrt + εµt )
ω = Θ
(1− θ) (1− βRθ)
θ
Finally, the expression for the real marginal cost can be calculated by combining (A.19)
with the aggregate household labour supply (A.16) and simplifying the resulting ex-
pression to give:
mcrt = yt
[
σ
1− γg +
ϕ+ α
1− α
]
− ĝt
[
σ
1− γg
]
− εat
[
1 + ϕ
1− α
]
A.6 Derivations for Proposition 2
Perfectly competitive labour markets
To aid notation, let Γ
′,PC =
(
ΓPC
)−1−γcϕλ (1 + ϕ) which is the denominator of ΦPC .
The first condition in the proof of Proposition 2: Differentiating ΦPC with
respect to λ provides:
∂ΦPC
∂λ
=
(
ΓPC
)−1
[σ(1− α)(1 + ϕ) + γcϕ(1 + ϕ)]
(Γ′,PC)
2 −
σ(1− α)(1 + ϕ)
Γ′,PC
which is positive if:
(
ΓPC
)−1
[σ(1− α)(1 + ϕ) + γcϕ(1 + ϕ)] > σ(1− α)(1 + ϕ)Γ′,PC
which after cancelling and combining like terms provides:
γcϕ(1 + ϕ)
[(
ΓPC
)−1
+ λ
]
> 0
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which we know to be true for all possible calibrations, and provides the first condition
in the proof of Proposition 2.
The second condition in the proof of Proposition 2: Differentiating ΦPCΘPCA
with respect to λ provides:
∂ΦPCΘPCA
∂λ
=
(1− λ) [ϕ(1 + µ)γc + σ(1− α)] [σ(1− α)(1 + ϕ) + γcϕ(1 + ϕ)]
(Γ′,PC)
2
σ
−ϕ(1 + µ)γc + σ(1− α)
(Γ′,PC)σ
which is positive if:
(1− λ) [ϕ(1 + µ)γc + σ(1− α)] [σ(1− α)(1 + ϕ) + γcϕ(1 + ϕ)]
> (ϕ(1 + µ)γc + σ(1− α)) Γ′,PC
which after cancelling and combining like terms provides:
σ(1− α) + γc(1 + ϕ) > (1 + µ)γc
which is true providing λ < λ∗, and provides the second condition in the proof of
Proposition 2.
The third and fourth condition in the proof of Proposition 2: Finally differ-
entiating ΓPC with respect to λ provides:
∂ΓPC
∂λ
= σ(1− α)(1 + ϕ) (ΓPC)2
which we know to be positive providing λ < λ∗ and therefore the third and fourth
conditions in the proof in Proposition 2 easily follow.
Imperfectly competitive labour markets
To aid notation, let Γ
′,IC =
(
ΓIC
)−1 − γcλ (1 + ϕ) which is the denominator of ΦIC .
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The first condition in the proof of Proposition 2: Differentiating ΦIC with
respect to λ provides:
∂ΦIC
∂λ
=
(
ΓIC
)−1
[σ(1− α) + γc(1 + ϕ)]
(Γ′,IC)
2 −
σ(1− α)
Γ′,IC
which is positive if:
(
ΓIC
)−1
[σ(1− α) + γc(1 + ϕ)] > σ(1− α)Γ′,IC
which after cancelling and combining like terms provides:
γc(1 + ϕ)
[(
ΓIC
)−1
+ λ
]
> 0
which we know to be true for all possible calibrations, and provides the first condition
in the proof of Proposition 2.
The second condition in the proof of Proposition 2: Differentiating ΦICΘICA
with respect to λ provides:
∂ΦICΘICA
∂λ
=
γ2c (1− λ)(1 + µ) [σ(1− α) + γc(1 + ϕ)]
(Γ′,IC)
2
σ
− γ
2
c (1 + µ)
(Γ′,IC)σ
which is positive if:
γ2c (1− λ)(1 + µ) [σ(1− α) + γc(1 + ϕ)] > γ2c (1 + µ)Γ
′,IC
which after cancelling and combining like terms provides:
σ(1− α) + γc(1 + ϕ) > (1 + µ)γc
which is true providing λ < λ∗, and provides the second condition in the proof of
Proposition 2.
The third and fourth condition in the proof of Proposition 2: Finally differ-
entiating ΓIC with respect to λ provides:
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∂ΓIC
∂λ
= σ(1− α) (ΓIC)2
which we know to be positive providing λ < λ∗ and therefore the third and fourth
conditions in the proof in Proposition 2 easily follow.
A.7 Derivations for Proposition 3
Perfectly competitive labour markets
The first condition in the proof of Proposition 3: Performing the second deriva-
tive of ΦPC with respect to λ provide:
∂2ΦPC
∂λ2
=
2
(
ΓPC
)−1
[σ(1− α)(1 + ϕ) + γcϕ(1 + ϕ)]2
(Γ′,PC)
3
−2σ(1− α)(1 + ϕ) [σ(1− α)(1 + ϕ) + γcϕ(1 + ϕ)]
(Γ′,PC)
2
which is positive when λ < λ∗ providing:
(
ΓPC
)−1
[σ(1− α)(1 + ϕ) + γcϕ(1 + ϕ)] > σ(1− α)(1 + ϕ)Γ′,PC
which after cancelling and combining like terms provides:
ϕγc(1 + µ) + σ(1− α) > 0
which we know to be true and provides the first condition in the proof of Proposition
3.
The second condition in the proof of Proposition 3: Performing the second
derivative ΦPCΘPCA with respect to λ provides:
∂2ΦPCΘPCA
∂λ2
=
2(1− λ) [ϕ(1 + µ)γc + σ(1− α)] [σ(1− α)(1 + ϕ) + γcϕ(1 + ϕ)]2
(Γ′,PC)
3
σ
−2 (ϕ(1 + µ)γc + σ(1− α)) [σ(1− α)(1 + ϕ) + γcϕ(1 + ϕ)]
(Γ′,PC)
2
σ
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which is positive when λ < λ∗ providing:
(1− λ) [σ(1− α)(1 + ϕ) + γcϕ(1 + ϕ)] > Γ′,PC
which after cancelling and combining like terms provides:
(1 + ϕ)(σ(1− α) + γcϕ) > ϕ(1 + µ)γc
which is true providing λ < λ∗, and provides the second condition in the proof of
Proposition 3.
The third and fourth condition in the proof of Proposition 3: Finally Per-
forming the second derivative ΓPC with respect to λ provides:
∂2ΓPC
∂λ2
= 2σ2(1− α)2(1 + ϕ)2 (ΓPC)3
which we know to be positive providing λ < λ∗ and therefore the third and fourth
conditions in the proof in Proposition 3 easily follow.
Imperfectly competitive labour markets
The first condition in the proof of Proposition 3: Performing the second deriva-
tive of ΦIC with respect to λ provide:
∂2ΦIC
∂λ2
=
2
(
ΓIC
)−1
[σ(1− α) + γc(1 + ϕ)]2
(Γ′,IC)
3 −
2σ(1− α) [σ(1− α) + γc(1 + ϕ)]
(Γ′,IC)
2
which is positive when λ < λ∗ providing:
(
ΓIC
)−1
[σ(1− α) + γc(1 + ϕ)] > σ(1− α)(1 + ϕ)Γ′,IC
which after cancelling and combining like terms provides:
ϕγc(1 + µ) + σ(1− α) > 0
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which we know to be true and provides the first condition in the proof of proposition
3.
The second condition in the proof of Proposition 3: Performing the second
derivative ΦICΘICA with respect to λ provides:
∂2ΦICΘICA
∂λ2
=
2γ2c (1− λ)(1 + µ) [σ(1− α) + γc(1 + ϕ)]2
σ (Γ′,IC)
3
−2γ
2
c (1 + µ) [σ(1− α) + γc(1 + ϕ)]
σ (Γ′,IC)
2
which is positive when λ < λ∗ providing:
(1− λ) [σ(1− α) + γc(1 + ϕ)] > Γ′,IC
which after cancelling and combining like terms provides:
σ(1− α) + γc(1 + ϕ) > (1 + µ)γc
which is true providing λ < λ∗, and provides the second condition in the proof of
Proposition 3.
The third and fourth condition in the proof of Proposition 3: Finally Per-
forming the second derivative ΓIC with respect to λ provides:
∂2ΓIC
∂λ2
= 2σ2(1− α)2 (ΓIC)3
which we know to be positive providing λ < λ∗ and therefore the third and fourth
conditions in the proof in Proposition 3 easily follow.
Appendix B
Appendices to Chapter 3
B.1 Determinacy conditions when ϕy > 0
Section 3.2.3 discusses the impact on the determinacy conditions of the model when
ϕy > 0: this section derives the algebra behind these discussions.
B.1.1 Determinacy when λ < λ∗
Following the conditions given in Woodford (2003) and detailed in Chapter 3, the
following conditions for Case I are obtained for when λ < λ∗:
A1 ΦΘA(ϕy + ωyϕpi) > β
R − 1;
A2 ΦΘAϕy
((
βR
)−1 − 1)+ (βR)−1 ωyΦΘA(ϕpi − 1) > 0;
A3 ΦΘAϕy(1 + β
R) + ΦΘAωyϕpi > −
[
2(βR + 1) + ωyΦΘA
]
.
Note that when λ < λ∗, Φ and ΘA are positive and therefore all three conditions are
satisfied providing ϕpi > 1: the Taylor Principle. However, it is also observable that as
ϕy increases, ϕpi can be less than one (passive), the degree to which this is permitted
depends on the size of ϕy.
B.1.2 Determinacy when λ > λ∗
Following the conditions given in Woodford (2003), the following conditions for Case I
are obtained for when λ > λ∗ :
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A1 ϕy + ωyϕpi < (ΦΘA)
−1(βR − 1);
A2 ϕy
((
βR
)−1 − 1)+ (βR)−1 (ϕpi − 1) < 0;
A3 ϕy(1 + β
R) + ωyϕpi < −(ΦΘA)−1
[
2(βR + 1) + ΦΘAωy
]
.
As in the analysis in Section 3.2 these conditions set a higher limit on ϕpi. Moreover,
the introduction of ϕy > 0 leads to higher values of ϕy needing more passive values of
ϕpi to ensure determinacy. Considering Case II of Woodford (2003) gives the results:
B1 ϕy(1− βR) + ωy(ϕpi − 1) > 0; and,
B2 ϕy(1 + β
R) + ωy(ϕpi + 1) > −(ΦΘA)−1
[
(2(βR + 1))
]
.
which are similar to those found in Section 3.2 where the monetary authority need
to respond very aggressively to movements in inflation. The conditions here for when
ϕy > 0 are less restrictive to those in Section 3.2 with respect to how high ϕpi needs to
be: in effect higher values of ϕy can compensate for ϕpi.
B.2 Algebraic properties
Disaggregate relationships: perfectly competitive labour markets
The assumption that non-Ricardian households consume entirely their disposable in-
come makes it possible to derive functions of their consumption and employment be-
haviour with respect to output. Log-linearising the non-Ricardian consumption func-
tion (2.6) provides, in the absence of tax changes:
cNRt =
1− α
1 + µ
[
nNRt + (wt − pt)
]
(B.1)
where the steady state ratio has been substituted with NNRW/CNRP = (1−α)/(1+µ)
using the observation that employment gets paid its marginal product net of the markup
charged by the monopolistically competitive firms. From Appendix A.3 the aggregate
labour supply expression (wt − pt) = ϕnt + σct can be obtained and substituting this
into (B.1) and deriving an expression for non-Ricardian employment, nNRt , in terms of
aggregate consumption, employment and non-Ricardian consumption using both the
aggregate and disaggregate labour supply functions provides (after manipulation):
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cNRt =
(1 + ϕ)(1− α)
ϕ(1 + µ) + σ(1− α) [ϕnt + σct]
Finally, using the aggregate log-linear production function (A.5) and market clearing
condition (A.11) to substitute out for both employment and consumption provides:
cNRt =
(1 + ϕ)(ϕ+ σ(1− α))
ϕ(1 + µ) + σ(1− α) yt −
(1 + ϕ)ϕ
ϕ(1 + µ) + σ(1− α)ε
a
t (B.2)
From this it is possible to observe the complications made through productivity shocks.1
Setting εat = 0, condition (C1) from Table 4 is trivial. Moreover, substituting out for
non-Ricardian consumption using the market clearing condition (A.11) provides:
cRt =
[
λ
1− λ
(1 + µ)ϕ+ σ(1− α)− λ(1 + ϕ)(ϕ+ σ(1− α))
1 + µ+ σ(1− α) ϕ
]
yt (B.3)
Where condition (C2) from Table 4 can be obtained, providing λ < λ∗. Moreover, the
above two conditions can combine to obtain condition (C3) from Table 4.2
Using the log-linear expressions for the aggregate and non-Ricardian labour supply
functions, in conjunction with the production function and goods market clearing con-
dition, one can obtain the result:
ϕnNRt + σc
NR
t =
[
ϕ+ σ(1− α)
1− α
]
yt
which can be used to substitute out cNRt from (B.2) to obtain a relationship between
non-Ricardian employment and output (N2):
nNRt =
1
ϕ
[
ϕ+ σ(1− α)
1− α −
σ(1 + ϕ)(ϕ+ σ(1− α))
(1 + µ)ϕ+ σ(1− α)
]
yt
Which can be used, once it has been observed that in the absence of technology shocks
∂nt/∂yt = 1/(1− α), to obtain the first half of condition (N3) from Table 4 where the
second half and condition (N3) are then logical extensions from this first result.
1Note that from these conditions we can substitute for εat using the conditions derived using the
method of undetermined coefficients. When this is performed, however, ambiguous conditions are
obtained.
2Another way of obtaining (C3) is to show that ∂cNRt /∂yt > 1 and ∂c
R
t /∂yt < 1 using the functions
derived above.
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Disaggregate relationships: imperfectly competitive labour markets
Performing similar procedures to those outlined above where nNRt = n
R
t = nt we can
obtain the following conditions similar to (B.2) and (B.3) respectively:
cNRt =
1 + ϕ+ σ(1− α)
1 + µ
yt − 1 + ϕ
1 + µ
εat (B.4)
cRt =
1
1− λ
[
1− λ (1 + ϕ+ σ(1− α))
1 + µ
]
yt (B.5)
From these, conditions similar to (C1) and (C2) can be derived where the latter is
true providing λ < λ∗ (the same condition as was required for perfectly competitively
labour markets). Moreover, from these it is possible to derive (C3) from Table 4
providing µ < ϕ+σ(1−α), the same condition as was required for perfectly competitive
labour markets. With the assumption of imperfectly competitive labour markets both
households work the same contracts and as such relationships similar to (N2) and (N3)
in Table 4 break down.
B.3 Derivation of the disaggregated welfare functions
To derive the welfare functions for each household, a second order Taylor series expan-
sion around steady state values of the period utility function (assumed to be identical
across households) is performed, such as that performed in Woodford (2003). This
provides:
U it − U i ≈ Uc
(
Cit − Ci
)
+ Un
(
N it −N i
)
+
1
2
Ucc
(
Cit − Ci
)2
+
1
2
Unn
(
N it −N i
)2
Where Ux = ∂U(·)/∂x, and the separability of consumption and employment provides
Ucn = 0. Following previous notation, upper case letters with no time subscripts
represent steady state values. Manipulating the above provides:
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U it − U i
UcCi
≈
(Cit − Ci
Ci
)
+
1
2
Ucc
Uc
Ci
(
Cit − Ci
(Ci)2
)2
+
UnN
i
UcCi
(N it −N i
N i
)
+
1
2
Unn
Un
N i
(
N it −N i
(N i)2
)2
With the assumptions made in Section (2.3.1), Ci = C and N i = N :
U it − U
UcC
≈
[(
Cit − C
C
)
+
1
2
Ucc
Uc
C
(
Cit − C
(C)2
)2]
+
UnN
UcC
[(
N it −N i
N i
)
+
1
2
Unn
Un
N i
(
N it −N
(N)2
)2]
The presence of the monopolistically competitive intermediate firms creates a distortion
in the employment market and subsequently in the general equilibrium, such that:
MPN
1 + µ
= MRS
Where the marginal rate of substitution is given by MRS = −Un(·)/Uc(·), and from
the production function (2.9) the marginal product of labour is given by, MPN =
(1− α)Y/N . Substituting these conditions into the Taylor series expansion above
gives:
U it − U
UcC
≈
[(
Cit − C
C
)
+
1
2
Ucc
Uc
C
(
Cit − C
(C)2
)2]
− (1− α)
1 + µ
N
C
Y
N
[(
N it −N i
N i
)
+
1
2
Unn
Un
N i
(
N it −N
(N)2
)2]
Which from the specified utility function provides:
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U it − U
UcC
≈
[(
Cit − C
C
)
− σ
2
(
Cit − C
(C)2
)2]
− (1− α)
(1 + µ)γc
[(
N it −N i
N i
)
+
ϕ
2
(
N it −N
(N)2
)2]
The above can be written in terms of log deviations as:
U it − U
UcC
≈
[
cit +
1
2
(
cit
)2 − σ
2
(
cit
)2]
− (1− α)
(1 + µ)γc
[
nit +
1
2
(
nit
)2
+
ϕ
2
(
nit
)2]
And simplified to:
U it − U
UcC
≈
[
cit +
1− σ
2
(
cit
)2]− (1− α)
(1 + µ)γc
[
nit +
1 + ϕ
2
(
nit
)2]
Finally, welfare losses for each type of household can be defined as the sum of lifetime
utility lost expressed as a fraction of steady state consumption as:
W i = E0
∞∑
t=0
βi,t
(
U it − U
UcC
)
W i = E0
∞∑
t=0
βi,t
(
cit +
1− σ
2
(
cit
)2)− (1− α)
(1 + µ)γc
E0
∞∑
t=0
βi,t
(
nit +
1 + ϕ
2
(
nit
)2)
B.4 Agent specific levels of steady state consumption
If we relax the assumption that both agents consume the same amount in steady state
(and therefore, by extension, work the same amount), note that the assumed identical
utility function for the two agents will result in the same ratio of consumption to work.
Maximisation of period utility (2.2) subject to either the budget constraint for Ricar-
dian households (2.3) or non-Ricardian households (2.6) with respect to consumption
and employment leads to the condition:
Wt
Pt
=
(
N it
)ϕ (
Cit
)σ
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and therefore if both households are subject to the same real wage they will both
optimise at a constant ratio of N/C.
The only difference the relaxation of identical steady state consumption levels will
have on the model is to change the log-linear aggregate consumption condition. Log-
linearising (2.17) where CNR 6= CR 6= C provides:
ct = λ
CNR
C
cNRt + (1− λ)
CR
C
cRt
which can be simplified to:
ct = χc
NR
t + (1− χ)cRt
where χ = λ
(
CNR/C
)
.
Appendix C
Appendices to Chapter 4
C.1 The closed system
As stated in Chapter 4, the economy can be described by six equations in six unknowns.
These six equations are the aggregate demand condition (2.20); the New Keynesian
Phillips curve (2.24); the Taylor rule (2.12); the government spending and taxation
rules (2.14) and (2.15); and the flow constraint for government debt (2.16). This can
be simplified by substituting the Taylor rule in to the aggregate demand condition
and the government spending and tax rules into the government flow constraint which
results in the following system of three equations in three unknowns:
AEt {ut+1} = But + Bεt
where ut =
[
yt, pit, b̂t
]′
and εt =
[
εrt , Et
{
∆εbt+1
}
, εat , ε
a
t+1, ε
µ
t
]′
and the matrices A, B
and C are given by:
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A =

1 + Φ [ΘCϕT − ϕg] ΦΘA Φ [ΘCϕb,T − ϕb,g]
0 βR 0
0 0 1

B =

1 + Φ [ΘAϕy + ΘCϕT − ϕg] ΦΘAϕpi Φ [ΘCϕb,T − ϕb,g]
ωgϕg − ωy 1 ωgϕb,g
(1 + ρR) (ϕg − ϕT ) 0 (1 + ρR) (1 + ϕb,g − ϕb,T )

C =

−ΦΘA ΦΘA −ΦΘB ΦΘB 0
0 0 ωε 0 1
0 0 0 0 0

where ωy = ω (σ/γc − (ϕ+ α)/(1− α)), ωg = ω (σ/γc) and ωε = ω(1 + ϕ)/(1− α).
C.2 Net discounted government spending in policy exper-
iment 1
As was stipulated in Section 4.2, net discounted government spending will be negligible
in policy experiment 1 because the interest which accrues on existing debt is the inverse
of the rate at which Ricardian agents discount future transactions. Under the conditions
of policy experiment 1, existing debt in any given period n will be equal to:
bn =
t=n∑
t=1
{(
1
βR
)n−t
gt
}
and given the solvency condition on government debt we know that bn → 0 as n→∞.
Put another way we could separate all those increases in government spending from
decreases to get the result:
t=∞∑
t=1
{(
1
βR
)t
gt|gt>0
}
=
t=∞∑
t=1
{(
1
βR
)t
gt|gt<0
}
That is, all reductions in government spending must pay back all the increases in
government spending including the interest accrued on it. This means that were the
government to temporarily increase spending the reductions over the medium term will
be greater than the short term increases. However, when the households evaluate the
welfare implications of such policy they discount future periods by the factor
(
βi
)t
and
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substituting this into the above, the net discounted increases in government spending
are exactly offset by the net discounted decreases, or algebraically:
t=∞∑
t=1
{g¯t|gt>0} =
t=∞∑
t=1
{g¯t|gt<0}
where g¯t represents discounted movements in government expenditure. This means that
the assumptions made about whether government spending enters the utility function
is trivial in policy experiment 1.
C.3 Steady state properties of fiscal policy
From the structure of the non-linear steady state model we can perform the following
substitutions in order to get a relationship between public and private consumption:
W
P
= MC(1− α)N−α = − 1

(1− α)N−α
C =
[
W
P
N−ϕ
] 1
σ
=
[
− 1

(1− α)N−(ϕ+α)
] 1
σ
Y = N1−α ⇔ N = Y 11−α
C =
[
− 1

(1− α)Y −ϕ+α1−α
] 1
σ
C =
[
− 1

(1− α) [C +G]−ϕ+α1−α
] 1
σ
G =
[
Cσ
(− 1)(1− α)
]− 1−α
ϕ+α
− C
from which it can be shown that:
∂G
∂C
=
−(1− α)σ
(
Cσ
(1−α)(−1)
)− 1−α
ϕ+α
C(α+ ϕ)
with which we can perform the following substitutions:
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
(− 1)(1− α) = N
−α
(
W
P
)−1
; Cσ =
W
P
N−ϕ
Cσ
(1− α)(− 1) = N
−α+ϕ = Y −
α+ϕ
1−α
∂G
∂C
= −σ(1− α)
α+ ϕ
Y
C
= − σ(1− α)
γc(α+ ϕ)
∂C
∂G
= −γc(α+ ϕ)
σ(1− α)
C.4 Adding distortionary taxation to the model
A tax on consumption can be included in the model such that the gross price paid for
a good is (1 + τ ct )Pt. Similarly, a tax on wage income can be imposed such that take
home pay for each unit of labour by households is given by (1 − τ lt )Wt (note that an
employee social security contributions would enter the model in the same way). These
two would change the optimisation results (2.4) and (2.7), and (2.5) respectively:
Wt(1− τ lt )
Pt(1 + τ ct )
=
(
N it
)ϕ (
Cit
)σ
R−1t = β
REt
{(
CRt+1
CRt
)−σ (
Pt(1 + τ
c
t )
Pt+1(1 + τ ct+1)
)(
εbt+1
εbt
)}
Moreover, a tax can be imposed on firms employment, analogous to an employer social
security (or national insurance) contribution, such that the gross amount paid for each
unit of labour is equal to (1 + τ ert )Wt and therefore real marginal costs become equal
to:
MCrt =
Wt(1 + τ
er
t )/Pt
(1− α)εat (Nt(j))−α
These three taxes will change the log-linear Ricardian Euler equation, non-Ricardian
consumption function, the labour supply conditions and the marginal cost dynamics
from the model presented in Chapter 2 to:
cRt = Et
{
cRt+1
}− 1
σ
(
rt − Et {pit+1} − Et
{
∆εbt+1
}
− τ
c
1 + τ c
Et
{
∆τ ct+1
})
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(1 + τ c)γc
(
cNRt +
τ c
1 + τ c
τ ct
)
= (1− τ l)1− α
1 + µ
(
(wt − pt) + nNRt −
τ l
1− τ l τ
l
t
)
− t̂t
wt − pt = ϕnRt + σcRt +
τ l
1− τ l τ
l
t +
τ c
1 + τ c
τ ct
wt − pt = ϕnNRt + σcNRt +
τ l
1− τ l τ
l
t +
τ c
1 + τ c
τ ct
mcrt = (wt − pt)− εat + αnt +
τ er
1 + τ er
τ ert
Moreover, the government flow constraint will be updated to reflect new sources of
income:
b̂t+1 = (1 + ρR)
[
b̂t + ĝt − t̂t − γcτ c (τ ct + ct) (C.1)
−1− α
1 + µ
τ l
(
τ lt + (wt − pt) + nt
)
− 1− α
1 + µ
τ er (τ ert + (wt − pt) + nt)
]
Appendix D
Appendices to Chapter 5
D.1 First-order conditions of Ricardian households
The first order condition with respect to consumption results in:
C−1t = λt (1 + τ
c
t )
where λt represents the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint. The first-order
conditions with respect to bond holdings results in the standard Euler equation:
λt = Et
[
Rt
Πt+1
βRλt+1
]
The left-hand side of the above represents the marginal utility cost of investing in
bonds; the right-hand side implies that investing in bonds provides an ex ante real rate
of return represented by Rt/pit+1. The first-order condition with respect to the capital
utilisation rate, presented below, indicates that the real rental rate net of capital taxes
is equal to the marginal cost of capital utilisation:
(
1− τkt
)
rk,t = a
′(ut)
A higher rate of return on capital or a lower capital tax implies a higher utilisation rate
up to the point where extra benefits are equal to extra costs. The first-order condition
with respect to capital links the shadow price of capital between two periods:
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Qt =
Etpit+1
Rt
Et
[
Qt+1(1− δk) +
(
1− τkt+1
)
(rk,t+1ut+1)− a(ut+1)
]
The above implies that the price of capital is simply the present value of future net
income from capital holdings. The price of capital depends positively on the expected
real rental rate and the expected utilisation rate, and depends negatively on the real
ex ante interest rate, capital taxes and the capital utilisation cost.
The first-order condition with respect to investment is given by:
λt = QtλtF
′
t (It, It−1) +Qt+1β
Rλt+1β
REtF
′
t+1 (It+1, It)
where Ft(·) = [1− s(·)]: the left-hand side represents the marginal utility cost of in-
vestment in physical capital, which is equal to the marginal utility cost of investment
in bonds. An increase in investment by one unit at time t leads to an increase in the
value of capital by QtF
′
t (It, It−1) in period t, and by Qt+1βRF ′t+1 (It+1, It) in period
t+ 1.1
D.2 Derivation of the disaggregated welfare function
To derive the welfare function in this model the same procedures as used in Appendix
B.3 can be applied where it is recognised that in steady state the marginal product of
labour and the marginal rate of substitution are equating through the following:
MRS =
MPLt
1 + τ er
ν − 1
ν
1− τ l − τ ee
1 + τ c
Thus leading to the welfare function:
W i = E0
∞∑
t=0
(
βi
)t(U it − U i
UcCi
)
W i = E0
∞∑
t=0
(
βi
)t (
cit
)− ν − 1
ν
1− τ l − τ ee
1 + τ c
(1− α)
(1 + τ er)
Y
Ci
E0
∞∑
t=0
(
βi
)t(
lit +
1 + σl
2
(
lit
)2)
1Substituting for Ft (It, It−1) results in:
1 = Qt
[
1− φk
2
− 3φk
2
(
εIt It
It−1
)2
+ 2φk
εIt It
It−1
]
+Qt+1
Uc,t+1
Uc,t
βR
[
φk
(
εIt+1It+1
It
)3
− φk
(
εIt+1It+1
It
)2]
.
Therefore F ′t (1) = 1 and F
′
t+1 (1) = 0, thus the steady state does not depend on the parameter φk and
Q = 1.
Appendix E
Appendices to Chapter 6
E.1 The log-linear model
The model as described in Chapter 6 once log-linearised, can be described in the fol-
lowing set of equations:
yt = γcct + γiit + ĝt (E.1)
yt = αkt + (1− α)nt (E.2)
kt − nt = (wt − pt)− (rkt − pt) (E.3)
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + δit (E.4)
qt = −
(
rt − Et
{
piPt+1
})
+ (1− β(1− δ))Et
{
rkt+1 − pt+1
}
+ βEt {qt+1} (E.5)
it − kt = ηqt (E.6)
ct = (1− λ)cRt + λcNRt (E.7)
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pit = βEt
{
piPt+1
}
+
(1− βθ)(1− θ)
θ
[(wt − pt)− (yt − nt)] (E.8)
rt = ϕpipi
P
t + ϕyyt (E.9)
cRt − h · ct−1 = Et
{
cRt+1 − h · ct
}− 1− h
σ
(rt − Et {pit+1}) (E.10)
cNRt =
1− α
γc(1 + µ)
[nt + (wt − pt)]− 1
γc
t̂NRt (E.11)
piwt = βEt
{
piwt+1
}
+
w − 1
φw
[
ct − h · ct−1
1− h + ϕnt − (wt − pt)
]
(E.12)
ĝt = ε
G
t + ϕb,g b̂t; ε
G
t = ρgε
G
t−1 + η
G
t (E.13)
t̂t = ε
T
t + ϕb,tb̂t; ε
T
t = ρtε
T
t−1 + η
T
t (E.14)
b̂t+1 = (1 + ρR)
(
b̂t + ĝt − t̂t
)
(E.15)
E.2 Deriving the aggregate demand condition
The aggregate demand condition is derived using a similar process that was used in
Section A.3. First note that through combining individual labour supply conditions
the following aggregate function can be derived:
(wt − pt) = ϕnt + σ
1− h(ct − h · ct−1)
which can be substituted into the non-Ricardian consumption function (E.11) to derive
an aggregate Euler equation:
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ct = Et {ct+1} −X1(rt − Et {pit+1})−X2Et {∆nt+1}+X3∆ct +X4Et
{
∆t̂NRt
}
X1 = (1− λ) 1
σ
(1− h) [γcϕ(1 + µ)(1− h) + σ(1− α)]X−15
X2 = λ(1− h)(1− α)(1 + ϕ)ϕΓ−1
X3 = [λϕσ(1− α)h− (1− λ)h [γcϕ(1 + µ)(1− h) + σ(1− α)]]X−15
X4 = λϕ(1 + µ)(1− h)X−15
X5 = γcϕ(1 + µ)(1− h) + σ(1− α) [1− λ(1 + ϕ)]
Finally, this can be combined with the market clearing and production function in
order to obtain the demand condition for the simplified model presented in Chapter 6,
equation (6.12).
E.3 Proofs for conditions in (6.15)
The first condition in (6.15) Differentiating Φ′ with respect to λ provides:
∂Φ′
∂λ
=
Γ′ [γcϕ(1 + µ)(1− h)h+ σ(1− α)(1 + ϕ)(1 + h) + (1− h)(1 + ϕ)ϕγc]
(Γ′′)2
−γcϕ(1 + µ)(1− h)h+ σ(1− α)(1 + ϕ)(1 + h)
Γ′′
which is positive providing:
Γ′ [γcϕ(1 + µ)(1− h)h+ σ(1− α)(1 + ϕ)(1 + h) + (1− h)(1 + ϕ)ϕγc]
> γcϕ(1 + µ)(1− h)h+ σ(1− α)(1 + ϕ)(1 + h)
(
Γ′′
)
which, after cancelling and combining like terms, is true providing:
σ(1− α) (1− (1 + µ)λh) + ϕγc(1 + µ)(1 + λh)) > 0
which is the condition as stated in main body: this is not a significant restriction at
reasonable calibrations.
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The second condition in (6.15) Differentiating Φ′ with respect to h provides:
∂Φ′
∂h
=
γcϕ(1 + µ) [(1− h)(1− λ)− 1− (1− λ)h] + σ(1− α) (1− λ(1 + ϕ))
Γ′′
−Γ
′ [γcϕ(1 + µ) [(1− h)(1− λ)− 1− (1− λ)h]]
(Γ′′)2
−Γ
′ [σ(1− α)(1− λ(1 + ϕ)) + λ(1 + ϕ)ϕγc]
(Γ′′)2
which is negative providing:
Γ′ [γcϕ(1 + µ) [(1− 2h)(1− λ)− 1] + σ(1− α)(1− λ(1 + ϕ)) + λ(1 + ϕ)ϕγc]
> γcϕ(1 + µ) [(1− 2h)(1− λ)− 1] + σ(1− α) (1− λ(1 + ϕ))
(
Γ′′
)
which, after cancelling and combining like terms, is true providing:
(1− h)2γcϕ(1 + µ)(1− λ) + 2σ(1− α) [1− λ(1 + ϕ)] > 0
which is the condition as stated in main body: this is not a significant restriction at
reasonable calibrations.
The third condition in (6.15) Differentiating ΘB with respect to λ provides:
∂ΘB
∂λ
=
γcϕ(1 + µ)(1− h)
Γ′′
+
γcϕ(1 + µ)(1− h)λ [γcϕ(1 + µ)(1− h) + σ(1− α)(1 + ϕ)(1 + h)]
(Γ′′)2
+
γcϕ(1 + µ)(1− h)λ [(1− h)(1 + ϕ)ϕγc]
(Γ′′)2
where everything above is positive, providing λ > λ∗, and therefore ∂ΘB/∂λ > 0.
The fourth condition in (6.15) Differentiating ΘB with respect to h provides:
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∂ΘB
∂h
= −γcϕ(1 + µ)
Γ′′
−γcϕ(1 + µ)(1− h) [γcϕ(1 + µ)(1− h)(1− λ)]
(Γ′′)2
−γcϕ(1 + µ)(1− h) [σ(1− α)(1− λ(1 + ϕ)) + λ(1 + ϕ)ϕγc]
(Γ′′)2
+
γcϕ(1 + µ)(1− h) [γcϕ(1 + µ)(1 + (1− λ)h)]
(Γ′′)2
which is negative, when λ < λ∗, providing:
Γ′′ + (1 + h) [γcϕ(1 + µ)(1− h)(1− λ) + σ(1− α)(1− λ(1 + ϕ)) + λ(1 + ϕ)ϕγc]
Γ′′
>
(1 + h) [γcϕ(1 + µ)(1 + (1− λ)h)]
Γ′′
which, after cancelling and combining like terms, is true providing:
2(1 + ϕ)
1− h > 1 + µ
which is the condition as stated in main body: this is not a significant restriction at
reasonable calibrations.
E.4 Proofs for conditions in (6.16)
The first condition in (6.16) Partially differentiating ΦA with respect to λ pro-
vides:
∂ΦA
∂λ
=
(Γ− λ(1− h)(1 + ϕ)ϕγc) [γcϕ(1 + µ) + σ(1− α)(1 + ϕ)(1 + h)]
(Γ′′)2
+
(Γ− λ(1− h)(1 + ϕ)ϕγc) [(1− h)(1 + ϕ)ϕγc]
(Γ′′)2
−σ(1− α)(1 + ϕ) + γc(1− h)(1 + ϕ)ϕ
Γ′′
which is negative providing:
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[σ(1− α)(1 + ϕ) + γc(1− h)(1 + ϕ)ϕ] Γ′′
> (Γ− λ(1− h)(1 + ϕ)ϕγc) [γcϕ(1 + µ) + σ(1− α)(1 + ϕ)(1 + h)]
(Γ− λ(1− h)(1 + ϕ)ϕγc) [(1− h)(1 + ϕ)ϕγc]
which, after cancelling and combining like terms, is true providing:
(1 + ϕ)(1 + h) [(1 + µ)(γcϕ(1− h)− 1) + 1] + ϕγc(1− h) [ϕ(1 + ϕ)− h(1 + µ)] > 0
which is certainly true when µ < ϕ, which is not reasonably restrictive.
The second condition in (6.16) Partially differentiating ΦA with respect to h
provides:
∂ΦA
∂h
=
γcϕ (λ(1 + ϕ− (1 + µ)
Γ′′
− [Γ− γcλ(1− h)(1 + ϕ)ϕ] (γcϕ(1 + µ)(1− h)(1− λ))
(Γ′′)2
− [Γ− γcλ(1− h)(1 + ϕ)ϕ] (σ(1− α)(1− λ(1 + ϕ))
(Γ′′)2
− [Γ− γcλ(1− h)(1 + ϕ)ϕ] (λ(1 + ϕ)ϕγc − γcϕ(1 + µ)(1 + (1− λ)h))
(Γ′′)2
which is negative providing:
γcϕ (λ(1 + ϕ− (1 + µ) Γ′′
< [Γ− γcλ(1− h)(1 + ϕ)ϕ] (γcϕ(1 + µ)(1− h)(1− λ))
+ [Γ− γcλ(1− h)(1 + ϕ)ϕ] (σ(1− α)(1− λ(1 + ϕ))
+ [Γ− γcλ(1− h)(1 + ϕ)ϕ] (λ(1 + ϕ)ϕγc − γcϕ(1 + µ)(1 + (1− λ)h))
which, after cancelling and combining like terms, is true providing:
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(1 + ϕ) [1 + h+ ϕγc(1− h)ϕ]− (1 + µ)(1 + h− γcϕ(1− h) > 0
which is certainly true when µ < 1 + ϕ, which is the restriction as in the main body
and is not reasonably restrictive.
The third condition in (6.16) Partially differentiating Φ′′ with respect to λ pro-
vides:
∂Φ′′
∂λ
=
[(1− λ)h (γcϕ(1 + µ)(1− h) + σ(1− α))− λϕσ(1− α)h]A1
(Γ′′)2
−h [γcϕ(1 + µ)(1− h) + σ(1− α)]− ϕσ(1− α)h
Γ′′
A1 = γcϕ(1 + µ)(1− h)h+ σ(1− α)(1 + ϕ)(1 + h) + (1− h)(1 + ϕ)ϕγc
which is positive if:
[(1− λ)h (γcϕ(1 + µ)(1− h) + σ(1− α))− λϕσ(1− α)h]A1
> [[γcϕ(1 + µ)(1− h) + σ(1− α)]− ϕσ(1− α)h] Γ′′
which, after cancelling and combining like terms, is true providing:
γcϕ(1 + µ)(1− h)
[
(1− λ)A− Γ′′]+ σ(1− α) [((1− λ)− λϕ)A− (1 + ϕ)Γ′′] > 0
which is certainly true when µ < ϕ, which is the restriction as in the main body and
is not reasonably restrictive.
The fourth condition in (6.16) Partially differentiating Φ′′ with respect to h pro-
vides:
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∂Φ′′
∂h
=
(1− λ) (γcϕ(1 + µ)(1− h) + σ(1− α)− hγcϕ(1 + µ))− λϕσ(1− α)
Γ′′
− [(1− λ)h (γcϕ(1 + µ)(1− h) + σ(1− α))− λϕσ(1− α)h]A2
(Γ′′)2
A2 = γcϕ(1 + µ)(1− h)(1− λ) + σ(1− α) (1− λ(1 + ϕ)) + λ(1 + ϕ)ϕγc
−γcϕ(1 + µ) (1 + (1− λ)h)
which is positive if:
[(1− λ) (γcϕ(1 + µ)(1− h) + σ(1− α)− hγcϕ(1 + µ))− λϕσ(1− α)] Γ′′
> [(1− λ)h (γcϕ(1 + µ)(1− h) + σ(1− α))− λϕσ(1− α)h]A2
which, after cancelling and combining like terms, is true providing:
ϕ(1 + µ)(1− h) [(1 + µ) [(1 + ϕ)(1 + (1− λ)h)− h(1− λ(1 + h))]]
ϕ(1 + µ)(1− h) [(1 + ϕ)(1 + λ(ϕ− h))] + σ(1− α)(1 + ϕ)(1 + h)λ(ϕ− h) > 0
which is certainly true when λ < 1/h(1+ϕ), which is the restriction as in the main body
and is not reasonably restrictive, especially when we are restricting to where λ < λ∗.
E.5 Adding distortionary taxation to the model
Taxes on consumption, labour income and employers labour usage can be applied to
the model using a similar procedure as performed in Appendix C.4. Moreover, a capital
tax can be charged such that Ricardian agents’ income from renting capital becomes
(1 − τkt )rktKt−1. Were these amendments to be included in the model the conditions
(E.3), (E.5), (E.8), (E.10), (E.11), (E.12), (E.15), would become, respectively:
kt − nt =
(
wt − pt + τ
er
1 + τ er
τˆ ert
)
− (rkt − pt)
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qt = −
(
rt − Et
{
piPt+1
})
+
1− δ
1− δ + (1− τk)rkEt {qt+1}
+
(1− τk)rk
1− δ + (1− τk)rk
(
rkt+1 − pt+1
)
− τ
krk
1− δ + (1− τk)rk τ
k
t+1
pit = βEt {pit+1}+ (1− βθ)(1− θ)
θ
[(
wt − pt + τ
er
1 + τ er
τˆ ert
)
− (yt − nt)
]
cRt − h · ct−1 = Et
{
cRt+1 − h · ct
}− 1− h
σ
(
rt − Et {pit+1}+ τ
c
1 + τ c
(
τˆ ct − Et
{
τˆ ct+1
}))
(1 + τ c) γc
[
cNRt +
τ c
1 + τ c
τˆ ct
]
=
(
1− τ l
) 1− α
1 + µ
[
wt + n
NR
t −
τ l
1− τ l τˆ
l
]
+ tˆt
piwt = βEt
{
piwt+1
}
+
w − 1
φw
[
ct − h · ct−1
1− h + ϕnt +
τ l
1− τ l τˆ
l
t +
τ c
1 + τ c
τˆ ct − (wt − pt)
]
bˆt = (1 + ρR)
[
bˆt−1 + gˆt − tˆt − τ cγc (τ c + ct)− τ l 1− α
1 + µ
(
τ lt + wt + nt
)
−τ er 1− α
1 + µ
(τ ert + (wt − pt) + nt)− τkrk
K
Y
(
τkt + r
k
t + kt−1
)]
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Appendices to Chapter 7
F.1 Data appendix
Table 21: Chapter 7 data appendix
Variable Description and Source
G Real annual government consumption converted from nomi-
nal figures, where possible, using a GDP deflator, otherwise
using CPI inflation. The measure of government consump-
tion includes all activities that decrease the net worth of the
government as defined by the IMF which includes: expenses;
compensation of employees; use of goods and services; con-
sumption of fixed capital; interest; subsidies and grants; and
social benefits. Data obtained from IMF International Fi-
nancial Statistics (IFS).
GDP Real annual GDP converted, where possible, using a GDP
deflator, otherwise using CPI inflation. Data obtained from
IMF IFS.
GrGDP Average of the annual growth rate of real GDP per capita:
units in percentage terms. Data obtained from Heston et al.
(2009).
InitialGDP Natural log of real GDP per capita, in PPP terms. Data
obtained from Heston et al. (2009).
Log(Edu) Natural log of average years of schooling for individuals
above the age of 15. Data obtained from Barro & Lee (2001).
Log(Fert) The log of the number of births per women, taken from the
World Bank.
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Log(Life) The log of the life expectancy at birth, obtained from the
World Bank.
SPS Size of the public sector measured as the average annual
proportion of government consumption (G) in real GDP
(GDP ). Units are measured in decimals. Authors’ calcula-
tions based on the data obtained from IMF IFS.
Open Average of annual exports plus imports over GDP in con-
stant prices. Unit measured in decimals. Data obtained
from Heston et al. (2009).
GDPVol Standard deviation of the annual growth rates of real GDP
per capita: data obtained from Heston et al. (2009).
ExRVol Exchange rate volatility measured as the standard deviation
in the growth rate of monthly nominal exchange rates be-
tween the country in question and the USA. Data used to
calculate are from IMF IFS.
POLITY Measure of democracy within a given country on a (-10,10)
scale; higher values relating to higher degrees of democracy
and lower values indicating greater degrees of autocracy.
Data are obtained from Henisz (2010).
OPENVol Standard deviation of the annual openness of a country mea-
sured using Open above. Data obtained from Heston et al.
(2009).
pi Value of the GDP deflator in percentage terms. Data ob-
tained from the World Development Indicators of the World
Bank.
CBI Measure of central bank independence obtained from
Cukierman et al. (1992).
CBI’ Measure of central bank independence obtained from
Cukierman et al. (1992) as well as Polillo & Guillen (2005),
where the latter uses the same methodology as the former
to update the statistics.
TURNOVER Variable that measures turnover of the central bank governor
between 1950 and 1989. Data obtained from Cukierman et
al. (1992).
POLCON Average ‘POLCONIII’ score using data obtained from
Henisz (2010).
XCONST Average ‘XCONST’ score using data obtained from Henisz
(2010).
Appendices to Chapter 7 201
Gini The average of available annual Gini coefficients in the rel-
evant time period using data obtained from Deininger &
Squire (1996).
IIRating Average Institutional Investor Ratings for 1979-2002 ob-
tained from Reinhart et al. (2003).
NumDefault Number of periods of external default since 1945; data ob-
tained from Reinhart (2010).
YrsDefault Number of years spent in external default since 1945; data
are obtained from Reinhart (2010).
PDefault Probability of default on sovereign debt computed as the
ratio of the number of years in default to the total num-
ber of years since independence for each nation: authors’
calculations using data from Reinhart (2010).
FiscalVol Standard deviation in the growth rates of government spend-
ing over the relevant period: authors’ calculations using data
from IMF IFS.
Corruption, Accountability, PoliticalStability, GovernmentEffectiveness,
RegulatoryQuality and RuleOfLaw are all variables obtained from Kaufmann
et al. (2009) where the variable names are matched in the source documentation.
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